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frictions for the allocation of control rights over firms (third chapter). 
The first chapter investigates the role of competition between lenders in determining 
how changes in capital requirements passthrough to the cost of credit for firms. 
Exploiting a drop in capital requirements through a Regression Discontinuity Design 
and detailed data on credit relationships from the Bank of Italy’s Credit Register, I 
show that firms with lower switching costs between credit providers experienced a 
much larger drop in the cost of credit as a result of the drop in capital requirements. 
The second chapter focuses on the importance of bank specialization in monitoring 
specific projects for the allocation of control (covenants) and cash flow (cost of credit) 
rights in syndicated lending. Using detailed information on credit relationships in 
the syndicated loan market, I document that banks specialize in lending to specific 
industries and that this specialization is persistent over time. Then, I show evidence 
that specialized banks retain less control rights (laxer covenants) when they arrange 
loans for firms within their specialization sector. Such evidence is coherent with 
information advantage explanations of bank specialization. 
The third chapter studies how credit market frictions affecting younger managers 
can explain the prevalence of senior managers in Italy. Using country-level and firmlevel 
survey data, I document the prevalence of over-65 year old CEO and entrepreneurs 
in Italy; using firm-level data, I show that only in Italy it is the case that firms led 
by younger people are more likely to be denied credit. I then draft a simple general 
equilibrium model of allocation of control rights over firms to study in which cases 
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN BANKING AND CORPORATE FINANCE
Stefano Pietrosanti
Guillermo L. Ordóñez and Michael R. Roberts
This thesis focuses on two themes in the field of empirical corporate finance and
banking. First, the importance of credit market structure for price and non-price
conditions of credit (first and second chapter); second, the importance of financing
frictions for the allocation of control rights over firms (third chapter).
The first chapter investigates the role of competition between lenders in determining
how changes in capital requirements passthrough to the cost of credit for firms.
Exploiting a drop in capital requirements through a Regression Discontinuity Design
and detailed data on credit relationships from the Bank of Italy’s Credit Register, I
show that firms with lower switching costs between credit providers experienced a
much larger drop in the cost of credit as a result of the drop in capital requirements.
The second chapter focuses on the importance of bank specialization in monitoring
specific projects for the allocation of control (covenants) and cash flow (cost of credit)
rights in syndicated lending. Using detailed information on credit relationships in
the syndicated loan market, I document that banks specialize in lending to specific
industries and that this specialization is persistent over time. Then, I show evidence
that specialized banks retain less control rights (laxer covenants) when they arrange
loans for firms within their specialization sector. Such evidence is coherent with
information advantage explanations of bank specialization.
The third chapter studies how credit market frictions affecting younger managers
can explain the prevalence of senior managers in Italy. Using country-level and firm-
level survey data, I document the prevalence of over-65 year old CEO and entrepreneurs
in Italy; using firm-level data, I show that only in Italy it is the case that firms led
by younger people are more likely to be denied credit. I then draft a simple general
equilibrium model of allocation of control rights over firms to study in which cases
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Chapter 1
THE IMPACT OF BANK
REGULATION ON THE COST OF
CREDIT: EVIDENCE FROM A
DISCONTINUITY IN CAPITAL
REQUIREMENTS
By Emilia Bonaccorsi di Patti†, Mirko Moscatelli† and Stefano
Pietrosanti‡
1.1 Introduction
Bank regulators have employed minimum capital requirements to ensure bank solvency
since the introduction of the Basel framework in the 1980s. More recently, minimum
capital requirements have become part of the macro-prudential policy toolkit, which
includes countercyclical changes in mandatory capital buffers to moderate lending
booms in good times and mitigate lending busts in bad times.1
Minimum capital requirements aim to bring bank leverage closer to the socially
optimal level. Banks may engage in excessive leverage because of moral hazard,
†Bank of Italy, Financial Stability Directorate.
‡University of Pennsylvania.
∗The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy, the Eurosystem or
their staffs. All errors are our own.
1For a detailed overview of macro-prudential policy and its tools, we refer to Claessens (2015).
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either induced by limited liability and managerial discretion (Jensen and Meckling
(1976), Myers and Majluf (1984)), or by the distorted incentives arising from deposit
insurance and the implicit or explicit government safety net. Imposing minimum capital
requirements increases shareholders’ stake, thereby reducing the ex ante incentive to
gamble with insured deposits (Kareken and Wallace (1978), Keeley (1990), Dam and
Koetter (2012)).
If capital and debt are not perfect substitutes, capital requirements may come at a
cost. If bank capital is more costly than debt,2 imposing minimum capital requirements
may result in higher interest rates and reduced credit supply. Even though there have
been many attempts at assessing the magnitude of such costs, for example through
model-based simulations (e.g. Kashyap, Stein, and Hanson (2010), Miles, Yang, and
Marcheggiano (2012), Baker and Wurgler (2015)) and through investigation of the
effect of negative shocks to banks’ capital (e.g. Berger and Udell (1994), Peek and
Rosengren (1995), Peek and Rosengren (2000), Behn, Haselmann, and Wachtel (2016)),
little consensus has emerged.
We provide direct evidence regarding such cost in a quasi-experimental setting.
We do so by investigating the effect of a discount in capital requirements of certain
loans, introduced to shield European Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) from
the adverse effects of Basel III tougher regulation. From the impact of such discount
on the spreads of SMEs revolving credit facilities, we infer that a 1 percentage point
decrease in minimum capital requirements causes a 9.5 basis points drop in interest
rates on bank lending. Moreover, we observe that estimates obtained from a restricted
sample of firms with low switching costs result in a larger effect, i.e. a 12.5 to 15.5
basis points drop.
We interpret the increase in the magnitude of the estimates for firms with low
switching costs as a result of lower banks’ monopoly power. This is important, as
it is evidence that banks’ capacity to exert monopoly power on borrowers drives
the pass-through of changes in minimum capital requirements to firms. We suggest
that differences in the credit market structure – such as more concentrated credit
market, greater importance of relationship lending, prevalence of smaller and more
opaque firms – may determine the effectiveness of changes in banks’ capital buffers as
2For theoretical arguments regarding why this may be the case, see e.g. Diamond and Rajan
(2000), Diamond and Rajan (2001), and Dewatripont and Tirole (2012).
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a macro-prudential policy tool.
To obtain our estimates, we collect a rich dataset on bank loans to firms from
the Italian Credit Register. We match the credit information with firm and bank
characteristics, and exploit a change in regulation called Small and Medium Enterprises
Supporting Factor (SME-SF). The SME-SF is a reduction in capital requirements
for certain SMEs loans, introduced on January 1, 2014, through Article 501(1) of
the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR). Thanks to the SME-SF, risk weights
of eligible exposures are reduced by 23.81 percent. Considering a corporate loan to
a SME with a risk weight of 100 percent, and a minimum capital requirement of 8
percent of risk weighted assets, the reduction in the minimum capital requirement is
approximately 2 percentage points.
The regulation and subsequent guidelines by the European Banking Authority
define eligibility in terms of two criteria: (i) the borrower must have a turnover (gross
sales) of less than euro 50 million, and (ii) the bank’s total exposure to that borrower
has to be below euro 1.5 million. Hence, the SME-SF introduces a discontinuous change
in the minimum capital requirement for bank-firm pairs around the two regulatory
thresholds for otherwise similar credit relationships.
Under the assumption that potential confounding factors do not change discon-
tinuously at the eligibility threshold, we can employ the SME-SF eligibility rule to
estimate the effect of capital requirements on lending rates with a Regression Dis-
continuity Design (RDD).3 Through the RDD, we compare credit relationships that
are very similar before the reform, but face different risk weights once the SME-SF
is implemented. To support the validity of such a design, we provide evidence that
firms’, banks’ and relationships’ characteristics do not vary discontinuously at the
SME-SF threshold, and that there is no bunching of credit relationships immediately
below the threshold before the policy implementation.
Our baseline analysis shows that, after the SME-SF implementation, loans that
benefit from the capital charge discount experience an average interest rate reduction
of about 19 basis points compared with loans that are not eligible. As a placebo
3The approach, introduced by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960), is commonly applied both
in labor economics (e.g. Angrist and Lavy (1999), Lalive (2007), Ludwig and Miller (2007)) and in
empirical corporate finance (e.g. Rauh (2006), Chava and Roberts (2008), Keys et al. (2010), Keys,
Seru, and Vig (2012), Baker, Pan, and Wurgler (2012), Agarwal et al. (2017)).
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test, we do not find any significant effect for credit relationships of non-SME firms,
nor for credit relationships of SMEs before the SME-SF implementation. Moreover,
the magnitude of the estimated effect is stable to the inclusion of additional firm,
bank, and relationship control variables. This suggests that, even if local to SME-SF
eligibility threshold, the result does not depend on the observable characteristics of
firm-bank pairs that are close to such threshold (Angrist and Rokkanen (2015)).
Dividing the estimates above by the 2 percentage point discontinuity in capital
requirements implied by the SME-SF, we obtain the average pass-through of 9.5 basis
points per percentage point decrease in the requirements. This is an average impact
estimate, which may only partially reflect the benefit coming to the banks from the
marginal capital requirements relaxation. Banks market power on borrowers can limit
the extent of the pass-through, creating a wedge between the average effect on the
cost of credit, and the marginal value of the relaxation to each bank.
To investigate the matter further, we combine our RDD analysis with the “within”
identification strategy proposed by Khwaja and Mian (2008).4 This strategy uses
firm fixed effects and identifies the impact of the SME-SF exploiting firms with both
eligible and non-eligible relationships around the threshold.5 These relationships are
ex ante virtually identical as they refer to the same borrower and are close to the
threshold before the SME-SF, but become ex post different as a result of the policy.
The fixed-effect estimator addresses the matter of bank market power in two ways.
First, by including firm fixed effects we restrict our estimates to a sub-sample of firms
which already have easily accessible outside options, thus arguably low switching
costs.6 If banks did not lower the cost of the eligible relationships, these firms would
4The within-firm design is the standard in the most recent literature identifying the effects of
bank shocks on credit (e.g. Paravisini (2008), Jiménez et al. (2012), Jiménez et al. (2014), Paravisini
et al. (2014)). This design relies on the assumption that firm-level shocks/unobservable factors
impact all the credit relationships of each firm in the same way (see Paravisini, Rappoport, and
Schnabl (2017)). In our case, we apply it only to a subsample of firms with multiple similar credit
relationships, which mitigates concerns regarding the validity of such assumption.
5Our sample includes about 7, 500 such relationships around the SME-SF assignment threshold,
belonging to 3, 100 firms.
6Evidence of the decreasing relationship between number of relationships and switching costs has
been found, for example, by Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) and Barone, Felici, and Pagnini (2011),
which uses our same data sources. For theoretical works on the effect of banks monopoly power on
the cost of credit, we refer instead to Sharpe (1990), Petersen and Rajan (1994), Petersen and Rajan
(1995).
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be indifferent between using their eligible and non-eligible credit lines, and can thus
credibly walk away. Second, firm fixed effects absorb all firm-level unobservable sources
of disturbance, including differences in bargaining power against lenders which cannot
be easily accounted for.7
The estimates derived from the RDD with firm fixed effects are larger than those
obtained without fixed effects; the interest rate reduction is between 25 and 31 basis
points. We take a number of steps to verify our interpretation of such increase in
magnitudes, i.e. that it is a result of lower banks’ monopoly power. First, if this is the
case, sample selection should play a role per se. Firms with credible outside options
should get larger discounts. Estimating the model again, on the same subsample, but
omitting the fixed effects, we show that sample selection is enough to see an increase in
point estimates. Second, we notice that a larger threshold effect may also come from
a larger increase in rates for non-eligible relationships in the fixed effects subsample.
This, clearly, would be at odds with our interpretation. We compare changes in the
cost of credit for non-eligible relationships between the fixed effects subsample and the
overall sample. We observe that, if anything, the cost of the first grows less than the
cost of the second, backing our interpretation. Third and last, we document how firms
that have observably less bargaining power against their lenders (highly leveraged
firms, or firms with low profitability) do get smaller discounts, coherently with our
logic.
Under the assumption that banks transfer the entire benefit of the capital discount
to borrowers that enjoy lower switching costs, we find that banks would be happy
to pay up to 12.5 - 15.5 cents per one euro of reduction in the capital requirements.
Thus, the upper bound of the benefit from a 1 percentage point decrease in capital
requirements for a firm with a 1 million euro loan would be between 1.25 and 1.5
thousand euro less in terms of interest payments.
Our assessment of the price effect of capital requirements contributes to the
literature on the impact of minimum capital requirements on the supply of credit
(Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek (2016), Behn, Haselmann, and Wachtel (2016),
7We stress that such disturbances should only increase noise in our environment. Firm-level
unobservables would bias the RDD estimates only if discontinuous at the SME-SF assignment
threshold. As all loan, firm, and bank-level characteristics we observe are smooth at such threshold,
the scope for concern appears limited.
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Cerutti, Claessens, and Laeven (2017), Jiménez et al. (2017), Gropp et al. (2018),
Mayordomo and Rodríguez-Moreno (2018)). In particular, we use tools from the
above empirical literature to contribute to the efforts to quantify the costs of capital
regulation (e.g. Kashyap, Stein, and Hanson (2010), Miles, Yang, and Marcheggiano
(2012), Baker and Wurgler (2015)). The magnitude of our results is approximately
in line with the long-run cost literature (see Dagher et al. (2016)), and suggests that
transition costs of capital regulation may be smaller than extrapolations from the
impact of adverse shocks to banks’ capital would imply, but still not negligible.
Our work is closely related to other recent efforts to directly quantify the cost of bank
capital regulation, i.e. Kisin and Manela (2016), Plosser and Santos (2018), Glancy
and Kurtzman (2018). Our assessment of the average pass-through is considerably
larger than the one suggested by the model in Kisin and Manela (2016), which backs
the shadow cost of capital requirements from the extent to which banks exploit a
costly loophole in regulation.8 Our magnitudes are instead closer to the ones suggested
by the two works exploiting quasi-experiments, Glancy and Kurtzman (2018), which
exploits variation coming from the increase in capital requirements applied to risky
commercial real estate loans, and Plosser and Santos (2018), which exploits changes
in capital requirements on long-term vs short-term commitments throughout Basel I
and II implementation.
With respect to Plosser and Santos (2018) and Glancy and Kurtzman (2018),
we add evidence highlighting how the degree of competition between banks can
influence such estimates to a large extent, suggesting an important and under-explored
link between the capital requirements literature and the literature on the effects of
monopoly power within the context of credit relationships (for the latter, see Santos
and andrew (2008), Hale and Santos (2009), Santos and andrew (2019)).9
8For a more in depth discussion of the modeling assumptions that are important to explain Kisin
and Manela (2016) very small estimates, we refer to Plosser and Santos (2018)’s introduction. In
brief, Kisin and Manela (2016) calculation assumes that banks can move freely and at a low cost
assets on their balance sheet to off balance sheet conduits; relaxation of such hypothesis may reconcile
the discrepancy between our findings and theirs.
9For what regards the effects of capital regulation, the only important exception we are aware of is
Corbae and D’Erasmo (2019), which uses a large, general equilibrium model of dynamic monopolistic
competition between lenders to track the effects of regulation on lending concentration, and ultimately
on the cost and availability of credit. A growing literature is instead tackling the importance of banks
monopoly power for the transmission of monetary policy, highlighting similar results (see Agarwal
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Our analysis also sheds light on the use of risk weights as a policy instrument.
Targeted increases in risk weights are being employed more and more within the
framework of macro-prudential policy (Andersen, Johansen, and Kolvig (2012), Al-
tunbas, Binici, and Gambacorta (2018), Hodbod, Huber, and Vasilev (2018)). We
add to the growing literature on the effects of such policies (e.g. Ferrari, Pirovano,
and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016, Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey (2018), Mayordomo and
Rodríguez-Moreno (2018), Lecarpentier et al. (2019)). In particular, Mayordomo and
Rodríguez-Moreno (2018) and Lecarpentier et al. (2019) focus on the SME-SF, finding
positive effects on access to credit for SMEs. Though, they do not investigate the
impact on the cost of credit and its implications.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 provides background information on
the SME-SF and discusses how it should affect the cost of credit, and Section 1.3
describes our data; Section 1.4 explains our identification strategy, and Section 1.5
illustrates the results. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Institutional background
Bank capital requirements are based on three main ingredients: minimum regulatory
capital ratios, risk weights for each asset or asset class, and rules defining what counts
as capital from a prudential perspective. After the onset of the Global Financial Crisis,
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision approved new capital standards (Basel
III) with the purpose of increasing the quantity and quality of the capital buffer that
banks need to hold against their risk weighted assets. The new standards were adopted
in the European Union in June 2013, and came into force on January 1, 2014 (see
European Commission (2013b)); some of the measures were applicable immediately
while others were subject to a gradual phase in.10
The framework put forth by the Basel Committee (BCBS (2011)) requires banks to
hold at least 4.5 percent of risk weighted assets in Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1),11
et al. (2015), Scharfstein and Sunderam (2016), Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2017) and Wang
et al. (2018)).
10On Basel III and its implementation, see BCBS (2011), and the updated summary in BCBS
(2017).
11CET1 mostly includes retained earning and common shares; additional Tier1, includes other
types of shares; Tier2 capital, including some subordinated debt instruments. For a detailed account
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and increases the minimum Tier 1 capital requirement from 4 to 6 percent while
leaving the overall requirement at 8 percent. Under Basel III banks are also required to
hold two additional buffers: the Capital Conservation Buffer and the Countercyclical
Capital Buffer. The first consists of an additional CET1 buffer of 2.5 percent of risk
weighted assets; the second is a CET1 buffer that varies between 0 to 2.5 percent of
risk weighted assets depending on cyclical conditions in the credit market.12
Considering that under the previous framework (Basel II) banks were required to
hold an overall 8 percent capital buffer, while under the new fully phased-in rules the
buffer would be at least 10.5 percent, European banks and other stakeholders raised
the concern that the reform would lead to an excessive tightening of the credit supply,
particularly to SMEs, hampering the recovery of the EU economy.13
In response to this concern, the EU capital regulation adopting Basel III in the
EU (Capital Requirements Regulation - Capital Requirements Directive IV, CRR-
CRD IV henceforth) introduced a Small and Medium Enterprise Supporting Factor
(SME-SF). The SME-SF is a discount of 23.81 percent on the risk weight that applies
to loans granted to firms with turnover below euro 50 million, provided that the total
exposure of the lender to each eligible firm is below euro 1.5 million. The magnitude
of the SME-SF was set to exactly counteract the maximum overall increase in capital
requirements implied by the additional Capital Conservation Buffer.14
The Capital Conservation Buffer was gradually phased in between 2016 and 2019,
but the SME-SF became effective on January 1, 2014. As a consequence, capital
on capital definitions, see BCBS (2011). On Basel III and its implementation, see BCBS (2011), and
the updated summary in BCBS (2017).
12These figures are the fully phased-in buffers; the time-line of implementation is described in
BCBS (2013)).
13For a more detailed comparison between the Basel II and Basel III regimes, we refer Gatzert and
Wesker (2012). Regarding the concern of European stakeholders about the strictness of Basel III’s
rules, we can directly quote from Recital 44 of the CRR (European Parliament (2013)) summarizes
such widespread concern in the following way: “The recovery and future growth of the Union economy
depends largely on the availability of capital and funding to SMEs established in the Union to
carry out the necessary investments to adopt new technologies and equipment to increase their
competitiveness. The limited amount of alternative sources of funding has made SMEs established in
the Union even more sensitive to the impact of the banking crisis. It is therefore important to fill the
existing funding gap for SMEs and ensure an appropriate flow of bank credit to SMEs in the current
context.”
14A 23.81 percent reduction in a pre-reform risk weighted exposure of 100 would exactly compensate
for the increase in the capital ratio: from the 0.08∗100 implied by Basel II, to the equivalent 0.105∗76.19
under the fully phased-in Basel III regime.
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requirements for outstanding and new eligible exposures to SMEs were de facto lowered
with respect to the pre-CRR/CRD IV framework. To give an example of the SME-SF
effect on minimum capital requirements, we consider an average capital requirement
of 8 percent and a pre-SME-SF risk weight of 100 percent. After the implementation
of the SME-SF, the minimum capital requirement on an SME’s credit line utilized for
1.6 million would be unchanged at euro 128, 000. Instead, the minimum requirement
on a 1.4 million SME exposure would amount to 85, 000 euro, taking the SME-SF
into account. Such stark change in minimum capital requirements at the SME-SF
eligibility threshold provides ground to expect an effect on loan pricing.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the SME-SF did influence credit supply for
targeted SMEs. According to the bank Intesa Sanpaolo Group (2015) response to the
Call for Evidence on the SME-SF by the European Banking Authority (EBA):
Despite being difficult to quantify the exact price reduction triggered by
the application of the SMEs supporting factor, a direct relation between
the SMEs SF and the credit price is easy to draw as the cost of regulatory
capital is one of the key components of the credit pricing models. The
possibility of applying the SF on the eligible SMEs exposures significantly
reduces the cost of regulatory capital for such exposures; this capital relief
ensures a direct (positive) effect of the SF on the credit price for SMEs
borrowers.
In the same vein, the German Banking Industry Committee (2015) responded that:
The SMEs Supporting Factor reduces own funds requirements and cuts
the cost of capital. This is all the more important the higher interest rates
climb, because customer price sensitivity then also increases. If interest
rates are expected to rise, cost of capital is thus likely to become more
important [...] A lower cost of capital increases profit margins and makes
SME loans more attractive.
Even so, the initial effort by the EBA (EBA (2016)) to evaluate the effect of the
SME-SF on lending has returned no strong evidence in favor of an effect. However, the
EBA’s analysis is based on survey data and, for this reason, it cannot fully disentangle
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supply from demand, or clearly separate the effect of the SME-SF from the confounding
effects of other aspects of Basel III implementation in Europe.
Two recent studies tackled such identification problems using micro-data, and both
found evidence of a positive effect of the SME-SF on lending. The first, Mayordomo
and Rodríguez-Moreno (2018), finds that the SME-SF contributes to easing credit
constraints of medium-sized firms. The second, Lecarpentier et al. (2019), finds instead
a lagged, positive effect on credit supply, which is stronger for very small loans of
small and micro firms. As both these works find evidence of an effect on credit
supply conditions, we argue that the SME-SF provides a promising testing ground to
improve our understanding of the effects of minimum capital requirement regulation.
In particular, the effect of the SME-SF on rates is still not explored. Our objective in
this paper is the investigation of this aspect, which gives us a chance to learn more
about the broader issue of the cost of capital requirements to banks.
1.3 Data and Measurement
We construct our dataset by matching information on loan quantities and interest
rates from the Italian Credit Register and the from Bank of Italy archive on interest
rates (TAXIA) with balance sheet information on borrowers from Cerved dataset, and
balance sheet information on lenders from the Supervisory Files on banks and banking
groups.
The Italian Credit Register contains detailed information on all loans issued by par-
ticipating intermediaries (banks and other credit intermediaries) above the minimum
threshold of 30, 000 euro, irrespective of whether disbursed or not. Intermediaries
report on a monthly basis information on credit granted, credit drawn, and collateral,
all split by loan category and by credit quality, on a per-firm basis. TAXIA includes
information on interest rates paid by borrowers on loans reported by all but the small-
est banks.15 Interest rates are the actual rates paid by each borrower on disbursed
credit, and are reported both net and gross of commissions and fees. We focus on
the cost of credit net of commissions and fees to avoid distortions due to fixed cost
15The sample is highly representative as the aggregate value of loans of reporting banks is about
80 percent of credit outstanding; banks report data on in interest rates for loans to borrowers that
have at least euro 75, 000 overall granted or disbursed credit.
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components. Finally, Cerved is a proprietary database containing firms’ balance sheet
information, and a credit score; total credit to Cerved firms covers about three fourths
of loans by Italian banks to the nonfinancial corporate sector.
We obtain such information for years 2013− 2014 to investigate the impact of the
reform, and years 2012− 2013 to run placebo tests, and we focus on revolving credit
lines. We focus on interest rates on revolving credit lines as, in Italy, these loans are
relatively standardized and not collateralized, with a rate that is adjustable on short
notice. We adjust our dataset for banks’ mergers applying the group structure of 2014
to 2013 relationships and, of 2013 to 2012 relationships. We also aggregate credit
relationships at the top tier bank holding company level, because capital requirements
are set for the consolidated entity and eligibility for the SME-SF is based on group
exposure.
Our measure of the cost of credit between the pre and the post-SME-SF introduction
is the difference between the average rate paid in 2014 and 2013. We make this choice
as we do not observe when credit lines are re-bargained, but only the resulting change
in rates. Hence, we want to encompass a period of time that is long enough to include
changes in the cost of the line, and short enough such that it can be reasonable to
attribute changes to the implementation of the SME-SF.
Defining Eligibility for the SME-SF
To perform our analysis we need to identify relationships that are eligible according
to the regulation. The SME-SF is applicable to exposures below euro 1.5 million
towards firms with gross sales below euro 50 million, excluding any amount that is
collateralized by residential real estate.16 First, we identify eligible firms employing the
data on gross sales from the Cerved database.17 In a given year, firm size is assessed
using gross sales in the previous year, which is the latest figure that banks can observe
as the current balance sheet will be released several months after the closure of the
16For example, if a bank grants a euro 5 million loan and the firm posts residential real estate
collateral covering euro 4.2 million the risk weight discount would apply because the exposure net of
the collateral is below the threshold.
17This criterion is only one of the three that the European Commission follows to define an SME
in other contexts; the other two are that an SME must employ less than 250 employees, and hold
less than euro 43 million in assets (see European Commission (2003)).
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fiscal year.
We then resort to the Credit Register data to identify SMEs’ credit relationships
that are below the exposure threshold. Eligible relationships are those for which total
credit disbursed is below 1.5 million, regardless of the amount granted. We assess
eligibility as of the end of period t-1 when analyzing the change in loan rates in period
t. This means that we assess the total exposure of credit relationships as of December
31, 2013, while in the placebo tests as of December 31, 2012. The eligibility status we
recover is thus a proxy for being “treated” with the SME-SF. First of all, we notice
that this is the best that can be done, as banks do not report treatment status of
each credit relationship, only aggregate exposure to SME-SF eligible loans. Moreover,
as long as the correlation between this proxy of treatment assignment and actual
treatment assignment is positive and large enough, the effect of mismeasurement will
be the attenuation of our estimates. As credit utilization is sticky, and we estimate
that lowering capital requirements lowers the cost of treated credit relationships, the
above assumption is the most credible.18
We take a number of steps to limit the scope of the mismeasurement concern.
First of all, we rely on the fact that, according to the regulation, each bank has
to verify the eligibility status of its borrowers and report the amount of SME-SF
eligible loans to the supervisors on a quarterly basis.19 This implies that at the end of
the first quarter of 2014 banks that do not have policies in place to track SME-SF
eligibility can be distinguished from banks that are active in exploiting the SME-SF.
We have access to this bank-level information on whether credit relationships eligible
to the SME-SF have been recorded and reported, and we use it to drop banks that do
18Intuitively, if lowering of capital requirements leads to a decrease in rates and our proxy of
treatment is extremely bad, we could estimate a significant increase in the cost of credit for what we
consider eligible relationships. For an extreme example of how this could happen, we can think of the
case in which all observations below threshold at the end of December 2013 end up not being assigned
to the SME-SF, and vice-versa. As we estimate a significant decrease in rates, we can conclude that
we find at worst a lower bound for the actual effect on rates of lowering capital requirements. To the
best of our knowledge, there is comparatively little work on measurement error in RDD settings when
no additional information regarding treatment status is present. One recent paper systematically
addressing the topic is Indarte (2019), to which we refer for a deeper discussion of the matter.
19The more detailed account we could find about the assessment of eligibility is in the answer to
question 2013_417, submitted by an undisclosed bank to the EBA (EBA (2013a)). The EBA indicates
that the requirement must be fulfilled on an ongoing basis, though, the reporting constraint implies
that banks must “report to competent authorities every three months their total SME exposures, on
the basis of adequate current information”.
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not report any SME-SF exposures. Furthermore, as we cannot distinguish between
residential and commercial real estate collateral, we focus on relationships that are not
collateralized and drop the others. Most short term loans, especially revolving loans,
are not collateralized, which limits the selection concerns coming from this restriction.
Finally, we also restrict our attention to relationships in good standing, because banks
cannot apply the capital requirement discount to borrowers that are nonperforming.
Control variables
Our dataset includes information on relationship, borrower and bank characteristics
that could influence the interest rate on loans. We use these variables for two purposes.
The first purpose is to verify that there are no discontinuous changes in observable
characteristics at the SME-SF eligibility threshold; the second is to increase the
precision of our estimate of the impact of the SME-SF, as suggested by Angrist and
Rokkanen (2015).
The first set of controls proxies for the nature of the relationship between the firm
and the bank. It includes the lagged ratio of credit disbursed by bank b to firm f to
total credit utilized by firm f , which proxies for the importance of the bf relationship
to f ; the lagged ratio of loans utilized to loans granted of each bf relationship, which
proxies for the amount of slack that f has in the relationship with b; the ratio of
revolving credit granted to total credit granted for each bf relationship, which captures
the intensity of the relationship as revolving credit lines generate soft information on
the firm (Berlin and Mester (1999)).
Moreover, we include a proxy for the distance between the bank and the firm,
using a dummy indicating whether the firm is located in the same province as the
one where the bank is headquartered or not. The literature finds that proximity
captures availability of soft information about the firm,20 which lowers screening and
monitoring costs for the bank. We also include the duration of the relationship, a
standard proxy for relationship intensity; duration is the number of years we observe
the bank-firm pair, and it is truncated at a maximum value of 9, because the reports
20For example, Petersen and Rajan (2002), Degryse and Ongena (2005), Mian (2006), and more
recently Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) all find that distance is an important factor in determining
credit condition faced by firms.
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from which we extract our dataset start in the year 2005.
The second set of controls proxies for credit risk and other firm characteristics,
including profitability, leverage and liquidity, which banks take into account when they
set interest rates. We measure profitability as gross operating profits, scaled by total
assets (EBITDA Ratio); liquidity is measured as liquid assets scaled by total assets;
leverage is computed as the ratio of debt to the sum of debt and equity. Furthermore,
to capture credit risk on top and above leverage, we include a score based on the
methodology proposed by Altman (1968), computed by Cerved. The score takes values
from 1 to 9, increasing in credit risk. To exploit such information in our regressions, we
include a dummy identifying firms with scores above 6, considered risky in the Cerved
methodology. Finally, to proxy for industry and regional specific characteristics, we
include industry dummy variables based on the two-digit Statistical Classification
of Economic Activities adopted by the EU,21 and region dummy variables for the
location of the firms’ headquarters (North West, North East, Center and South).
The third and last set of controls is meant to capture banks’ characteristics that
are likely to influence the cost of loans, particularly funding and capitalization. We
collect the following bank variables: Tier 1 capital ratio, the ratio of liquid assets to
total assets, the fraction of assets funded with retail funding sources, the fraction of
assets funded with wholesale funding excluding central bank funding. We also include
the log of total assets to control for bank size.
Data Description
Matching firms from Cerved and loan data from the Credit Register yields approx-
imately 515, 000 bank-firms pairs for 2014, of which 253, 000 have information on
interest rates. Among these, 235, 000 are eligible relationships of eligible firms (most
Italian firms are SMEs); approximately 7, 000 observations are instead non-eligible
relationships of eligible firms.
We also keep data on non-eligible firms to run placebo regressions; 7, 000 such
observations refer to relationships by non-eligible firms that were below the eligibility
threshold at the end of December 2013, while 4, 000 are relationships by non-eligible
firms that were above the eligibility threshold at the same date.
21See EUROSTAT (2016).
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In Figures 1.2 and 1.3 we show the scatter plot of observations around the two
SME-SF assignment thresholds (firms turnover and exposure). The plots show that
although there are significantly fewer observations referring to large firms with large
amounts of disbursed credit (fourth quadrant in Figure 1.1), coverage of the treatment
space is sufficiently uniform, particularly if we focus on SMEs.
We report descriptive statistics regarding SMEs’ relationships characteristics in
treated (2014-2013) and placebo (2013-2012) samples in Tables 1.1 and 1.3 respectively;
for non-SME firms (used as further placebo), we report statistics in Tables 1.2 and
1.4; moreover we report firms’ characteristics in Tables 1.5 and 1.6; banks’ in Tables
1.7 and 1.8. The information on the changes in interest rates pertain to the SME-SF
implementation window (2014-2013), and to the placebo window of (2013-2012). The
control variables are instead measured as of the end of 2013 for the implementation
time window, and as of the end of 2012 for the placebo time window.
The descriptive statistics on banks’ balance sheets (Tables 1.7 and 1.8) show
that, on average, banks’ balance sheets became stronger over time as Retail Funding,
Liquidity and the CET1 ratio slightly increased. Although interest rates increased
more in 2014 than 2013 (Tables 1.1 and 1.2 for 2014, vs Tables 1.3 and 1.4 for 2013),
the relationship data suggest that only for SMEs and only in the 2014-2013 time
window the cost of credit increased less on eligible than on non-eligible relationships
(Table 1.1, and Table 1.3 for SMEs, and Tables 1.2 and 1.4 for non-SMEs). All firms’
characteristics but leverage, instead, were similar in the two periods (Table 1.5 for
2014, and Table 1.6 for 2013).
Interestingly, as non-eligible lines of non-SMEs have grown in cost by 10 basis
points less than non-SMEs eligible lines, while for SMEs the opposite is true, we
can derive a rough approximation of the SME-SF’s impact. This is around 20 basis
point lower cost for treated credit lines, which is basically the same result we obtain
through our Regression Discontinuity Design. The estimation of the effect by regression
discontinuity is though crucial, as the result of this back of the envelope calculation
may well reflect differences between large and small lines that are not related to the
SME-SF.
For example, as shown in Tables 1.1 and 1.3, eligible relationships are younger
relationships, have a higher share of revolving loans, and have a lower drawn to granted
15
ratio. Such heterogeneity suggests that, across all the sample, demand and supply
shocks unrelated to the SME-SF are likely to affect such relationship heterogenously
and may well account for different patterns of change in the interest rate payed by
firms.22 In the next section, we describe the details of our approach to estimate the
causal effects of the SME-SF based on Regression Discontinuity Design, and discuss
evidence supporting its validity.
1.4 Empirical strategy
As the SME-SF eligibility threshold impinges on credit utilization, it is difficult to
derive the causal effect of the capital requirement discount on credit supply through
changes in credit quantities. On the one hand, after the implementation of the policy,
SMEs with marginally eligible credit lines might have an incentive to keep their credit
utilization below the eligibility threshold; on the other hand, firms with marginally
non-eligible loans might have an incentive to reduce their credit utilization to benefit
from a lower cost on their overall credit exposure. We thus focus on the change in the
interest rate, as, at difference with credit drawn, it is not related to the eligibility for
the SME-SF, and cannot be directly manipulated by the borrower.
Identification challenges
Consider a set of banks b = 1, ..., B who lend to firms f = 1, ..., F ; each firm f can
borrow from different banks. There are two periods, before and after the introduction
of the SME-SF. For each bank-firm relationship, there is a pricing function chosen
by the bank. The cost of credit by bank b to firm f at time t, ibft, is a function of a
number of factors that may change over time for reasons other than the SME-SF:
ibft = f
(
Mbf , Dbft, Sbft, Rbft
)
(1.1)
where Mbf represents all the determinants of the cost of credit that are constant over
time, and specific to the relationship.
22For extensive discussion of how relationship level heterogeneity can interact with demand and
supply shocks and mediate their effects, we refer to Paravisini et al. (2014), and Paravisini, Rappoport,
and Schnabl (2017).
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Dbft collects time-varying borrower characteristics, including unobservable changes
in the risk of the borrower and in the demand for credit. For example, f may experience
a negative shock that induces the banks that grant credit to f to consider it riskier
and raise the interest rate that f pays. A shock to firm demand might produce similar
results on prices.23 Sbft denotes time-varying bank characteristics, including changes
in unobservable factors affecting credit supply, such as shocks to the cost of funding
or to capital, which would cause a rise in ibft, and/or a reduction in quantity of credit
supplied.24 Finally, Rbft is the regulatory capital charge, i.e. the amount of regulatory
capital that the bank b has to set aside at time t on the loan granted to firm f .
Our goal is to estimate the effect of a change in Rbft on the cost of credit, exploiting
the change induced by the SME-SF on the subset of eligible relationships. To clarify
which identification challenges we need to address, we consider estimating this effect
with the following regression model:
∆ibf = α + βRbf + εbf (1.2)
where the effect of the SME-SF would be captured by the coefficient β of a dummy
Rbf equal to 1 if the risk weight applied to the loan to firm f by bank b at time
t = post benefits from the SME-SF (the relationship bf is treated), 0 otherwise (the
relationship bf is not treated). The treatment status of the bf relationship depends
on the joint condition of the firm being an SME and the exposure of b to f being
below the eligibility threshold. Finally, εbf is the residual term, and the regression is
specified in terms of changes ∆ibf , so that all the variation stemming from observable
and unobservable sources of heterogeneity that are fixed over time are removed.
Dropping the t subscript and focusing on the linear framework, we can see that
the residual εbf includes three main components: εbf = D∗bf + S∗bf + ebf . D∗bf and
S∗bf capture any variation due to demand and supply factors not explained by the
regression variables, while ebf is an idiosyncratic error component. The estimate of
β from Equation 1.2 would be a biased estimate of the effect of the SME-SF on the
23Here we use the bft notation instead of the ft since we are not assuming that such demand-side
shocks affect equally all the relationships of the same firm f .
24The overall effect of the Basel III reform on bank credit supply conditions would be captured
by the Sbft term. Again, we are using the bft notation, and not bt, as we are not starting from the
assumption that supply-side disturbances affect the different relationships of the same bank equally.
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cost of credit if any of the confounding factors included in εbf are correlated with Rbf .





6= 0 if eligible relationships (Rbf = 1) are systematically af-
fected by supply shocks that are different from those affecting non-eligible relationships.
For example, SMEs tend to borrow more frequently from small banks; if the Basel III
rules implied a larger increase in capital requirements for small banks, the borrowers
of these banks might experience an increase in interest rates that would compensate
part or all of the benefit from the SME-SF, and the β̂ would be biased downwards by
the non-random matching between firms and banks.25




6= 0, which could occur if
firms with eligible exposures face demand shocks that differ from those of firms with
non-eligible exposures. We cannot rule out this hypothesis because eligibility is based
not only on firm size but also on the volume of outstanding credit. A firm that borrows
more than 1.5 million before the SME-SF implementation is likely to have a higher
demand for credit than a similar firm that utilizes a significantly smaller amount of
credit. If demand shocks are positively correlated over time, the first firm would be
more likely to increase its demand for credit and, consequently, to face an increase in
the interest rate. A systematically higher incidence of interest rates increases for firms
with non-eligible credit lines would bias upwards β̂, without any causal relationship
with the SME-SF.
The recent literature on the impact of bank-level shocks on credit supply usually
follows an identification strategy based on a difference-in-difference plus fixed effects
approach. Identification is achieved using observations referring to firms borrowing
from more than one bank, some “shocked” and some not, and controlling for demand-
side confounding factors with firm fixed effects.26 This strategy requires the assumption
that any unobserved confounding factor affects equally all the credit relationships of
the same firm.27
25This is possible because typically small banks do not use internal risk weighting models, but
rely on the standardized approach to calculate risk weighted assets and capital requirements (Behn,
Haselmann, and Wachtel (2016)).
26One of the first examples of such approach in a banking context is Khwaja and Mian (2008);
other studies are Jiménez et al. (2012), Schnabl (2012), Chodorow-Reich (2013), Jiménez et al. (2014),
Jiménez et al. (2017), Amiti and Weinstein (2018), Jiménez et al. (2019), Morais et al. (2019).
27If cov(D∗bf , Rbf ) 6= 0 and our objective was to identify the effect of a bank shock accounting for
unobservable and correlated demand disturbances, firm fixed effects would capture such disturbances
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In the case of the SME-SF, it is not plausible to assume that all eligible and
non-eligible relationships are affected by the same demand and supply shocks even for
the same firm. If we compared all non-eligible relationship with eligible ones within
firms with multiple banks, we would be including in the comparison relationships that
are very heterogeneous (some very small, some very large). Banks might be pricing
large loans differently from small loans, and firms might withdraw more credit from
“preferred” relationships in case of unexpected needs (demand shocks) but hold some
backup credit lines that are not often utilized (Sette and Gobbi (2015)).
We address the issue of comparability using a local approach based on Regression
Discontinuity Design (RDD), exploiting the fact that the treatment status is defined
by an arbitrary threshold on a continuous variable. If bank-level and firm-level
confounding factors do not vary discontinuously around the threshold, we can use
the untreated relationships that are close to the threshold as counterfactuals for the
treated relationships that are close to threshold, and attribute any discontinuous
change in the cost of credit (∆ibf) between the two types of relationships to the
SME-SF policy.
Given the richness of our data we can take a number of steps to show that concerns
about RDD validity are reasonably limited. First, there is no evidence of bunching
of relationships at the SME-SF threshold, suggesting that no manipulation of the
assignment variable was performed; moreover, we can show that bank, firm, and
relationship level characteristics vary smoothly at the threshold, confirming that no
evident sign of sorting is detectable (see Section 1.4 for details).
An advantage of RDD with respect to the diff-in-diff plus fixed effects approach is
that we do not need to focus only on firms borrowing from multiple banks - which
would force us to drop smaller firms that are the target of the SME-SF. The cost of
using RDD is that the estimate will apply only locally to credit relationships near the
threshold. We therefore perform multiple robustness tests to examine whether the
estimates are robust, or depend on local observations characteristics. We provide this
evidence in Section 1.5.
if and only if cov(D∗bf , Rbf ) = ηf for every f . Conversely, if we were concerned about supply-side
unobservable confounders cov(S∗bf , Rbf ) 6= 0, then bank fixed effects would remove them if and only
if cov(S∗bf , Rbf ) = ηb for every b.
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Estimating the SME-SF effect - a Regression Discontinuity
Design
Ideally, to elicit the effect of the SME-SF on the cost of credit, we would need to
observe identical credit relationships of the same firm f with the same bank b, some
of which are randomly “treated” with the SME-SF and some of which are not.28 The
difference in the cost of credit between treated and untreated relationships would
measure the effect of the SME-SF. The design of the SME-SF allows us to get close
to this ideal, because the discontinuity in assignment can be exploited to achieve
identification through an RDD.29
RDD does not require perfect randomization in the treatment assignment, but only
a sharp change in the probability of treatment induced by the existence of a threshold
on a continuous assignment variable. Sufficient condition for obtaining a valid causal
estimate of the effect of a treatment is the validity of the relatively weak assumption
that all possible confounders are continuous at the threshold defining the treatment
assignment rule, plus lack of manipulation of the threshold by treatment takers.30
Eligibility for the SME-SF is based on a bi-dimensional assignment rule (see Figure
1.1) that takes into account firm gross sales (turnover) and the credit disboursed
by the bank to the firm. As stated in Section 1.3, the turnover threshold is part of
the criteria that define an SME for other policies in the EU. We thus cannot use it
for identification, as it is highly likely there are other confounding factors that vary
discontinuously at this threshold. Instead, we focus on SMEs (i.e., firms below such
turnover threshold), and implement a RDD around the euro 1.5 million exposure
threshold.
28From now on, the treatment is the SME-SF, treated observations are credit relationships elgiible
to the SME-SF policy, and non-treated viceversa.
29The RDD strategy was first employed by education policy researchers more than half a century
ago (Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960)). It has become increasingly popular in the corporate
finance literature. For example, RDD has been used to study the sensitivity of investment to internal
funds by Rauh (2006), the effect of financial frictions on corporate investment by Chava and Roberts
(2008), the effect of credit scores on loan securitization by Keys et al. (2010) and Keys, Seru, and
Vig (2012), the effects of reference prices on firms merger and acquisition strategies in Baker, Pan,
and Wurgler (2012), pass through of credit expansion policies in Agarwal et al. (2017).
30Manipulation of the assignment variable would imply that all the manipulators are on one side
of the threshold, which would violate the continuity assumption. For technical details, see Hahn,
Todd, and Klaauw (2001). Reviews of recent applications of RDD are Imbens and Lemieux (2008),
Lee and Lemieux (2010), Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014), Skovron and Titiunik (2015)
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The SME-SF treatment consists in the reduction in the risk weight, and the
assignment variable is the total amount of credit disbursed by bank b to firm f before
policy implementation, while the outcome variable is the change in the cost of credit
by bank b to firm f after the SME-SF implementation. Using changes is consistent
with the difference-in-difference within approach of Khwaja and Mian (2008) that we
also implement to examine robustness in Section 1.5 below.
Conditional on meeting the turnover eligibility criterion, the treatment probability
changes sharply at the exposure threshold:
xbf = drawn credit
Eligibilitybf = Rbf =
1 if x2013bf ≤ x̄ = euro 1.5 million0 otherwise
The change from 1 to 0 of the treatment probability defines a sharp RDD.
Our main estimating equation is:
∆ibf = a+ φ
+(|x2013bf − x̄|) + φ−(|x2013bf − x̄|) + βRbf + νbf
Estimated on bf : xbf ∈ [x̄− h−, x̄+ h+]
(1.3)
where h−, h+ delimit the bandwidth of choice, selected using data-driven methods, as
explained in Section 1.5. Here, a is a common intercept; φ+,−(.) are smooth polynomial
component in the distance from threshold (+ on the right, − on the left), meant to
control for disturbances that vary continuously with credit utilization; β is the bias
corrected (bias due to bandwidth choice) parameter of interest, measuring the effect
of the treatment; νbf is a stochastic error component.
Identification by RDD and the continuity assumption
An RDD strategy achieves identification of the treatment of interest, β, when
lim
xbf→x̄−
E[∆ibf (1)|xbf ]− lim
xbf→x̄+
E[∆ibf (0)|xbf ] = β (1.4)
In the vicinity of the threshold, the “jump” between the expected interest rate change
below threshold, E[∆ibf(Rbf = 1)|xbf ], and above threshold E[∆ibf(Rbf = 0)|xbf ]
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isolates the impact of the SME-SF. Identification is achieved if both the conditional
expected outcome functions are continuous at the assignment threshold, i.e. if and
only if the following holds:
Continuity Assumption: for every value ofRbf ∈ {0, 1}, E[∆ibf (Rbf )|xbf ]
is continuous in xbf at x̄.
From Equation 1.2 and using the notation in Section 1.4 on demand and supply
confounders, we can write:




bf |Rbf = 1, xbf
]
+ β




bf |Rbf = 0, xbf
]











bf |Rbf = 1, xbf
]
= φ−(|xbf−x̄|), for some smooth functions
φ+,− whose limits at x̄ exist and coincide. If this is true, then:
lim
xbf→x̄−
E[∆ibf (1)|xbf ]− lim
xbf→x̄+
E[∆ibf (0)|xbf ] = φ−(0)− φ+(0) + β = β
i.e. 1.4 is verified. Violation of the continuity assumption, instead, would invalidate
the design because we would not be able to claim that the discontinuity depends solely
on the treatment.
It is important to notice that the assumption of continuity at threshold above is less
restrictive than the assumption of a bias unrelated to any relationship characteristic,
required by the fixed effect diff-in-diff strategy widely employed in the recent literature.
Although we cannot directly test the validity of the continuity assumption, there are
tests that can be performed to mitigate concerns that Equation 1.4 is not a correct
description of reality.
Evidence supporting continuity
We provide two types of evidence to support the assumption of continuity. The first
type is direct evidence of absence of manipulation of the assignment variable (McCrary
(2008)); the second, is evidence of the absence of a discontinuity at the threshold
for relevant exogenous variables (e.g., see Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Lee and
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Lemieux (2010)). Any evidence of manipulation or discontinuity in covariates would
raise the concern of sorting around the threshold, which would invalidate the design.
Below we show that there is no evidence of manipulation or discontinuity in relevant
covariates in our data.
Manipulation
If the subjects under study were aware of the treatment before its introduction,
and could perfectly manipulate the forcing variable, they would be able to sort on
their preferred side of the threshold. Sorting could correlate with some unobserv-
able characteristic of subjects, implying that such unobservable characteristic varied
discontinuously at the threshold, invalidating the continuity assumption.
In principle, one could argue that firms that are more informed anticipate the
policy and adjust marginal credit relationships below the eligibility threshold to benefit
from the capital charge discount. If these firms were the better managed ones - they
were aware of relevant policy changes - they would also plausibly be able to negotiate
lower interest rates for reasons other than the SME-SF. Alternatively, one could think
that banks that are facing a capital shortage might inform their corporate borrowers
of the SME-SF, encouraging them to lower their exposure to bring it below 1.5 million,
for example by posting additional collateral.
A first counterargument is that, in practice, the demand for credit of firms is
subject to unforeseen shocks that can move marginal credit relationships on the two
sides of the SME-SF eligibility threshold. The policy is based on the notion of exposure,
which includes also exposure generated by contingent liabilities such as guarantees
and letters of credit provided by banks. The unpredictability of liquidity demand is
supported by evidence that firms hold significant amounts of unused credit lines to
meet unexpected needs. In our sample, the average ratio of credit disbursed to credit
granted is 53 percent (see Table 1.1). Furthermore, fluctuations of real collateral values
also affect the value of exposure that counts towards eligibility. Perfect manipulation
would be difficult.
A second counterargument is that, even if firms could manage exactly their exposure
at all times, manipulating would require ex ante knowledge of the exact eligibility
threshold. We note that before the approval of the SME-SF regulation there was
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considerable uncertainty about the eligibility threshold that would have been applied,
and on how exposure had to be computed. Although the discussion on the SME-SF
began in 2012, regulators initially considered “a reduction by one third of the risk
weight for the retail exposure class and an increase of the threshold for retail from
euro 1 million to euro 5 million for SMEs ” (EBA (2016)). The 1.5 million exposure
threshold appeared in the final draft that was approved the 26th of June 2013,31 but
banks were uncertain about the criteria they had to follow to compute the eligible
exposure until after the beginning of 2014.32 We can thus conclude that banks were
unlikely to be ready to identify eligible exposures with sufficient advance, and to
have incentivised marginally ineligible customers to reduce their exposure below the
threshold. It is also unlikely that firms were able to target their exposure before the
introduction of the SME-SF.
To support our case, we also test for manipulation following McCrary (2008).
When the incentive to manipulate goes in one clear direction, a discontinuity in the
density of observations around the threshold should be observable. If firms prefer to be
eligible, and there are enough firms that are informed, we should observe significantly
less marginally non-eligible relationships than the marginal eligible ones. A simple
density test can highlight a statistically significant drop in the density just above the
SME-SF threshold.
We run the test on the density with respect to the amount of credit outstanding
both in the treatment (2013− 2014) and placebo samples (2012− 2013). We do so
to reject manipulation since the beginning of the discussion on the SME-SF in 2012.
The test does not detect any statistically significant discontinuity in the density of
31The SME-SF timeline is: first official record in a “proposal for a regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on prudential requirements for credit institutions” dated 12 June 2012,
in which a 2 million limit was discussed (European Parliament (2012)); the proposal was assessed
by the EBA in September 2012, which (EBA (2012)) focused on the possibility of increasing the
retail threshold to euro 2 million for banks calculating their capital requirement with the Standard
Approach, and to euro 5 million for banks calculating their capital requirement with the Internal
Ratings Based Approach; the Commission proposal was then brought to final debate in the European
institutions during spring 2013 (for example, see the March 2013 EU Commission - European
Commission (2013a) -, where, we notice, there is no direct reference to the euro 1.5 million threshold);
the reform is finally approved in June 2013 (European Parliament (2013)).
32As in Section 1.3, we refer to the EBA Q&A, which included questions submitted until the 27th
of November 2013, and to which answers were provided well into the 2nd quarter of 2014 (see EBA
(2013a) and EBA (2013b)).
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observations at the threshold in either sample, as shown in Figures 1.4, 1.5 and in
Table 1.9.
Discontinuity of covariates
Even in the absence of evidence of manipulation, it could be possible that relationships,
firms, or banks with specific characteristics were more likely to appear on one side of the
threshold than the other. We estimate the same specification as Equation 1.3 replacing
the dependent variable with each of the relationship, firm or bank variables described
in Section 1.3, to detect any significant discontinuity at the eligibility threshold. We
show a simple comparison of means (polynomial of order 0), and regressions with
polynomials in the forcing variable of orders 1 and 2. The results, shown in Tables
1.10, 1.11, and 1.12, do not support the existence of discontinuities at the SME-SF
threshold for any of the covariates.
1.5 Results
We start inspecting the behavior of raw data on interest rates around the SME-SF
eligibility threshold. In order to do so, we show fit and confidence intervals from
local kernel regressions of changes in interest rates (dependent variable) on past credit
utilization of firm f from bank b, in a neighborhood of the SME-SF threshold.33
The plots show that in 2014 interest rates increased on average, most likely because
the implementation of Basel III increased the overall cost of credit, and the increase is
larger than the ones occurred in 2013. More importantly, only in 2014 and for the
SMEs sample, there is a evidence of a discontinuity in the interest rate changes at the
policy threshold. Which is, the price of credit relationships that were not eligible to
the SME-SF discount in December 2013 appears to grow more than the price of their
eligible counterparts. This, only for SME firms at the SME-SF threshold (Figure 1.6).
33Such neighborhood is selected employing the mean square error minimization method documented
in Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) In particular, we perform the necessary computations
in Stata, employing the last available version of the rdrobust package, described in Calonico et al.
(2017), and constraint the width of the eligible and non-eligible intervals to be equal for clarity
of graphical presentation. As our data continuously decrease in density with the increase in the
dimension of the credit lines, this choice is not the most conservative, and we remove such restriction
when we compute the discontinuity point estimates in order to quantify the average effect.
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Local fits for the 2012-2013 sample, or at placebo thresholds inspected at the same
time as the SME-SF implementation, or for non-SME (Figure 1.6 and 1.7), do not
show comparable “jumps” in the behavior of rates.
This evidence is suggestive of an effect of the policy, but in order to get a precise
idea of the significance and magnitude of the effect we need to compute discontinuity
point estimates and confidence intervals corrected for the bias coming from bandwidth
selection (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014)). To do so, we estimate Equation
1.3 as a local polynomial regression, using the Stata routine based on Calonico,
Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014) and Calonico et al. (2019), and described in Calonico
et al. (2017).
In order to drive a clear link between our estimation procedure and the framework
introduced in Equation 1.3, for expositionary purpose we focus on the local linear
specification case (as in Hahn, Todd, and Klaauw (2001)). The expected value of
interest rate changes conditional on eligibility for the SME-SF can be expressed as
E[∆ibf (1)|xbf ] = a− + b−(|x2013bf − x̄|) for observations whose past exposure x2013bf was
below the threshold; E[∆ibf(0)|xbf ] = a+ + b+(|x2013bf − x̄|) for observations whose
past exposure x2013bf was above the threshold. We want then to estimate a+/− and
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where h+/− are again data-driven bandwidth limits, allowed to be different on the two
sides of the threshold,34 and K is a triangular kernel weight function.35
34As our sample density continuously decreases with relationship’s size, we allow the bandwidth
to be different on either side of the threshold for all our reported point estimates of the discontinuity.
Such choice is the most conservative, and results are robust (and larger) if the alternative option of
constraining the bandwidth to be equal on the two sides is chosen.
35The triangular kernel weight function has been shown by Cheng, Fan, and Marron (1997) to
minimize the worst case mean squared error for a continuous assignment variable.
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The results are displayed in the first row of Table 1.13 using local linear and
quadratic polynomials;36 for the main result table we also report, as further robustness,
the estimates obtained from a simple weighted comparison of means (degree 0 polyno-
mial specification). Our estimates show that there is a statistically significant sharp
difference in the change in interest rates between eligible and non eligible relationships,
only for SMEs, and only at the moment of SME-SF implementation. The magnitude
of the difference is approximately 19 basis points, with very little difference between
the first and second degree specification.
Robustness and Placebos. For robustness purposes we repeat the estimation
including bank, firm and relationship characteristics as further independent variables.
Even though these controls do not vary discontinuously at the eligibility threshold (as
we have shown in Section 1.4), their inclusion can increase precision and also provide
information on the effect of heterogeneity in observable characteristic on our coefficient
of interest. As suggested by Angrist and Rokkanen (2015), including control variables
can mitigate concerns of lack of external validity of RDD estimates.
Furthermore, we observe that our relationships are stratified at the firm and bank
level. The main correlation concern is at the firm level, as it is reasonable to think that
decisions on the pricing of loans of the same firm are taken by the same team based on
the same set of information (e.g. leverage, profitability, credit score). For this reason,
every result in the robustness section is computed clustering the standard errors at
the firm level. We thus obtain the results displayed in Table 1.14. The estimated
effects are very similar to our baseline results without the inclusion of covariates - a
discontinuity of approximately 18.5 basis points - while statistical significance remains
unchanged.
Another test addresses the possibility that other policies already in place may
be affecting differently relationships below and above the threshold of the SME-SF.
Access to credit for Italian SMEs has been supported by different policy interventions.
There are two main programs at this purpose,37 the Nuovo Plafond PMI Investimenti
and the Fondo Centrale di Garanzia. None of such programs, to the best of our
knowledge, impinges on the same exposure threshold as the SME-SF.
36For arguments in favor of focusing on the results of low degree (first and second) local polynomial
specifications see Andrew and Imbens (2017).
37For details on such programs, we refer to Infelise (2014).
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As both of these programs were already active as of December 2013, we check that
no other discontinuity at the SME-SF threshold was present for ∆ibf in 2012-2013 by
repeating the estimation of (1.3) on the pre-treatment period. As shown in Tables
1.13 and 1.16, none of the specifications detect a statistically significant discontinuity
in the change in interest rates between 2012-2013 for relationships with credit drawn
above and below euro 1.5 million at the end of 2012.
Finally, there could be some alternative driver of our result, having to do with small
credit relationships. It is unlikely for small credit relationship to be less pricey or less
subject to price increase, as fixed costs hit them more heavily, but we may entertain
the possibility that capital constrained banks see them as less capital consuming in
general, no matter the SME-SF. If enough banks would treat the euro 1.5 million in
terms of past exposure as a rule of thumb to classify small credit lines, we may have a
spurious driver of our results.
If this were the case, though, we should find a discontinuity at the threshold also
for firms that are not SMEs according to the definition of the SME-SF. We run a
placebo test estimating Equation (1.3) on firms with turnover above euro 50 million.
The placebo regressions shows that there is no such discontinuity, no matter the
specification (see Tables 1.13 and and 1.16).
How competition affects the pass-through
Even if the main result captures the average pass-through from the SME-SF to the
cost of credit, this does not mean that it reflects the full extent of the benefit to banks
from such capital requirement discount. Indeed, as firms are small with respect to
banks, and SMEs in particular have difficulties replacing banks’ credit, it is reasonable
to suspect that the average pass-through does not fully reflect the implicit benefit to
banks from the SME-SF. In order to further investigate how the degree of borrower
lock-in affects our result we modify our main specification by adding firm fixed effects.
We argue that this limits the extent of the problem in two ways. First, by demeaning
observations at the firm level, we absorb all observable sources of heterogeneity that
can affect our results, included differences in firms bargaining power. Furthermore, by
restricting our identification to firms that have multiple relationships, some eligible and
some not, in the vicinity of the SME-SF threshold, we are restricting our estimation to
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a subsample of firms that have a very easy way in substituting credit. In this Section,
we show how doing so increases the magnitude of the result, and we show multiple
pieces of evidence in favor of the interpretation that lower monopoly power by banks
on such borrowers is the driver of this increase in magnitudes.
The implementation of a within RD estimation with high dimensional fixed effects
requires some adjustment to the estimation procedure. To perform the within RD,
we select the bandwidth using Calonico et al. (2019), then construct triangular
kernel weights on the basis of such bandwidths, and finally estimate a weighted fixed
effect regression using the routine described in Correia (2016), useful to handle high
dimensional fixed models.38 In Table 1.16, we can observe how the magnitude of
the point estimates increase to values ranging between 25 and 31 basis points, while
statistical significance increases.
There are two possible explanations for such increase in the point estimates.
The first is that the firm fixed effects are absorbing some attenuation bias due to
unobservables, which may or may not be due to borrower lock-in with the creditor;
the second, that the sample selection imposed by the fixed effect estimator is focusing
our attention on a subsample for which the SME-SF pass-through is larger.
In order to understand which of the two is the actual driver, we estimate again the
model on the subset of observations for which the fixed effect estimator of the SME-SF
treatment is identified, but omitting the fixed effects. We run local regressions using
observations belonging to firms that have at least two relationships, one eligible for the
SME-SF and one not, in the neighborhood of the eligibility threshold selected through
the data-driven algorithm. Results of such estimation are shown in Table 1.17, and
highlight even larger effects, suggesting that sample selection, and not the control of
attenuation bias through fixed effects, drives the increase in the point estimates.
Still, the fact that the estimates are larger for the fixed effects subsample may
38We make this choice as the rdrobust Stata routine (Calonico et al. (2019)) does not provide a
way to directly handle high dimensional fixed effects. This would imply that, to keep working within
rdrobust framework, one should create thousands of firm identifier dummies and feed them to the
model, and manually drop local singleton observations for clustered error cases (Correia (2015)). As
the reghdfe performs all such steps automatically, we consider it to be the least ad-hoc option at our
disposal. The cost of doing so are point estimates and standard errors that are not corrected for bias
as when using Calonico et al. (2019). As such correction has very low impact on our main results
(see Table 1.15, which omits the correction), we argue that the scope for concern can be considered
limited.
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be caused by two possible reasons. On the one hand, it may be the case that the
rates on eligible credit lines of such firms indeed grow less; on the other hand, it may
also be true that the rates on non-eligible relationships of such firms grow more. We
thus check that the increase in the estimated SME-SF impact is not due to higher
increase in the rates of non-eligible credit relationships of the firms in the fixed effects
subsample. In Table 1.18 we show the result of a comparison in rate changes for
non-eligible credit relationships of firms in and out the fixed effects subsample. Across
different specifications, we can see that firms in the subsample experience changes in
rates that are in line with other firms’ (or smaller). We can thus conclude that the
SME-SF effect on eligible relationships appears to be stronger in the firm fixed effects
subsample.
The fact that sample selection from the firm fixed effect strategy is enough to see
an increase in the result, substantiates the interpretation of the increase in magnitude
of point estimates as coming from higher bargaining power of firms in the subsample
where the fixed-effect estimator is identified. If firms borrowing from a single bank were
locked in a monopolistic relationship with their lender, the latter would not necessarily
transfer the benefit stemming from the SME-SF to the firm. The pass-through would
instead be larger for firms that can switch between existing relationships, which limits
banks capacity to extract rents.39
The subsample on which the local fixed effect estimator of the treatment effect is
identified is composed by such firms that have multiple similar relationships, at least
one of which eligible, and one not. Hence, they are exactly the firms that are less
likely to be captured by a relationship lender, as they have other credit relationships
that are close substitutes.
Heterogeneity driven by firm observables
As a further check of our intuition that competition between lenders determines the
pass-through, we look also to how firm-level observables drive heterogeneity in the
estimates. If it is true that borrower-capture by banks is attenuating the extent of the
pass-through, and the increase in magnitude of the pass-through we observe under
39For theoretical work arguing in this sense, see Rajan (1992) and Von Thadden (2004). Evidence
coherent with such theoretical work has been provided, for example, in Detragiache, Garella, and
Guiso (2000) and Ioannidou and Ongena (2010).
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the fixed effect specification is linked to this phenomenon, it should also be true that
firms that are more credit constrained, or in general are less attractive for a lender,
get less of the discount.
In order to verify the above, we select two proxies of lack of outside options at the
firm level. First, high leverage, second, low profitability. In order to do so, we create
two dummies per variable, each equal to one if the credit relationship belongs to a
firm showing low/high levels of the proxy chosen. We show results for thresholds of
below 45 percent leverage for the low leverage dummy, and above 90 percent leverage
for the high leverage dummy; below 3 percent return on assets for the low profitability
dummy, and above 10 percent return on assets for the high profitability dummy.40
We estimate a local parametric interaction specification, in the following form
∆ibf = α + βMRbf + ωLLowf ∗Rbf + ωHHighf ∗Rbf
+ ΓXbf + φ−(|x2013bf − x̄|) + φ+(|x2013bf − x̄|) + εbf
Estimated on bf : xbf ∈ [x̄− h−, x̄+ h+]
(1.7)
where Lowf/Highf are the dummies that take value one if the firm is in the low/high
level of the characteristic group, φ functions are linear or second order polynomial
components, Xbf collects controls and εbf is an error term which allows for clustering
simultaneously at the firm and bank level. The coefficient of the Lowf/Highf inter-
action with the threshold term Rbf can be interpreted as the extent to which being
in the low/high group changes the pass-through of the policy for relationships close
to the threshold, while the βM coefficient-estimate tracks the effect for firms with
values of the characteristic in the middle of the distribution. In every specification, we
include independently the level of the characteristics as a control, and we progressively
saturate the regression with relationships, firm, and bank controls.
We report the results of such estimation in Table 1.19. We can see that across all
specifications, we consistently find that being in the less “mobile” group – respectively
the firms with low profitability and the firms with high leverage – results in lower
pass-through of the discount. In particular, firms with leverage above 90 percent get
almost no discount after policy implementation, as we would expect if firm bargaining
40Thresholds are chosen on the base of the lowest and highest quartile of every characteristic.
Profitability is proxied by EBITDA. Results are qualitatively robust to variations in the thresholds
of interest.
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power against the bank played a role. Furthermore, we can appreciate how βM is
both stable across specifications and close to the baseline non-parametric estimate
of the average pass-through. This is a further robustness, and ensures us that our
quantification of the average pass-through is not driven by extreme observations.
What we learn on the cost of capital regulation to banks
Our estimates easily convert into a measure of the impact of 1 percentage point
decrease in the minimum capital ratio requirement on the cost of credit to the firms,
from which, under some assumptions, we can learn about the benefit of the same
change for banks.
To see how, we start summarizing how regulators set the minimum capital ratio






here ΩbA is the mandated minimum equity amount bank b must set aside given it
finances asset A for a sum of euro Ab.41 ΩbA is a Θ fraction of the whole Ab amount,
on the basis of the ωA risk weight on assets of type A.
Changes in risk weights cause a change in ΩbA. The eligibility to the SME-SF
implies a saving on the capital required of approximately 2 percentage points vis-a-vis








≈ −8% ∗ 24% = −0.02
41In practice banks hold more than the minimum buffer for prudential reason, i.e. there exists
a Θb > Θ for each bank b. For a theoretical explanation of such behavior see Repullo and Suarez
(2013), and Francis and Osborne (2012) for empirical evidence. This is not relevant for our analysis,
as our reform affects the risk weights directly, whatever the buffer desired by the bank.
42We use 100 percent as the reference numbers for the baseline (without SME-SF) risk weight,
and 8 percent as the baseline minimum capital ratio as they are the same employed in the design
of the SME-SF itself (see, e.g. EBA (2016), p.42). They roughly correspond to the one faced by a
corporate exposure for a bank that relies on external risk weights (Standard Approach), and does
not use an internal risk weighting system for that exposure.
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where 24 percent is the approximate decrease in the risk weight on eligible exposures.
In the previous Sections we have shown that the estimated impact β̂ is close to 19
basis points. Then, a simple fraction yields us a value of the impact on the cost of








9.5 bp per percentage point change in the capital requirement
It is interesting to note that Glancy and Kurtzman (2018), studying an increase
in capital requirement for real estate loans, find approximately the same effect on
the cost of credit; what we add, though, is a deeper investigation of the extent of the
pass-through from the bank to the firm, which suggests that average impact estimates
may underestimate the total effects from such changes in capital regulation. Indeed,
if we focus on our fixed effect estimate we obtain a pass through between 12.5 to 15.5
basis points per percentage point change in the capital requirement.
Under the assumption that banks transfer the benefit of the SME-SF capital
discount to firms, we can employ our estimates to infer the implicit cost of raising the
minimum capital requirements for banks. We argue that the estimates obtained with
the sample of multiple bank borrowers is more appropriate to perform the calculation,
since the pass-through would be larger and hence the value given up by the banks
closer to the banks’ implicit evaluation of the discount.
Similarly to Plosser and Santos (2018), we apply the above back of the envelope
calculation to a loan of 1 euro. The minimum capital requirement on this loan would
decrease by 2 cents after the SME-SF implementation. Assuming that the value of the
reform to the banks is reflected in the drop in rates estimated through the fixed effects
specification, we divide the range [25 bp, 31 bp] by the 2 cent decrease in the requirement
per unit of credit, and obtain that the shadow cost of 1 more euro of mandated minimum
capital buffer for the banks is in the range of [12.5 e cent, 15.5 e cent].
Our calculation is based on a different assumption than the one by Plosser and
Santos (2018). The focus of Plosser and Santos (2018) is on the difference between
the interest rate charged by banks on new syndicated credit commitments with a
maturity of less than 364 days and the interest rate charged on longer term identical
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commitments. The assumption behind their calculation of the cost of capital regulation
is that the market for the short term commitments is not saturated. Only in this case
a bank can satisfy more demand for such facilities by decreasing their price; banks
will reduce the price up to the extent to which the loss in profits is compensated by
the saving on costly regulatory capital resources. This may in part explain why our
estimates, even if in the same ball-park, are larger than the 5 bps per percentage point
difference in requirements found in their work.
Finally, if we believe that banks are optimally choosing their balance-sheet struc-
tures, that they are using to the full possible extent every alternative to equity they
have, and that they will keep a fixed buffer on top and above the minimum require-
ments – so that one euro less minimum requirement would imply one euro less equity
to hold for the bank – we can read this number as an approximation of the increase in
bank profit for holding one euro less in equity to finance the loan.
1.6 Conclusion
We evaluate by a Regression Discontinuity Design the impact of the discount in the
capital requirement implied by SME-SF, which favors exposures to SMEs below 1.5
million, and find that the cost of eligible loans decreases by approximately 19 basis
points relative to non-eligible loans to SMEs. Normalizing this estimate by the 2
percentage points drop in capital required implied by the SME-SF, we obtain that
lowering the capital requirement by 1 percentage point causes, on average, a reduction
in the cost of credit of 9.5 basis points.
The estimated effect is larger upon the inclusion of firm fixed effects in the RDD.
In such case the estimation is performed on the subsample of firms with multiple
relationships, some eligible and some not, in the neighborhood of the SME-SF threshold.
Given that these firms are likely to have lower switching costs, we interpret this finding
as evidence that competition plays an important role in the pass through of capital
requirements to the cost of credit. Under the assumption of a full pass-through of the
benefit from a lower capital requirement to these low switching cost borrowers, we
derive an approximation of the relief to banks from decreasing minimum capital buffer
by 1 percentage point ranging between 12.5 and 15.5 bps.
34
Such figures imply that the potential benefit to firms from such measures is quite
small, at least looking at the cost of credit. For example, a firm with low switching
costs and a 1 million euro loan outstanding can at most gain 1.5 thousand euro less
in interest rate payments from a 1 percentage point decrease in minimum capital
requirements. Furthermore, the evidence that low switching cost firms get larger
discounts suggests that the effectiveness of minimum requirements relaxations – as
implied by macro-prudential regulations – may be hindered by lack of competition
between lenders.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics - SMEs’ relationships - SME-SF time window
Mean Std Deviation P(10) P(50) P(90) Count
Non-Eligible Relationships
Rate Change2014 36.842 201.474 -160.051 23.327 261.341 7,072
Drawn
Total Drawn 0.435 0.279 0.138 0.355 0.954 7,072
Revolving
Granted 0.172 0.281 0.006 0.050 0.632 7,072
Drawn
Granted 0.812 0.175 0.558 0.851 0.997 7,072
Years of Relationship 7.248 2.512 3 9 9 7,072
Close Bank 0.158 0.365 0 0 1 6,948
Eligible Relationships
Rate Change2014 26.58 179.476 -154.288 21.074 205.203 235,584
Drawn
Total Drawn 0.366 0.327 0.034 0.251 1 231,156
Revolving
Granted 0.320 0.333 0.030 0.176 1 235,584
Drawn
Granted 0.589 0.320 0.076 0.634 0.982 235,584
Years of Relationship 5.446 3.120 1 5 9 235,584
Close Bank 0.149 0.356 0 0 1 232,605
All the Relationships
Rate Change2014 26.879 180.163 -154.39 21.136 206.892 242,656
Drawn
Total Drawn 0.368 0.326 0.036 0.255 1 238,228
Revolving
Granted 0.316 0.332 0.028 0.169 1 242,656
Drawn
Granted 0.596 0.319 0.083 0.644 0.983 242,656
Years of Relationship 5.498 3.118 1 6 9 242,656
Close Bank 0.149 0.357 0 0 1 239,553
A "relationship" is a bank-firm pair, reporting the total exposure firm f has toward bank b. The loan-level
data comprise all performing loans, from Italian banks in good standing (for which we have complete
balance sheet information), to Italian firms whose balance sheet data are available through CERVED. All
variables with the exception of the change in the interest rate are measured as of the end of year 2013.
Information reported regard only relationships for which the interest rate is reported.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics - Non-SMEs’ relationships - SME-SF time window
Mean Std Deviation P(10) P(50) P(90) Count
Non-Eligible Relationships
Rate Change2014 18.781 206.389 -199.243 19.554 224.015 4,499
Drawn
Total Drawn 0.193 0.189 0.044 0.133 0.406 4,499
Revolving
Granted 0.161 0.254 0.005 0.050 0.504 4,499
Drawn
Granted 0.704 0.231 0.364 0.741 0.976 4,499
Years of Relationship 6.720 2.861 2 9 9 4,499
Close Bank 0.121 0.326 0 0 1 4,384
Eligible Relationships
Rate Change2014 28.034 192.591 -166.932 21.098 222.006 7,121
Drawn
Total Drawn 0.300 0.364 0 0.102 1 6,995
Revolving
Granted 0.355 0.367 0.019 0.185 1 7,121
Drawn
Granted 0.499 0.376 0 0.511 0.998 7,121
Years of Relationship 4.844 3.320 0 5 9 7,121
Close Bank 0.135 0.342 0 0 1 7,014
All the Relationships
Rate Change2014 24.451 198.09 -178.23 20.535 223.559 11,620
Drawn
Total Drawn 0.258 0.312 0.002 0.123 0.981 11,494
Revolving
Granted 0.279 0.341 0.01 0.111 1 11,620
Drawn
Granted 0.578 0.343 0.001 0.641 0.987 11,620
Years of Relationship 5.570 3.280 1 6 9 11,620
Close Bank 0.130 0.336 0 0 1 11,398
A "relationship" is a bank-firm pair, reporting the total exposure firm f has toward bank b. The loan-level
data comprise all performing loans, from Italian banks in good standing (for which we have complete
balance sheet information), to Italian firms whose balance sheet data are available through CERVED. All
variables with the exception of the change in the interest rate are measured as of the end of year 2013.
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Table 1.3: Descriptive statistics - SMEs’ relationships - placebo time window
Mean Std Deviation P(10) P(50) P(90) Count
Non-Eligible Relationships
Rate Change2013 12.013 222.464 -235.795 16.141 243.825 20,955
Drawn
Total Drawn 0.609 0.313 0.185 0.597 1 20,955
Revolving
Granted 0.167 0.28 0 0.046 0.613 20,955
Drawn
Granted 0.892 0.152 0.669 0.954 1.005 20,955
Years of Relationship 6.330 2.173 3 8 8 20,955
Close Bank 0.186 0.389 0 0 1 20,466
Eligible Relationships
Rate Change2013 8.351 193.4 -203.538 16.004 193.451 312,852
Drawn
Total Drawn 0.424 0.348 0.045 0.312 1 308,448
Revolving
Granted 0.304 0.329 0.018 0.167 1 312,852
Drawn
Granted 0.650 0.319 0.135 0.720 1 312,852
Years of Relationship 5.094 2.705 1 5 8 312,852
Close Bank 0.160 0.366 0 0 1 307,882
All the Relationships
Rate Change2013 8.58 195.353 -205.125 16.012 195.878 333,807
Drawn
Total Drawn 0.436 0.349 0.048 0.329 1 329,403
Revolving
Granted 0.296 0.328 0.013 0.158 1 333,807
Drawn
Granted 0.665 0.317 0.153 0.743 1 333,807
Years of Relationship 5.171 2.692 1 6 8 333,807
Close Bank 0.161 0.368 0 0 1 328,348
A "relationship" is a bank-firm pair, reporting the total exposure firm f has toward bank b. The loan-level
data comprise all performing loans, from Italian banks in good standing (for which we have complete balance
sheet information), to Italian firms whose balance sheet data are available through CERVED. All variables
with the exception of the change in the interest rate are measured as of the end of year 2012.
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Table 1.4: Descriptive statistics - Non-SMEs’ relationships - placebo time window
Mean Std Deviation P(10) P(50) P(90) Count
Non-Eligible Relationships
Rate Change2013 0.222 228.361 -270.588 7.567 222.926 5,283
Drawn
Total Drawn 0.231 0.234 0.046 0.147 0.553 5,283
Revolving
Granted 0.158 0.255 0.003 0.046 0.5 5,283
Drawn
Granted 0.742 0.219 0.413 0.789 0.987 5,283
Years of Relationship 6.090 2.488 2 8 8 5,283
Close Bank 0.121 0.326 0 0 1 5,152
Eligible Relationships
Rate Change2013 16.003 205.426 -205.805 18.62 221.038 10,109
Drawn
Total Drawn 0.390 0.383 0.001 0.239 1 9,981
Revolving
Granted 0.316 0.346 0 0.167 1 10,109
Drawn
Granted 0.605 0.372 0 0.691 1.007 10,109
Years of Relationship 4.750 2.882 1 5 8 10,109
Close Bank 0.153 0.360 0 0 1 9,970
All the Relationships
Rate Change2013 10.586 213.7 -227.134 14.514 221.39 15,392
Drawn
Total Drawn 0.335 0.347 0.011 0.183 1 15,264
Revolving
Granted 0.261 0.326 0.002 0.111 1 15,392
Drawn
Granted 0.652 0.334 0.058 0.742 1 15,392
Years of Relationship 5.210 2.825 1 6 8 15,392
Close Bank 0.142 0.349 0 0 1 15,122
A "relationship" is a bank-firm pair, reporting the total exposure firm f has toward bank b. The loan-level
data comprise all performing loans, from Italian banks in good standing (for which we have complete balance
sheet information), to Italian firms whose balance sheet data are available through CERVED. All variables
with the exception of the change in the interest rate are measured as of the end of year 2012.
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Table 1.5: Descriptive statistics - firms - SME-SF time window
Mean Std Deviation P(10) P(50) P(90) Count
Non-SMEs
Sales 252,721.715 1,124,447.220 55,225 92,967 401,653 2,937
Leverage 53.993 93.821 11.4 55.8 83.5 2,937
EBITDA Ratio 6.981 7.546 -0.166 5.996 15.213 2,937
Risky Firm 0.176 0.381 0 0 1 2,937
log(Assets) 11.42 1.143 10.159 11.253 12.923 2,937
Number of Relationships 7.162 3.957 2 7 12 2,937
Liquidity Ratio 0.054 0.079 0.002 0.026 0.141 2,937
Investment Ratio 0.032 0.049 0.002 0.018 0.072 2,937
SMEs
Sales 2,900.305 5,677.063 86 1,000 7,043 181,783
Leverage 59.462 184.651 0 66.3 96.3 181,726
EBITDA Ratio 6.606 10.069 -1.733 5.561 16.207 181,773
Risky Firm 0.305 0.461 0 0 1 181,783
log(Assets) 7.425 1.247 5.908 7.313 9.113 181,773
Number of Relationships 2.679 1.824 1 2 5 181,783
Liquidity Ratio 0.041 0.077 0 0.011 0.118 181,773
Investment Ratio 0.035 0.083 0 0.007 0.091 181,773
All Firms
Sales 6,872.401 145,275.121 89 1030 8,103.5 184,720
Leverage 59.375 183.560 0 66 96.2 184,663
EBITDA Ratio 6.612 10.034 -1.71 5.570 16.194 184,710
Risky Firm 0.303 0.460 0 0 1 184,720
log(Assets) 7.488 1.342 5.919 7.340 9.246 184,710
Number of Relationships 2.751 1.959 1 2 5 184,720
Liquidity Ratio 0.042 0.077 0 0.011 0.118 184,710
Investment Ratio 0.035 0.082 0 0.007 0.091 184,710
The firm-level information reported concern all Italian firms with available balance sheet information in the
CERVED firms’ dataset. All variables refer to year 2013 balance sheets.
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Table 1.6: Descriptive statistics - firms - placebo time window
Mean Std Deviation P(10) P(50) P(90) Count
Non-SMEs
Sales 255,246.193 1,161,372.144 55,038 93,303 403,917 3,154
Leverage 48.331 235.141 12.7 57 85 3,154
EBITDA Ratio 6.673 7.820 -0.537 5.654 15.480 3,154
Risky Firm 0.194 0.396 0 0 1 3,154
log(Assets) 11.449 1.132 10.214 11.292 12.916 3,154
Number of Relationships 7.014 3.789 2 7 12 3,154
Liquidity Ratio 0.048 0.072 0.001 0.022 0.126 3,154
Investment Ratio 0.035 0.059 0.002 0.019 0.074 3,154
SMEs
Sales 2,874.788 5,607.778 86 1,000 6,971 199,337
Leverage 60.829 226.946 0 67.8 96.8 199,271
EBITDA Ratio 6.339 10.510 -2.089 5.246 16.025 199,332
Risky Firm 0.318 0.466 0 0 1 199,337
log(Assets) 7.435 1.249 5.916 7.327 9.126 199,332
Number of Relationships 2.686 1.817 1 2 5 199,337
Liquidity Ratio 0.039 0.075 0 0.01 0.112 199,332
Investment Ratio 0.038 0.179 0 0.008 0.098 199,332
All Firms
Sales 6,805.725 148,356.628 89 1,028 7,972 202,491
Leverage 60.634 227.080 0 67.6 96.8 202,425
EBITDA Ratio 6.344 10.473 -2.068 5.253 16.01 202,486
Risky Firm 0.316 0.465 0 0 1 202,491
log(Assets) 7.498 1.343 5.924 7.351 9.255 202,486
Number of Relationships 2.753 1.939 1 2 5 202,491
Liquidity Ratio 0.040 0.075 0 0.01 0.113 202,486
Investment Ratio 0.038 0.177 0 0.008 0.098 202,486
The firm-level information reported concern all Italian firms with available balance sheet information in the
CERVED firms’ dataset. All variables refer to year 2012 balance sheets.
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Table 1.7: Descriptive statistics - banks - SME-SF time window
Mean Std Deviation P(10) P(50) P(90) Count
CET1 Ratio 0.132 0.038 0.095 0.126 0.187 90
Liquidity Ratio 0.229 0.105 0.097 0.228 0.359 90
Retail Funding 0.636 0.154 0.480 0.680 0.775 90
Wholesale Funding 0.261 0.196 0.093 0.202 0.455 90
log(Assets) 22.122 1.543 20.672 21.639 24.434 90
The bank-level data comprise information on Italian and are collected from the Supervisory Reports. All
variables refer to year 2013 balance sheets.
Table 1.8: Descriptive statistics - banks - placebo time window
Mean Std Deviation P(10) P(50) P(90) Count
CET1 Ratio 0.119 0.036 0.073 0.113 0.169 95
Liquidity Ratio 0.208 0.084 0.1 0.212 0.321 95
Retail Funding 0.612 0.160 0.417 0.660 0.745 95
Wholesale Funding 0.273 0.230 0.086 0.193 0.584 95
log(Assets) 22.099 1.502 20.592 21.671 24.336 95
The bank-level data comprise information on Italian and are collected from the Supervisory Reports. All
variables refer to year 2013 balance sheets.
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Table 1.9: McCrary’s density test
2014 2013
Observations (l - r) 2761− 2075 3301− 2670
T-Stat 0.43 0.46
P-Value 0.66 0.64
The table presents the t-statistics and p-values of the McCrary’s density test, with number of observation
considered in density estimation at the left and right of the cutoff reported in the second row. In both cases,
the null hypothesis is that there is no discontinuity in the density. The bandwidth is handpicked so to fit an
interval of +/− euro 500, 000 around the threshold.
Table 1.10: Continuity of relationship covariates
Control Variable Test, Pol(0) Test, Pol(1) Test, Pol(2)
Lag Share of Total Drawn 0.002 0.001 0.003
(0.01) (0.011) (0.013)
Lag Revolving Rate 0.049 0.055 0.116
(0.178) (0.195) (0.221)
Lag Revolving Fraction 0.009 0.011 0.014
(0.01) (0.012) (0.013)
Lag Drawn on Granted 0.002 0.001 0.003
(0.01) (0.011) (0.013)
log(Age) −0.005 −0.009 −0.012
(0.02) (0.025) (0.028)
1(Hq in Same Province)bf 0.003 0.006 0.014
(0.013) (0.014) (0.019)
Robust std. errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The Table reports the statistical significance and coefficients’ values for discontinuities in each of the relation-
ship level covariates included in the covariates augmented version of Equation 1.3. This means the following
specification: covariatebf2013 = b0 + b1Rbf +φ−(|x2013bf − x̄|) +φ+(|x2013bf − x̄|) + ebf locally, estimated locally,
with a triangular kernel. Here xbf is drawn credit, x̄ the euro 1.5 million threshold, φ+/− the right/left
polynomial in the xbf centered at the threshold, and the null hypothesis is b1 = 0.
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Table 1.11: Continuity of firm covariates
Control Variable Test, Pol(0) Test, Pol(1) Test, Pol(2)
Lag Leverage 3.179 3.323 5.224
(3.69) (3.682) (4.511)
Lag Ebitda/Assets 0.164 0.193 0.231
(0.252) (0.297) (0.327)
Lag D. Risky −0.012 −0.015 −0.015
(0.015) (0.02) (0.024)
Lag log(Assets) −0.019 −0.022 −0.015
(0.049) (0.044) (0.044)
Lag Liquidity 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Lag Investment −0.002 −0.002 −0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Lag N. Rel. −0.209 −0.237 −0.279∗
(0.143) (0.148) (0.168)
Robust std. errors, clustered at the firm level, in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The Table reports the statistical significance and coefficients’ values (up to third digit) for discontinuities
in each of the firm level covariates included in the covariates augmented version of Equation 1.3. This
means the following specification: covariatebf2013 = b0 + b1Rbf + φ−(|x2013bf − x̄|) + φ+(|x2013bf − x̄|) + ebf ,
estimated locally with a triangular kernel. Here xbf is drawn credit, x̄ the euro 1.5 million threshold, φ+/−
the right/left polynomial in the xbf centered at the threshold, and the null hypothesis is b1 = 0.
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Table 1.12: Continuity of bank covariates
Control Variable Test, Pol(0) Test, Pol(1) Test, Pol(2)
CET1 Ratio −0.001 −0.001 −0.001
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Total Capital Ratio −0.002 −0.001 −0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Lag Liquidity 0.003 −0.002 −0.004
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
Lag Retail Fund. 0.006 0.02 0.03
(0.076) (0.076) (0.073)
Lag Whole Fund. −0.014 0.008 0.007
(0.103) (0.105) (0.104)
Lag Bank Size 0.007 −0.003 0.009
(0.703) (0.705) (0.705)
Robust standard errors, clustered at the bank level, in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The Table reports the statistical significance and coefficients’ values (up to third digit) for discontinuities
in each of the firm level covariates included in the covariates augmented version of Equation 1.3. This
means the following specification: covariatebf2013 = b0 + b1Rbf + φ−(|x2013bf − x̄|) + φ+(|x2013bf − x̄|) + ebf ,
estimated locally with a triangular kernel. Here xbf is drawn credit, x̄ the euro 1.5 million threshold, φ+/−
the right/left polynomial in the xbf centered at the threshold, and the null hypothesis is b1 = 0.
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Table 1.13: Simple RD on interest rate change in bp
RD, Pol(0) RD, Pol(1) RD, Pol(2)
β̂ 2014 −11.754∗∗ −19.135∗∗ −19.541∗∗
(5.833) (7.828) ( 9.362)
Obs. (left; right) 6,844; 3,797 9,378; 6,284 19,195; 6,854
β̂ 2013 −2.087 −1.594 1.943
(3.953) (5.092) (6.592)
Obs. (left; right) 11,852; 12,917 27,481; 17,965 25,625; 19,860
β̂ 2014 (Non-SME) −6, 745 −3.354 11.761
(14.445) (18.454) (28.294)
Obs. (left; right) 402; 2,821 833; 3,875 671; 4,181
This Table presents the results of discontinuity tests run via local estimation of β̂ in Equation 1.3:
∆ibf = α + βRbf + φ−(|x2013bf − x̄|) + φ+(|x2013bf − x̄|) + εbf , where ∆i is the interest rate change in basis
points, xbf the past drawn credit, x̄ the euro 1.5 million threshold, φ+/− the right/left polynomial in
the xbf centered at the threshold, and the null hypothesis of each test is β = 0. The different columns
report increasing polynomial specifications. Estimates are computed for the SMEs 2014 sample, and on the
SMEs 2013 and non-SMEs 2014 samples for placebo purposes. Estimates reported employ triangular kernel
weights, with robust standard errors.
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Table 1.14: Simple RD on interest rate change in bp, adding controls
RD, Pol(0) RD, Pol(1) RD, Pol(2)
Firm Clustered Errors Firm Clustered Errors Firm Clustered Errors
β̂ 2014 −15.461∗∗ −18.841∗∗ −18.611∗∗
(7.201) (8.058) (8.743)
Obs. (left; right) 2,609; 3,191 8,047; 5,919 26,803; 6,540
β̂ 2013 −1.694 −1.293 3.394
(4.306) (5.187) (6.987)
Obs. (left; right) 8,208; 11,523 24,780; 17,147 18,566; 18,990
β̂ 2014 (Non-SMEs) −8.656 −11.896 23.767
(14.014) (16.603) (30.341)
Obs. (left; right) 389; 2,533 786; 3,672 554; 3,936
Controls X X X
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This Table presents the results of discontinuity tests run via local estimation of β̂ in Equation 1.3:
∆ibf = α + βRbf + φ−(|x2013bf − x̄|) + φ+(|x2013bf − x̄|) + ΓCbf + εbf , where ∆i is the interest rate change in
basis points, xbf the past drawn credit, x̄ the euro 1.5 million threshold, φ+/− the right/left polynomial in
the xbf centered at the threshold, Cbf is a matrix of controls, and the null hypothesis of each test is β = 0.
The different columns report increasing polynomial specifications. Estimates are computed for the SMEs
2014 sample, and on the SMEs 2013 and non-SMEs 2014 samples for placebo purposes. Estimates reported
employ triangular kernel weights, with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Controls: Relationship level: lags of share of total drawn credit, revolving granted/total granted, uti-
lized/granted, firm’s and bank’s hq in same province, log(relationship age); firm level: lags of liquidity
ratio, leverage, log(assets), risk dummy (low Altman z-score), EBITDA/assets, industry dummies, regional
dummies, number of credit relationships, investment ratio; bank level: Tier 1 capital ratio, liquidity, frac-
tion of retail funding, fraction of wholesale funding, log(assets).
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Table 1.15: Main estimates omitting bias and error correction
RD, Pol(0) RD, Pol(1) RD, Pol(2)
Firm Clustered Errors Firm Clustered Errors Firm Clustered Errors
β̂ 2014 −11.591∗∗ −16.05∗∗ −16.728∗∗
(5.917) (6.931) (7.486)
Obs. (left; right) 2,609; 3,191 8,047; 5,919 26,803; 6,540
β̂ 2013 −1.409 −1.450 1.728
(3.462) (4.335) (6.263)
Obs. (left; right) 8,208; 11,523 24,780; 17,147 18,566; 18,990
β̂ 2014 (Non-SMEs) −4.837 −9.462 18.181
(11.171) ( 14.193) ( 26.793)
Obs. (left; right) 389; 2,533 786; 3,672 554; 3,936
Controls X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This Table presents the results of discontinuity tests run via local estimation of β̂ in Equation 1.3:
∆ibf = α + βRbf + φ−(|x2013bf − x̄|) + φ+(|x2013bf − x̄|) + ΓCbf + εbf , where ∆i is the interest rate change in
basis points, xbf the past drawn credit, x̄ the euro 1.5 million threshold, φ+/− the right/left polynomial in
the xbf centered at the threshold, Cbf is a matrix of controls, and the null hypothesis of each test is β = 0.
Point estimates and errors are, in this case, not corrected for bandwidth selection. The different columns
report increasing polynomial specifications. Estimates are computed for the SMEs 2014 sample, and on the
SMEs 2013 and non-SMEs 2014 samples for placebo purposes. Estimates reported employ triangular kernel
weights, with robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.
Controls: Relationship level: lags of share of total drawn credit, revolving granted/total granted, uti-
lized/granted, firm’s and bank’s hq in same province, log(relationship age); firm level: lags of liquidity
ratio, leverage, log(assets), risk dummy (low Altman z-score), EBITDA/assets, industry dummies, regional
dummies, number of credit relationships, investment ratio; bank level: Tier 1 capital ratio, liquidity, frac-
tion of retail funding, fraction of wholesale funding, log(assets).
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Table 1.16: Fixed effects RD on interest rate change in bp
WRD, Pol(1) WRD, Pol(2) WRD, Pol(1) WRD, Pol(2)
Double Clustered Errors Double Clustered Errors Double Clustered Errors Double Clustered Errors
β̂ 2014 −27.507∗∗∗ −27.106∗∗ −30.545∗∗∗ −25.034∗∗
Eligible firms (9.895) (10.46) (10.596) (10.314)
Clusters 3,109 (Firms), 93 (Banks) 5,293 (Firms), 94 (Banks) 2,778 (Firms), 87 (Banks) 6,763 (Firms), 89 (Banks)
N. Observations 8,198 14,769 7,198 19,146
β̂ 2013 4.996 12.179 2.447 17.360
Eligible firms (8.225) (8.983) (7.932) (10.621)
Clusters 7,157 (Firms), 95 (Banks) 7,193 (Firms), 96 (Banks) 6,719 (Firms), 92 (Banks) 5,860 (Firms), 92 (Banks)
N. Observations 18,662 18,856 17,430 15,096
β̂ 2014 −5.134 18.418 −8.371 28.845
Non-Eligible firms (18.005) (33.444) (14.922) (37.378)
Clusters 1,086 (Firms), 77 (Banks) 1,105 (Firms), 77 (Banks) 1,043 (Firms), 76 (Banks) 1,044 (Firms), 73 (Banks)
N. Observations 4,174 4,314 4,099 4,062
Rel. Controls X X
Bank. Controls X X
Firm FE X X X X
This Table presents the results of discontinuity tests run via local estimation of β̂ in Equation 1.3, augmented
with fixed effects: ∆ibf = α + βRbf + φ−(|x2013bf − x̄|) + φ+(|x2013bf − x̄|) + f + εbf , where ∆i is the interest
rate change in basis points, xbf the past drawn credit, x̄ the euro 1.5 million threshold, φ+/− the right/left
polynomial in the xbf centered at the threshold, f firm fixed effect, and the null hypothesis of each test is
β = 0. The different columns report increasing polynomial specifications, and - final columns - the estimates
of the linear polynomial specification adjusted for covariates insertion. Estimates are computed for the SMEs
2014 sample, and on the SMEs 2013 and non-SMEs 2014 samples for placebo purposes. Estimates reported
employ triangular kernel weights, with robust standard errors, double-clustered at the bank and firm level.
The acronym WRD stands for “within RD”.
Controls (when included): Relationship level: lags of share of total drawn credit, revolving granted/total
granted, utilized/granted, firm’s and bank’s hq in same province, log relationship age; bank level: Tier 1
capital ratio, liquidity, fraction of retail funding, fraction of wholesale funding, log(assets).
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Table 1.17: Estimates only including FE-sample observations
β̂ 2014 −29.162∗∗∗ −29.295∗∗∗ −24.087∗∗∗
1st Order Specification (10.463) (10.789) (8.504)
Observations 5,665 5,665 5,601
β̂ 2014 −30.645∗∗∗ −28.565∗∗∗ −23.743∗∗∗
2nd Order Specification (9.485) ( 7.612) ( 7.911)
Observations 8,917 6,645 6,566
Firm Controls X X
Bank Controls X
β̂ 2014 −34.931∗∗∗ −33.108∗∗∗ −28.976∗∗∗
1st Order Specification (10.991) (10.714) (8.551)
Observations 5,200 5,200 5,145
β̂ 2014 −33.688∗∗∗ −31.205∗∗∗ −27.875∗∗∗
2nd Order Specification (9.215) ( 6.951) (6.966)
Observations 10,138 6,893 6,812
Relationship Controls X X X
Firm Controls X X
Bank Controls X
t statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This Table presents the results of discontinuity tests run via local estimation of β̂ in Equation 1.3:
∆ibf = α + βRbf + φ−(|x2013bf − x̄|) + φ+(|x2013bf − x̄|) + εbf , on the subsample of observations on which
the fixed effect estimator of β is identified. Such subsample is composed by all the observation belonging
to firms that have at least one eligible and one non-eligible observation within the bandwidth selected by
minimizing the MSE. ∆i is the interest rate change in basis points, xbf the past drawn credit, x̄ the euro
1.5 million threshold, φ+/− the right/left polynomial in the xbf centered at the threshold, and the null
hypothesis of each test is β = 0. The different columns report specification including different controls.
Controls: Relationship level: lags of share of total drawn credit, revolving granted/total granted, uti-
lized/granted, firm’s and bank’s hq in same province, log(relationship age); firm level: lags of liquidity
ratio, leverage, log(assets), risk dummy (low Altman z-score), EBITDA/assets, industry dummies, regional
dummies, number of credit relationships, investment ratio; bank level: Tier 1 capital ratio, liquidity, frac-
tion of retail funding, fraction of wholesale funding, log(assets).
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Table 1.18: Comparison between large relationships, in and out of FE-sample
γ 2014 3.364 1.284 −2.860
1st Order Specification (6.753) (7.027) (7.148)
Observations 6,214 6,118 6,012
Firm Controls X X X
Bank Controls X X
Relationship Controls X
γ 2014 −1.244 −4.597 −9.364∗∗
2nd Order Specification ( 4.387) ( 4.392) (4.358)
Observations 6,840 6,732 6,616
Firm Controls X X X
Bank Controls X X
Relationship Controls X
t statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This Table presents the results of the comparison between the pre-post reform change in the rates of non-
eligible relationships within the firm fixed effects sample, and within the overall sample. Each time, we
select the relationships within the right side of the data-driven bandwidth of the respective (1st or 2nd
order) specification, and run the following test: ∆ibf = η + γSbf + φ+(|x2013bf − x̄|) + ΩCbf + εbf . ∆ibf is
the interest rate change in basis points, Sbf is a dummy equal to one if the observation falls in the local
subsample for which the firm fixed effect is identified, xbf the past drawn credit, x̄ the euro 1.5 million
threshold, φ+ the right polynomial in the xbf centered at the threshold, Cbf includes other covariates, εbf is
the stochastic error term, for which we allow clustering at the bank and firm level, and the null hypothesis
of each test is γ = 0. The different columns report specification including different controls.
Controls: Relationship level: lags of share of total drawn credit, revolving granted/total granted, uti-
lized/granted, firm’s and bank’s hq in same province, log(relationship age); firm level: lags of liquidity
ratio, leverage, log(assets), risk dummy (low Altman z-score), EBITDA/assets, industry dummies, regional
dummies, number of credit relationships, investment ratio; bank level: Tier 1 capital ratio, liquidity, frac-
tion of retail funding, fraction of wholesale funding, log(assets).
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Table 1.19: Effects of firm characteristics on the pass-through
Pol(1) Pol(1) Pol(1) Pol(2) Pol(2) Pol(2)
Profitability
ω̂H −1.531 −1.893 −1.145 −3.427 −3.558 −2.613
(5.592) (5.774) (5.537) (6.01) (5.796) (5.009)
β̂M −18.732∗∗∗ −18.496∗∗∗ −17.861∗∗∗ −18.807∗∗∗ −18.794∗∗∗ −18.204∗∗∗
(4.824) (4.716) (5.359) (6.028) (5.887) (6.618)
ω̂L 9.364
∗∗ 8.337∗ 7.08∗ 7.402∗∗∗ 6.94∗∗∗ 5.914∗∗∗
(4.231) (4.413) (4.118) (1.881) (2.039) (1.806)
Observations 14,257 14,257 14,056 33,254 33,252 32,753
Leverage
ω̂H 17.960
∗∗∗ 10.222∗ 11.223∗ 17.119∗∗∗ 10.735∗∗ 11.317∗∗
(6.611) (6.156) (6.612) (4.552) (4.920) (5.65)
β̂M −17.744∗∗∗ −16.323∗∗∗ −15.659∗∗ −18.995∗∗∗ −17.78∗∗∗ −17.023∗∗
(5.599) (5.507) (6.143) (6.377) (6.319) (7.063)
ω̂L −4.315 −7.821 −9.446 −2.358 −5.729 −7.312
(8.035) (8.119) (7.615) (7.823) (7.822) (7.849)
Observations 14,257 14,257 14,056 33,254 33,252 32,753
Rel. Controls X X X X X X
Firm Controls X X X X
Bank Controls X X
t statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This Table presents tests of differential pass-through for low and high profitability, and low/high leverage
firms. Specifications are as follows β̂ in Equation 1.7: ∆ibf = α+βMRbf +ωLLowf ∗Rbf +ωHHighf ∗Rbf +
ΓXbf + φ−(|x2013bf − x̄|) + φ+(|x2013bf − x̄|) + εbf . They are estimated locally. ∆i is the interest rate change in
basis points, xbf the past drawn credit, x̄ the euro 1.5 million threshold, φ+/− the right/left polynomial in
the xbf centered at the threshold, and the null hypothesis of each test is that the true value of the parameter
is equal zero. Highf and Lowf are dummies that equal one if the firm falls in the group with high and low
characteristic (profitability/leverage). Xbf collects all controls. The different columns report specification
including different controls.
Controls: Relationship level: lags of share of total drawn credit, revolving granted/total granted, uti-
lized/granted, firm’s and bank’s hq in same province, log(relationship age); firm level: lags of liquidity
ratio, leverage, log(assets), risk dummy (low Altman z-score), EBITDA/assets, industry dummies, regional
dummies, number of credit relationships, investment ratio; bank level: Tier 1 capital ratio, liquidity, frac-
tion of retail funding, fraction of wholesale funding, log(assets).
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RW constant (3)
Note: The figures present the assignment space defined by the SME-SF eligibility rules.
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Figure 1.2: Sample distribution end
of 2012
Figure 1.3: Sample distribution end
of 2013
Note: The figure presents the distribution of relationships in the vicinity of the assignment to the
SME-SF threshold.
Figure 1.4: Density plot, 2014 Figure 1.5: Density plot, 2013
Note: The figures present the graphical outputs of testing discontinuity in the density of observations
on the left and the right of the cutoff. The shaded area plots the 95 percent confidence interval
around the smoothed density backed from the data.
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Note: From the top left, we report the reform effect at the eligibility threshold for SME 
credit lines in 2013-2014; the placebo for SME credit lines at the SME-SF threshold in 
2012-2013; the placebo discontinuity employing non-SME credit lines in 2013-2014; the 
placebo for the fictitious 500 thousand euro of past utilization threshold, for SMEs in 
2013-2014. The figure plots on the y-axis the delta in yearly rates before and after SME-SF 
implementation (and for the 2012-2013 window in subfigure (b)); on the x-axis, we plot 
the lag of credit drawn, in thousands of e . The overall limits of the x-axis shown are 
selected minimizing the MSE of the discontinuity point estimate, under the constraint of 
equal spans on the two sides of the threshold for presentation clarity. We present binned 
averages of the data as gray balls, whose dimension reflects the number of observations in 
each equally spaced bin, and local polynomial smoothing estimates (smoothing bandwidths 
as large as the bin size) of the change in rates with respect to past drawn amounts, together 
with their 95%confidence intervals.
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Note: From the top left, we report alternative placebo thresholds we inspect to run placebo 
graphical tests. The figure plots on the y-axis the delta in yearly rates before and after 
SME-SF implementation; on the x-axis, we plot the lag of credit drawn, in thousands of 
e . The overall limits of the x-axis shown are selected minimizing the MSE of the 
discontinuity point estimate, under the constraint of equal spans on the two sides of the 
threshold for presentation clarity. We present binned averages of the data as gray balls, 
whose dimension reflects the number of observations in each equally spaced bin, and 
local polynomial smoothing estimates (smoothing bandwidths as large as the bin size) of 





THE DESIGN OF LOAN
CONTRACTS
By Marco Giometti† and Stefano Pietrosanti‡
2.1 Introduction
Diversification of risk plays a central role in many theories of financial intermediation
(e.g. Boyd and Prescott 1986; Diamond 1984). However, empirical evidence shows
that banks often concentrate their lending across multiple dimensions, including
geography, scale, and industry.43 There has been extensive work showing how portfolio
concentration can have important implications for banks’ economic performance and
risk, as well as for their borrowers via the transmission of shocks through the banking
sector.44
What is less well understood are the implications of bank specialization for security
design. In particular, there is no or little evidence on the role of specialization in
†Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.
‡University of Pennsylvania.
43Hughes et al. (1996), Carey, Post, and Sharpe (1998), Berger and Robert (2001), and Paravisini,
Rappoport, and Schnabl (2018).
44On the relation between bank portfolio concentration and related performances, see Acharya,
Hasan, and Saunders (2006), Beck, Jonghe, and Mulier (2018), Boeve, Duellmann, and andreas
(2010), Hayden, Porath, and Westernhagen (2007), and Tabak, Fazio, and Cajueiro (2011). On the
real effects of bank specialization, see Schwert (2018), Paravisini, Rappoport, and Schnabl (2018),
and De Jonghe et al. (2019).
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lending on loan contract terms, such as covenants or loan spreads.45 We believe it is
important to fill this gap for two reasons. First, contracts, by construction, specify the
allocation of resources and the division of surplus, both of which affect welfare. Second,
they reflect the preferences of the contracting parties, and as such, they provide insight
into the objectives of those parties. They might inform a better understanding of
the lending advantages associated to bank specialization, and ultimately of how the
structure of credit markets interacts with financial contracting.
The goal of this paper is to address the question of how specialization in bank
lending affects the design of loan contracts, in the context of the $2 trillion, corporate
syndicated loan market.46 First, we document that the average bank’s loan portfolio
has a higher industry concentration than the market, that bank specialization is
common across industries and that it is persistent over time. Then, we show that loan
contracts display less restrictive covenants when the borrower belongs to an industry
in which the bank is specialized, with no higher spreads or fees. To interpret this
finding, we build on theoretical works such as (Garleanu and Zwiebel 2008), which
see in covenant strictness a measure of the degree of information frictions between
borrowers and lenders. In this sense, we suggest that the evidence we bring supports
an explanation of bank specialization based on information advantages in screening
and monitoring specific type of projects.
In order to perform our analysis, we obtain data on the syndicated loans from
LPC DealScan, and we merge it with Compustat. The resulting dataset is a loan-level
panel with bank, firm and loan characteristics, from 1996 to 2016.47 We use this data
to estimate the degree of diversification of bank loan portfolios. We then analyze the
extent to which banks specialize their lending towards different sectors adapting the
approach in Paravisini, Rappoport, and Schnabl (2018) to our setting. A bank is
defined as specialized in a sector if it has an abnormally large portfolio share of loans
towards a sector, relative to other banks. Intuitively, this measure captures the extent
45One exception is represented by the study of Daniels and Ramirez (2008), in which they document
that banks specialize in lending towards large firms and non banks towards small firms, with banks
demanding lower spreads.
46U.S. syndicated lending topples records in 2017, Reuters, December 2017.
47We choose this sample period for two reasons. First, coverage of the syndicated loan market
sharply improves in DealScan after 1995 (Chava and Roberts 2008). Second, in our main analysis
we use the text-based network industry classification developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2010) and
Hoberg and Phillips (2016), which is available starting from 1996.
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to which corporate lending on banks’ balance sheets deviates from a value-weighted
portfolio. In doing so, the measure accounts for heterogeneity in the size of sectors
in the economy and in the size of bank sectoral lending relative to the bank’s overall
corporate lending.
We find clear evidence of bank specialization. First, we show that the average
bank displays more concentration in lending than what would be implied by the
overall distribution of credit in the market. Second, we document that certain banks
specialize in lending by holding a disproportionately large share of loans in certain
sectors. In particular, each sector consistently displays at least one specialized bank.
Furthermore, specialization is persistent: a bank that is specialized in a given year
has a 20% probability of being specialized 10 years after.
We then explore the implications of bank specialization for the design of loan
contracts. In particular, we focus on the allocation of control rights and cash flow
rights between the lender and the borrower. To proxy for the degree of ex-ante control
rights allocated to the lender, we employ the measure of contract strictness developed
by Demerjian and Owens (2016).48 Intuitively, this measure captures the ex-ante
probability of violating at least one of the covenants embedded in the contract. For
cash flow rights, we use loan spreads, i.e. the all-in-drawn spread and the all-in-
undrawn spread.49 Looking at both is important as these contract terms are jointly
determined, and there might be a trade-off between them (Bradley and Roberts 2015).
We find that the average loan contract between a bank specialized in a sector
and a borrower from that sector includes covenants that are 7 percentage points less
restrictive, and an all-in-drawn spread that is 20 basis points lower. This, with respect
to a loan contract granted by the same bank, in the same year, to a firm in another
sector. The observed effects are economically and statistically significant. For contract
strictness it amounts to 17% of the empirical standard deviation; for the spread, it
amounts to 15% of the empirical standard deviation.
Comparing loans made by the same bank in the same year rules out that our
finding is driven by unobserved, time-varying lender heterogeneity. However, the
observed variation in contract might be simply driven by specialized banks matching
48This measure is the non-parametric version of the one originally developed by Murfin (2012).
49The former is a fee paid over the base rate (usually LIBOR) for each dollar of credit drawn,
whereas the latter is a fee for each dollar of credit committed, but undrawn.
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systematically with different firms. We take several steps to mitigate this concern.
First, we control for observable proxies of borrower risk, such as distance to default,
leverage, liquidity and ability to provide collateral. Second, we restrict our analysis to
firms that borrow from more than one bank over the duration of our sample, employing
a within-firm approach. Third, we restrict our comparison to loans made to firms
that have the same credit rating. The main finding does not change: the average
loan contract between a bank specialized in a sector and a borrower from that sector
includes a covenant structure that is less restrictive, and it does not display higher
spreads.
We then ask whether our findings can improve our understanding of the lending
advantages associated with bank specialization. Theory suggests that the degree of
allocation of ex-ante control rights to the lender should be directly proportional to
the level of asymmetric information that exists between a borrower and a lender over
potential future transfers from debt to equity (Garleanu and Zwiebel 2008). In this
view, the strictness of the covenant structure embedded in a loan contract captures
the information distance between a borrower and a lender. Therefore, a plausible
interpretation of our results implies the existence of an industry-specific information
advantage for banks specializing their lending towards a specific industry. The fact
that a less restrictive covenant structure is not compensated by higher spreads provides
further support to this interpretation.
We rule out a number of alternative explanations for our findings. First, we show
that specialization in lending toward an industry does not simply reflect a pattern of
relationship lending with borrowers in that industry. While it is indeed true that the
longer the relationship with a given borrower the less restrictive the loan contract –
consistently with the work of Prilmeier (2017) – this appears to be uncorrelated with
bank specialization. Second, our results are not driven by geographical specialization,
which confirms the notion of an industry-specific information advantage. This is
consistent with the recent evidence provided by Di and Pattison (2019) for small
business loans. Third, specialized banks might have high market share in an industry.
Recent work by Giannetti and Saidi (2018) suggests that lenders with high market
shares in an industry have a high propensity to internalize the spillovers of their credit
decision. This might involve writing less strict contracts to avoid triggering potentially
69
costly defaults or renegotiations, and could represent a different economic mechanism
that would explain our results.50 We show that this is not the case, and find that
banks with high market shares actually write stricter contracts, possibly implying a
higher bargaining power in the contracting process.
Finally, to further validate our interpretation, we use defaults on lenders’ loan
portfolios as a plausible source of exogenous variation in lenders’ perception of their
own screening ability (Murfin 2012). We look at the extent to which default of firms
in each bank’s loan portfolio affects the terms (covenant strictness and cost of credit)
of the new contracts each bank underwrites. We show that a bank is more sensitive
to the default of a firm whenever such firm belongs to a sector in which the bank
is specialized, as it is expected under an interpretation of specialization patterns as
stemming from information advantage.
Related Literature. With this paper, we contribute to and connect two different
strands of literature. First, to the literature focusing on patterns of specialization
in the market for credit, and their effects. For example, Carey, Post, and Sharpe
(1998) and Daniels and Ramirez (2008) highlight how different types of financial
intermediaries – such as banks and private finance companies – specialize in lending
towards different types of firms. Black, Krainer, and Nichols (2020) show that in the
commercial real estate mortgage market banks systematically fund riskier collateral
compared to arm’s length investors. Acharya, Hasan, and Saunders (2006), Tabak,
Fazio, and Cajueiro (2011), and Beck, Jonghe, and Mulier (2018), document how
bank concentration either does not have negative effects on bank risk, or decreases it.
Finally, Paravisini, Rappoport, and Schnabl (2018) and De Jonghe et al. (2019) show
that even within a single class of intermediaries – banks – there is specialization in
lending towards specific firms, and this drives the effect of bank shocks on firms.
Among these works, the closest one is Paravisini, Rappoport, and Schnabl (2018).
Paravisini, Rappoport, and Schnabl (2018) introduces the measure of specialization we
also use in our paper, and applies it to the context of the market for credit to Peruvian
exporters. Using that measure, it provides a test of information advantage based on
50There is a large literature documenting negative consequences of debt covenant violations
on investment, employment, and other firm-level outcomes. See Chava and Roberts (2008) and
Chodorow-Reich (2013).
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the degree of substitutability between credit by specialized and non-specialized lenders.
We contribute in two ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to look
at bank specialization in the context of security design. We show that specialization is
an important determinant of contract features. In this way we provide an alternative
test to identify the presence of information advantage in lending by specialized banks,
based on information distance between borrowers and lenders. Second, we show that
specialization is present in a market for large corporate loans.
Furthermore, our finding regarding the importance of bank specialization for con-
tract features contributes to the study of financial contracting and its determinants.
Several works highlight the role of borrower or lender characteristics for the deter-
mination of loan covenants (e.g. Berlin and Mester 1992; Billett, King, and Mauer
2007; Demiroglu and James 2010; Murfin 2012; Bradley and Roberts 2015), or pricing
(e.g. Ivashina 2009; Cai et al. 2018). Our results stress, instead, the importance of
taking into account borrowers and lenders characteristics jointly when looking at the
determinants of contracts’ features. In this sense, we are close to Bao (2019), who
studies how peer effects in loan portfolios affect the cost of credit. With respect to
her study, we focus more broadly on security design.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2 we describe the sample construction,
discuss how we measure specialization, and provide evidence on bank specialization
in the syndicated loan market. In Section 2.3we present our empirical strategy, our
findings, and discuss several alternative explanations. In Section 2.4 we provide
concluding remarks.
2.2 Data and Measurement
To characterize specialization and to study its implications, we construct a sample of
syndicated loans matched with bank and firm characteristics. Below we describe the
sample construction, introduce and discuss the way we measure bank specialization,




Our two main sources of data for this paper are LPC DealScan and Compustat. LPC
DealScan contains detailed information on syndicated loans, including loan amounts,
covenants, pricing, and maturity. Compustat provides balance-sheet information for
both banks and firms. We merge the loan data with borrower characteristics thanks
to the linking table provided by Chava and Roberts (2008), which matches firms
in Compustat to borrowers in DealScan from 1987 to 2017.51 We also merge firm
characteristics in Compustat with the industry classification developed by Hoberg
and Phillips (2010) and Hoberg and Phillips (2016), which is available for most public
companies present in Compustat. We obtain information on banks by matching lenders
in DealScan with bank characteristics, thanks to the linking table provided by Schwert
(2018), which identifies the Bank Holding Company (BHC) of all DealScan lenders
with at least 50 loans, or $10 billion loan volume in the matched DealScan-Compustat
sample. Following the literature we drop all loans to financial corporations (SIC codes
from 6000 to 6999). The final matched dataset contains 66% of DealScan-Compustat
loan volume, and accounts for mergers (Schwert 2018). We attribute loans of the
merged bank to the new entity from the time of the merge onward.
In this paper, we define a bank to be the BHC, not the individual DealScan lender.
As most loans in DealScan are syndicated, the same loans will be associated to one
or more lead arrangers, and several other participants bank. Consistently with other
studies, we focus only on the lead arranger(s), and we attribute the whole loan amount
to the lead arranger(s)of the syndicate.52 This choice stems from observing that a
lead arranger is the bank in charge of the active management of the loan, even if it
does not retain the entirety of its amount on their balance sheets (Ivashina 2009). If
there are multiple lead arrangers, we split the loan amount equally among them. We
identify a lead arranger following the procedure outlined in Chakraborty, Goldstein,
and Andrew (2018), and we drop those loans that appear to have more than 10 lead
arrangers, as those are probably the result of an incorrect classification.53
51The linking table is constantly being updated, as of November 2018 this is the most recent and
comprehensive version.
52See, for example, Schwert (2018), Prilmeier (2017), and Chakraborty, Goldstein, and Andrew
(2018).
53Specifically, DealScan has two fields that can be used to determine the lead arranger, a text
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The unit of observation in DealScan is a loan facility. However, information on
loan covenants is available only at the package level. Since in our analysis the main
dependent variable is contract strictness, which is based on covenants, we conduct our
analysis at the package level, aggregating facility-level information by weighting the
facility characteristics – such as the spreads and maturity – by the respective facility
amounts. Therefore the observation level in the dataset is the package-bank-firm triplet
at a quarterly frequency. Following Murfin (2012), we also report the contracting
date of a package as 90 days prior to the DealScan reported start date, to account for
the time lag between the effective moment in which banks and firms commit to loan
contract terms and the legal start date reported by DealScan.
Two Measures of Bank Specialization
Methodology
We are interested in understanding whether banks specialize by lending towards
specific sectors of the economy. To address this issue, we employ two approaches.
The first consists in comparing how diversified the commercial lending portfolio of an
average bank is relative to the whole syndicated-loan market portfolio. Intuitively,
if banks are less diversified than the market, it means at the very least that they
prefer to concentrate their lending towards some, but not all, sectors of the economy
– implying a certain degree of specialization. The second involves identifying those
banks that are abnormally exposed to a given industrial sector with respect to the
other banks active in that sector.
variable that defines the lender role in the syndicate and a yes/no lead arranger credit variable, both
are employed to define which bank has a lead role. Chakraborty, Goldstein, and Andrew (2018),
who in turn follows Bharath et al. (2009), defines as lead arranger, within each syndicate, the bank
that “scores” highest in the following ten-part raking: “1) lender is denoted as “Admin Agent”, 2)
lender is denoted as “Lead bank”, 3) lender is denoted as “Lead arranger”, 4) lender is denoted as
“Mandated lead arranger”, 5) lender is denoted as “Mandated arranger”, 6) lender is denoted as
either “Arranger” or “Agent” and has a “yes” for the lead arranger credit, 7) lender is denoted as
either “Arrange” or “Agent” and has a “no” for the lead arranger credit, 8) lender has a “yes” for the
lead arranger credit but has a role other than those previously listed (“Participant” and “Secondary
investor” are also excluded), 9) lender has a “no” for the lead arranger credit but has a role other than
those previously listed (“Participant” and “Secondary investor” are also excluded), and 10) lender is
denoted as a “Participant” or “Secondary investor”." (Chakraborty, Goldstein, and Andrew (2018),
Online Appendix, p.1)
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In the first approach, we employ the entropy metric, originally employed in the
social sciences to measure the degree of diversity in a population of individuals.54
We employ this measure to the context of banking, and we use it to characterize the
level of diversification of the market portfolio, and that of the average bank, with
respect to the different industries in the economy.55 For a given bank, the entropy of









in which Lbit denotes the portfolio share of loans from bank b, towards industry i in the
list of industries from 1 to I, at time t. Ebt reaches its maximum – which is equal to
log(I) – in presence of a perfectly diversified portfolio, i.e. Lbit = 1/I ∀i ∈ I, whereas
we can impose its minimum to be zero in case of no diversification, i.e. Lbit = 1 for
only one industry i, and 0 for all the others.
We can then compute the entropy of the average bank by simply taking a weighted
average of the entropy of all banks, in which the weights are represented by a bank’s



















it is the amount of credit – to any industry – issued by bank




t is the total amount of credit
outstanding at time t.
Similarly, we can define the entropy for the market portfolio. If we think of all the
credit exposures of all the banks, summed together at a given time, as the “market”
portfolio for the syndicated loan market at that time, we can define the entropy of




Lit log (Lit) (2.3)
54It has been used extensively in studies on segregation and inequality. See White (1986) for a
discussion.
55An alternative could be to use the HHI index, but we prefer the entropy as it is a measure of
diversification, whereas HHI is a measure of concentration. See Avila et al. (2013) for a comparison
of these different approaches to measuring portfolio concentration/diversification.
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it denotes the share of credit – from all banks – towards industry
i, in the whole syndicated loan market.
In the second approach, we adapt the methodology developed by Paravisini,
Rappoport, and Schnabl (2018) to capture bank specialization at the industry level.
According Paravisini, Rappoport, and Schnabl (2018), a bank is specialized in lending
towards a given industry if its portfolio share of loans outstanding in that industry is
abnormally large, relative to other banks. More formally, specialization is a dummy
variable, defined as follows:
Specbit =
1 if Lbit ≥ L∗it0 otherwise (2.4)
in which Lbit is, as above, the share of credit issued bank b to industry i outstanding
at time t, and L∗it is an extreme value defined as the sum of the 75th percentile of the
distribution of bank portfolio shares in industry i at time t and 1.5 the inter-quartile
range of the same distribution. In other words, according to this approach, a bank
is specialized in an industry if it is a right-tail outlier in the distribution of portfolio
shares of lending by all banks towards that industry.
To help understand this approach and highlight its advantages, Figure 2.1 presents
some simple examples involving two banks and an economy with only wo sectors.
In panel (a) neither bank is specialized as each bank’s balance sheet is split in half
between the two sectors, and the pattern is equal across banks. Panel (c) is similar
to the first case. Although one bank is larger and the other smaller, and they are
both mostly exposed to sector A, the pattern of exposure is the same. Thus, large
exposures to sector A might simply reflect a different demand of credit from sector A
with respect to sector B in that particular economy, and we cannot detect evidence
that one particular bank is specialized.
In panel (b), instead, we have an example of specialization. In this case, Bank
1 is specialized in sector A and Bank 2 in sector B. Each bank could both lend to
both sectors – and they do – but each of them is abnormally exposed to one sector,
indicating a bank-level pattern that is coherent with comparative advantage in lending
towards that sector. This does not depend simply from the amount of credit that goes
from each bank to each sector. In fact, in panel (d), in which Bank 1 is specialized in
75
sector A only, and bank B is specialized in sector B: while Bank 1 provides overall
more credit to sector B than Bank 2, its portfolio share is really small compared to
Bank 2, which has all of its loan portfolio invested in sector B.
Specialization in Lending in the US Syndicated Loan Market
To compute these measures of specialization, we need granular information on banks’
commercial lending portfolio. For US banks there is no balance-sheet information at
the level of granularity required – i.e. with a breakdown by industrial sector. Therefore,
we rely on DealScan and focus on syndicated lending, which nonetheless represents a
sizable portion of the corporate loan market in the US. This allows us to obtain data
on bank-firm credit relationships. However, DealScan only provides information on
loan originations.
Similarly to Chakraborty, Goldstein, and Andrew (2018) and Lin and Paravisini
(2012), we create a panel that resembles a credit registry by aggregating DealScan
loan-level data at the bank-firm relationship level over time. We assume each loan is
outstanding until the original end date, or, if the information is available on DealScan,
until the amended end date.56 In this way we obtain a dynamic representation of
the commercial lending portfolio for each bank in our sample, which we then use to
compute time-varying portfolio shares in each industry by aggregating loan amounts
for each bank-firm relationship at each given point in time.
Since a bank portfolio share towards a given industry is a proxy to capture a
comparative advantage in lending towards specific types of project in the economy, we
use the Text-based Network Industry Classification (TNIC) developed by Hoberg and
Phillips (2010) and Hoberg and Phillips (2016), which better measures similarities
across firms with respect to a standard SIC or NAICS classification, and is updated
annually.
We employ the 25-industry version of their classification, as this ensures a good
balance between the number of firms present in DealScan in each industry and a
sufficient precision in the characterization of the different set of projects in the economy.
56It is possible that a loan is renegotiated and appears as a new loan in DealScan, and this might
be potentially problematic for us if loan renegotiation is not identically and independently distributed.
To partially address this issue, we drop of our sample all the loans that have a description such as
"This loans amends and restates..." in the various "comment" fields available in Dealscan.
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We apply the methodology described in the previous subsection, and compute the two
measures of specialization for all the banks in the sample of syndicated loans granted
to firms that have a TNIC classification, from 1996 to 2016.
First, we look at the measure of loan portfolio diversification. In Figure 2.2, we plot
the entropy of the commercial lending portfolio for the average bank computed for each
quarter as in (2.2), and the same measure computed for the market portfolio as in (2.3).
Given that a larger value of this measure imply larger diversification, a comparison
of the two reveals that the loan portfolio of the average bank is less diversified than
the market. Comparing the average entropy of the market portfolio(∼ 2.8) and that
of the average bank (∼ 2.5) over time, we see that the average bank is about 10%
less diversified than the market. This implies that not every bank is lending to every
industry in the same way, providing suggestive evidence of specialization in lending.
Second, we look at specialization by industry. Specifically, we are interested in
understanding whether we can observe abnormally large loan portfolio shares towards
certain industries, similarly to what Paravisini, Rappoport, and Schnabl (2018) do
for countries of destination for Peruvian exporting firms. Figure 2.3 shows, at four
different moments in time, the box-and-whisker plots of the distribution of Lbit − L̄it,
that is of bank portfolio shares towards each industry i demeaned by the average
share of lending in that industry. We can see that across time almost every industry
display at least one or more right-tail outliers; that is, one or more specialized lenders.
Moreover, specialization is persistent. In Figure 2.4 we plot the autocorrelation of
Specbit defined in (2.4), and we can see that a bank specialized in lending towards an
industry in a given year is 20% more likely to be specialized in lending towards the
same industry 10 years later, with respect to a bank that was not specialized.
Overall, the evidence presented in this section points to bank specialization in
lending as a defining feature of the US syndicated loan market.
Measurement of Economic Variables
Dependent Variables: Loan Contract Strictness and Loan Spreads
Our ultimate goal is to understand whether specialization is associated with information
advantages in lending towards specific sectors of the economy. We therefore need
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an empirical proxy to capture the notion of information advantage when a bank is
lending to firms in a given industry.
To achieve this, we build upon the theoretical work by Garleanu and Zwiebel (2008),
and consider the covenant structure embedded in a loan contract as capturing the
information “distance” between a bank and a firm. The more restrictive the contract –
in terms of what the firm can or cannot do in order not to trigger a technical default
by violating a covenant – the less information a bank has about a borrower, according
to the theory. However, in presence of multiple covenants it is not obvious how to
assess the overall strictness of the loan contract. Therefore, we are going to rely on
the measure of contract strictness developed and made available by Demerjian and
Owens (2016), which improves on the original measure proposed by Murfin (2012).57
Contract strictness is defined as the ex-ante probability of violating at least one
financial covenant during the life-time of the loan, ranging from 0 to 100. This
measure is characterized by four properties, all valid on an “all else equal” basis. First,
it increases in the number of covenants; second, for a fixed number of covenants,
it decreases in the initial slack of a covenant, defined as the distance between the
level of the covenant threshold and the starting level of the corresponding financial
ratio; third, it increases in the volatility of the ratios targeted by covenants; fourth, it
decreases in the correlation between covenants—intuitively, since a technical default
is triggered even if a single covenant is violated, contracting on independent financial
ratios increases the probability of violating at least one.
In order to draw conclusions it is also important to track the cost of credit.
Covenant and the pricing structure of a loan are often jointly determined, with a
potential trade-off between them—stricter contracts might be associated with lower
costs and viceversa. Therefore we also collect information on loan pricing available
on DealScan, specifically the All-in Drawn Spread (AISD) and the All-in Undrawn
Spread (AIUD). The AISD is the sum of the spread over the base rate, generally
LIBOR that a borrower need to pay for every dollar of credit drawn down and all
the annual fees paid to the lender. The AIUD is the annual cost that a borrower is
charged by the lender on the portion of credit that is not drawn down.
57The measure developed for Demerjian and Owens (2016) is publicly available at
http://faculty.washington.edu/pdemerj/data.html.
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Bank, Firm, and Relationship level Variables
We obtain bank- and firm-level variables from Compustat, and information on loan
quantities and characteristics from Dealscan. From this merged dataset, we construct
proxies for relationship lending and banks’ market share.
First, following Prilmeier (2017), we create a measure of Relationship Intensity and
a measure of Relationship Length. Rel. Intensityf,b,t is defined at time t as the fraction
of credit firm f has obtained from bank b over the total amount of credit firm f has
received over the previous 60 quarters (5 years). Rel. Lengthf,b,t is defined as the time
elapsed between period t and the first interaction of firm f and bank b in DealScan.
Then, we collect information on the geographic distance between the borrower and
the lender, to proxy for “arms-length” credit relationships. We use historical data
on firm and bank locations available on Compustat to construct a dummy variable,
Same Statef,b,t. This dummy equals to 1 if bank b and firm f are in the same state at
time t, and 0 otherwise.
Finally, we compute each bank Market Shareb,f,t. This is the fraction of credit that
a bank b provides to the industry of firm f over the total credit that industry receives
at period t− 1. Taking bank market share into account is important. For example,
Giannetti and Saidi (2018) shows that banks with a large market share in an industry
are more likely to internalize the systemic consequences of credit supply contractions
on that industry.
Sample Characteristics
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics for the samples we use in our empirical analysis.
In particular, we distinguish two samples. The first one, “Matched Sample" is the full
DealScan-Compustat matched sample , constructed as described in Section 2.2. The
second one, “Strictness Sample" is a subsample obtained from merging the Matched
Sample with data on the measure of contract strictness developed by Demerjian and
Owens (2016), and represents the sample employed in our main empirical analyses.
The top panel of Table 2.1 reports information on the characteristics of loan-level
variables in our samples. The Strictness Sample includes 11, 223 distinct loans. On
average, a loan agreement contains two financial covenants, displays a level of strictness
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such that the borrower has 36% probability to violate at least one of the covenants,
and contains an All-In-Drawn Spread of 188 basis points, with relatively small average
fees—the mean All-In-Undrawn Spread is 26 basis points. The same average loan
has maturity of approximately 45 months, amounts to approx. $500 million and the
average number of members in the syndicate is 9. These statistics are similar in the
larger Matched sample, which displays a smaller number of covenants, larger average
loan amount, and a slightly smaller number of syndicate members.
The mid panel of Table 2.1 reports information on the borrowers in our samples.
The Strictness Sample includes 10, 721 firm-quarter observations for 3, 673 firms. These
are large firms – with on average $1 billion in total assets – having higher leverage
and profitability than the average firm in Compustat. About 50% do not have a
long-term issuer credit rating, and for those that have a rating, the average rating is
BBB-/BB+.58 Over our sample period (1996-2016), they enter, on average, into 10
syndicated loan agreements and interact with a relatively small number of lenders,
approx. 4. With the exception of book leverage, which is quite noisy, these statistics
are coherent in both the Strictness Sample and the Matched Sample.
Finally, the bottom panel of Table 2.1 reports information on the lenders in our
samples. The Strictness Sample includes 2, 155 bank-quarter observations for 89 banks.
The average bank is large, with $169 billion in total assets, with approx. 700 loans
arranged over our sample period.
2.3 Bank Specialization and Loan Contract Terms
In this section we explore the effect of bank specialization in lending on loan contract
strictness and the cost of credit. We first perform a simple univariate analysis, which
highlights potential non-randomness in the matching between banks and firms, and
underscores to the need of a more sophisticated regression framework. Employing
different multivariate specifications aimed at mitigating these concerns, we then show
that bank specialization is associated with significantly lower contract strictness, and
no higher spreads.
58Rating is a categorical variable. We assign value 1 to AAA ratings, 2 to AA+, and so on. The
largest value is 20, assigned to “D" or “SD" indicating default in the S&P Long Term Credit Rating.
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We interpret this evidence as support for explanations of bank specialization based
on lending advantages, and we suggest that part of this advantage is an information
advantage, which is sector-specific. Finally, using default on lenders’ loan portfolios
as a possible source of exogenous variation in banks’ perception of their expertise
in dealing with a certain industrial sector, we show that specialized banks are more
sensitive to defaults of firms in their sector of specialization and less sensitive to
default to other firms, providing further evidence in line with this interpretation.
Univariate Analysis
We begin by comparing the characteristics of loans arranged by a bank specialized in
lending towards the industry a given borrower belongs to, with all other loans. To
make things clear, a loan to a firm f starting at time t is considered to be arranged by
a specialized bank b if Specbi,t−1, defined in (2.4), is equal to 1 and the firm f belongs
to industry i. The top panel of Table 2.2 reports the results of these basic univariate
t-tests.
While there is not a significant difference in contract strictness between loans
arranged by banks specialized in a given industry and banks that are not specialized,
it appears that the former have higher spreads. Moreover, loan agreements between a
bank specialized in an industry and a borrower in the industry of specialization display
lower amounts, lower maturity and lower number of syndicate members. Even though
this is suggestive of a relationship between bank specialization and contract features,
this evidence may come simply from the different characteristics of specialized banks
and their borrowers.
We pursue the matter further performing t-tests on bank and firm characteristics,
similarly to what we do for loans. Specifically, we split all bank-quarter observations
into those that are associated with a loan arranged to any sector the bank is specialized
in, and those that are not. We do the same for firm-quarter observations.
The mid panel of Table 2.2 displays the results of the t-tests for firm characteristics.
The estimates confirm that firms obtaining loans from banks specialized in their
industry are generally different than other firms. They are smaller, less likely to have
a long-term issuer credit rating – and therefore less likely to have access to public
debt/equity markets – and if they do have a credit rating, it is on average lower.
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Essentially, a firm that borrows from banks specialized in its own industry is likely to
be subject to more severe information frictions. It also displays a higher current ratio,
and lower profitability, with respect to firms borrowing from other banks.
The bottom panel of Table 2.2 shows the estimate of t-tests on bank characteris-
tics.59 To be clear, a bank can appear both in the “specialized” and “non-specialized”
sample at a given moment in time. With this caveat in mind, what emerges is that
banks specialized in lending towards a given sector are different compared to other
banks. Specifically, they are smaller, have a larger reliance on deposits, and they
appear to be better capitalized. However, they do not appear to have larger loan loss
allowances nor larger amounts of non-performing assets.
Overall, the evidence in Table 2.2 suggests that bank specialization might play a
role in determining loan characteristics, but any conclusion based on simple univariate
analysis would be distorted by the pervasive selection in the matching between
borrowers and lenders. In the next Section, we analyze this in a multivariate regression
framework with fixed effects.
Empirical Strategy: a Within-Bank Approach
To retrieve the effect of bank specialization on loan contract strictness, ideally we would
like to observe identical firms borrowing from two different banks, one specialized in
lending towards the firm’s industry and one not specialized. In particular, the firms
should be randomly assigned to the banks, and each bank should differ from each
other only for its specialization status. However, matching between banks and firms is
rarely random and loan contract terms are an outcome of this matching process. If,
as Table 2.2 suggests, specialized banks are small banks that in general tap a pool
of borrowers which are smaller, more opaque and riskier, any observed variation in
the loan contract strictness might just be the direct consequence of the systematically
different characteristics of the firms and banks involved.60
59Since the same bank issue more than one loan, the standard errors for the t statistics in Table 2.2
have been adjusted for clustering at the bank level.
60This systematic difference can regard both observable and unobservable characteristics. It is in
fact well known in the literature that contract strictness reflects borrower riskiness (Demiroglu and
James 2010), and ex-ante bank confidence in the underwritten loans (Murfin 2012).
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To mitigate these concerns, we procede in the following way. We start from a
within-bank approach, akin to the one proposed at the firm level by Khwaja and Mian
(2008). Underlying our empirical strategy there is the idea of comparing two loans
arranged by the same bank in the same year, one issued to a borrower in an industry
in which the bank is specialized in lending to, and one issue to a borrower in another
industry. This, however, does not fully account for the borrower selection problem.
Even after absorbing all bank-specific, time-varying characteristics, it may be the
case that within each bank’s borrower pool, the firms that fall within the industries
in which the bank are specialized are systematically different. To address this, we
first include firm balance sheet controls, which absorb variation due to observable
and time-varying firm characteristics. Furthermore, we add firm-fixed effects, which
account for all firm-specific, observable and unobservable characteristics that are fixed
in time.61
Formally, we employ the following specification:
Loan Contract Termf,b,t = α + θb,y(t) + Other Fixed Effects
+ β · Specializationf,b,t−1 + γF · Firm Controlsf,t
+ γL · Loan Controlsf,b,t + εf,b,t
(2.5)
in which Loan Contract Termf,b,t stands for loan contract strictness, or the all-in-
drawn spread, or the all-in-undrawn spread, for a loan originated in quarter t by bank
b to firm f . α is the common intercept; θb,y(t) represents bank×year fixed effects; the
term Other Fixed Effects includes borrower fixed effects and separate intercepts for
each S&P long-term issuer credit rating, with the omitted dummy variable capturing
unrated firms. The main explanatory of interest is included as Specialization, a
lagged 12-quarters rolling average of the specialization dummy Specbit (defined in (2.4)).
Firm Controls includes firm level proxies of time-varying risk. It includes the Altman
Z-score of the borrower at the time of issuance (Altman 1968), as well as debt to
tangible net worth, current ratio, and tangible net worth scaled by total assets. These
controls account for repayment risk (especially for non-rated firms), leverage, liquidity,
and the firm’s ability to provide collateral, and are likely to represent the accounting
61Ideally, we would rather to have a within bank-time and within firm-time specification. Unfor-
tunately, as we work on a sample of very large loans, we do not see the many firms doing multiple
deals in the same year. This makes the adoption of such strategy infeasible.
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ratios lenders take into account in their analysis of borrowers (Murfin 2012).62 Finally,
Loan Controls includes also loan-level controls such as logged maturity, logged loan
amount and the logged number of syndicate members.
We make the choice to average the specialization dummy over 12 quarters to put
less weight on banks that are only sporadically specialized in a sector. This might be
simply the result of a single large loan at a time of relative low lending activity in
that industry, or measurement error due to the limitations of our dataset. We chose
12 quarters as this length ensures a good balance between capturing persistence and
avoiding that our measure simply mimics the origination of new loans—the average
maturity of a loan in DealScan is around 4 years.63
The Effect of Specialization on Loan Contract Strictness and
Pricing
We now introduce the baseline results of our analysis. Table 2.3 reports the regression
estimates of the specification in (2.5) over the Strictness Sample, for three different loan
contract characteristics: Strictness, AISD, and AIUD. Looking at contract strictness
first, the estimate on the specialization variable is negative and statistically significant,
indicating that banks specializing in lending towards a given industry write less strict
contracts when entering loan agreements with firms in that industry. The estimates
on loan spreads are overall negative, but their significance and magnitude is more
dependent on the specification.
In particular, with respect to loans issued to firms in other industries by the same
62Murfin (2012) uses logged tangible net worth instead of tangible net worth scaled by total assets,
and fixed charge coverage ratio, which we do not utilize, as controls. We do not use logged tangible
net worth because it would result in a considerably-lower number of observations in our sample
(approx 25% of the observations) as tangible net worth can be negative as well—however, repeating
the analysis with logged tangible net worth does not change the main results of the paper, and if
anything, it makes them stronger. We do not use the fixed charge coverage ratio because it is a ratio
that lacks a credible common definition across loan agreements (Demerjian and Owens 2016, Table
4).
63However, we stress that performing the analysis with a measure of specialization averaged over
rolling windows of different length does not change the main results of the paper. At this purpose, we
refer to Robustness checks presented in Section 2.3. Finally, we note that the same rolling window’s
length choice, performed for similar reason, can also be found in Paravisini, Rappoport, and Schnabl
(2018).
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bank in the same year, a loan contract with a firm in the bank’s area of specialization
is less strict by 7.5 percentage points (column 1). This estimate is economically
significant, as it amounts to 20% of the mean value and to 17% of the standard
deviation of the distribution of contract strictness in our sample. Note that this is not
associated with higher loan spreads: the estimates on the specialization variable in
relation to the all-in-drawn spread is negative and statistically significant (column 4),
and in relation to the all-in-undrawn spread the coefficient is positive but very close
to zero and not statistically significant (column 7).
In columns 2, 5, and 8, we include borrower and rating fixed effects to further
reduce concerns that the effect of specialization just highlighted might be entirely a
byproduct of unobserved heterogeneity in borrower types and riskiness. For contract
strictness, the estimate on the specialization variable remains statistically significant
and is slightly larger in magnitude, while the effect on spreads becomes insignificant.
However, banks specializing in lending towards certain industries might provide
credit with credit instruments that are systematically different compared to non
specialized banks; e.g. suppose that specialized banks only agree to provide credit in the
form of term loans, whereas non-specialized banks only in the form of revolving credit.
To address this concern we add loan type fixed effects in the baseline specification,
and results are reported in columns 3, 6, and 9 of Table 2.3. The estimates on the
specialization variable are virtually unchanged.
The negative, economically and statistically significant effect of the specialization
variable on contract strictness suggests less information asymmetry, or “distance”,
between a bank specialized in lending towards a given industry and firms in that
industry. The negative or null estimates on the same specialization variable when loan
spreads are the dependent variables, reinforce this hypothesis, ruling out that lower
strictness is compensated with a higher cost of credit, which would weaken the notion
of lending advantage. It appears that specialized banks not only leave more leeway to
their borrowers, but they appear not to see this “slacker leash” as a risk for which they
must be properly compensated. This suggests less restrictive covenant in such cases
actually reflect better ex-ante knowledge of the projects/capacity to screen them.
This conclusion is further supported by analyses of the relation between bank
specialization and loan spreads conducted over the larger Matched Sample. Table 2.4
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reports the results for the same regressions as in Table 2.3 – without restricting the
sample only to those loan contracts for which a measure of strictness is available –
with just all-in-drawn spread and all-in-undrawn spread as dependent variables. In
this case, the estimates on the specialization variable when all-in-drawn spread is the
dependent variables (columns 1 to 3) are larger, and they are statistically significant
even when borrower and rating fixed effects are included in the specification. The
estimate is still large but loses significance when loan type fixed effects are included
on top of borrower and rating individual dummies. When all-in-undrawn spread is the
dependent variable instead the estimates on the specialization variable are basically
zero and never statistically significant (columns 4 to 6).
Overall, the evidence presented so far is consistent with explanations of bank
specialization based on the existence of lending advantages, and in particular it singles
out a specific source of such advantages, namely an industry-specific information
advantage.
Assessing Alternative Explanations
There might be alternative explanations for the results presented in Tables 2.3 and 2.4.
In particular, the results presented so far are consistent with at least three other
economic mechanisms: presence of relationship lending, internalization of externalities
that arise when a bank has a large market share in a given industry, and geographic,
rather than industry-specific, specialization.
Relationship Lending
First, we could argue that the industry-specific information advantage simply reduces
to an information advantage that is borrower-specific. This would be consistent with
the observed phenomena of “relationship lending” (Petersen and Rajan 1994; Petersen
and Rajan 1995; Berger and Udell 1995). For example, recent work by Bharath et al.
(2009) and Prilmeier (2017) specifically show that relationship lending matters for the
determination of covenants and other contract terms in syndicated loan agreements.
To explore the role that borrower-specific information might have on the determi-
nation of loan contract strictness, we include in our specification the two empirical
proxies for the intensity and length of the bank-firm relationship we described in
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Section 2.2. Table 2.5 reports the results for these regressions. Across all specifi-
cations, for both contract strictness and loan spreads, the estimated coefficient on
the specialization variable is virtually unchanged – and still statistically significant
when considering contract strictness – validating the hypothesis that banks have an
information advantage that stems from an industry-specific expertise and not only
from borrower-specific information.64
In conclusion, we see that an explanation based only on relationship lending does
not seem appropriate to fully rationalize the observed relationship between bank
specialization and the existence of an information advantage relative to that industry.
Specialized Banks as High-Market-Share Lenders
Second, we might be concerned that if banks are specialized in lending towards a given
industry, those banks are also the one providing a relatively large share of credit to that
industry, i.e. they have a high market share in that industry. The literature points out
that this could be an alternative mechanism explaining our findings. Giannetti and
Saidi (2018) show that banks that have a high market share in an industry are more
likely to internalize negative spillovers and possible systemic effects of tougher credit
conditions in that industry – as well as upstream and downstream the relative supply
chain – in periods of distress. For analogous reasons, they might have incentives to
write less strict contracts to avoid triggering covenant violations that might potentially
be costly not only for the specific firm – in terms of investment for example – but also
for the entire industry the firm is part of.
To control for this issue, we include in our specifications the variable Market Share,
defined in Section 2.2, which is exactly the share of credit outstanding that a bank
has in one industry relative to the total credit supplied to the industry by all banks.
Table 2.6 reports the results for these regressions. When looking at contract strictness,
64This does not imply at all that relationship lending is not important. As Prilmeier (2017), we
do find evidence that the longer a bank-firm relationship, the lower strictness and all-in-drawn spread
associated with the contract. Yet, this is true only when considering a within-bank approach. With
the inclusion borrower and rating fixed effects this effect disappears. This result is not surprising,
given that there is probably little variation in those variables within-firm, also in light of the small
number of banks a firm interacts with in our sample. Further discrepancies between ours and Prilmeier
(2017)’s findings (e.g. the lower power of the relationship intensity’s coefficient) are explained by the
different measure of covenant strictness we use.
87
the estimates on the specialization variable are still negative, statistically significant,
and 1-2 percentage points larger in magnitude. For loan spreads, we still observe
negative or null effect of the specialization variable, confirming the results of the main
analysis.
Turning to the effect of a high market share on contract strictness, we can see that
the estimated coefficient for the market share variable is positive and highly significant.
We have two possible explanations for this relation. First, it may be a result of the
fact that banks with high market share in an industry have a larger pool of loans in
that industry by construction. As a consequence, their marginal borrower is of lower
quality, has higher information distance from its lender, and receives stricter covenants.
Second, it may be the case that these banks have overall higher market power, which
increases their charter value, making them less willing to take risks (Keeley 1990).
Geographical Proximity
Third, the literature points to the role of geographic distance as an important proxy
for the degree of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. Loan terms
are more favorable when borrowers are geographically closer to lenders (Agarwal and
Hauswald 2010; Alessandrini, F, and Zazzaro 2008; Degryse and Ongena 2005), even
in market of large corporations (Hollander and Verriest 2016).
We are thus concerned that banks specialized in lending towards a given industry
have an abnormal exposure to that industry because they are lending to specific loca-
tions that feature business concentration in that industry and that are geographically
close to these banks’ headquarters. This geographical proximity between banks and
firms in specific industries might in turn explain our results. If this is the case, we
would still interpret our result in light of an information advantage of these banks.
However, this advantage would not stem from an industry-specific expertise, but from
the acquisition of soft information based on geographical proximity. To address this
issue, we construct a dummy variable, Same State, which takes value 1 if the bank
and the firm headquarters are located in the same state, and we include it in our
specifications.
Table 2.7 presents the results for these regressions. Consistent with the notion
that geographical proximity between borrowers and lenders reflects a lower level of
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asymmetric information, the estimates on the same-state dummy are negative for
both contract strictness and loan spreads. However, they are not significant or only
marginally so. On the other hand, the estimated coefficients on the specialization
variable are essentially the same as the baseline specifications.
Finally, Table 2.8 reports the results of regressions that includes all aforementioned
controls for relationship lending, market share and geographical proximity. The
coefficients on the specialization variables across various specifications with the different
loan terms as dependent variable are unchanged or slightly larger in magnitude, and
consistent with the baseline estimates. Overall, none of these possible alternative
explanations appears able to rule out the important role of bank specialization in
determining covenant strictness, nor the information advantage interpretation we are
providing for it.
Specialization and Defaults on Lender Portfolios
To provide further evidence in support of our proposed interpretation, inspired by
Murfin (2012), we employ defaults on lender loan portfolios as a relatively exogenous
shock to the lenders’ perception of their own screening ability. We examine whether
default of firms from industry x in the portfolio of bank b affect differentially banks
that are specialized in lending to x and banks that are not. In particular, we focus
on how the pricing and covenant strictness change for loans underwritten after the
defaults.
To do so, we compute the number of defaults each bank experiences in its loan
portfolio by counting the times any given borrower, among those the bank has an
active credit relationship with, has a credit rating of “D” or “SD” over a period of time
that ranges from 90 to 360 days.65 Suppose it is indeed true that banks specialized in
lending towards one sector have an information advantage in screening or monitoring
specific projects in that industry. We posit that, for a given number of defaults on
a lender portfolio that occur to borrower in a that industry, banks specialized in
lending towards that industry would revise more the perception of their own ability
of screening borrowers in that industry, compared to banks not specialized in lending
65See Murfin (2012) for more details on why to employ those time intervals.
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towards that industry. In fact, a default in a given industry should be relatively more
informative for those banks who have an information advantage for that given industry.
If defaults occur in industries out of a bank’s area of specialization, on the other hand,
we should not observe any differential revision of a bank’s own screening ability.
We empirically test this implication by employing a specification similar to the one
in (2.5), with the inclusion of interaction terms between the specialization variable
and the number of defaults on lender portfolio, as follows:
Loan Termsf,b,t = α + θb + θt + Fixed Effects + β · Specializationf,b,t−1
+ γD · Defaultsb,t−1 + ρ · Specializationf,b,t−1 × Defaultsb,t−1 (2.6)
+ γB · Bank Controlsb,t + γF · Firm Controlsf,t
+ γL · Loan Controlsf,b,t + εf,b,t
The specification in (2.6) does not include neither bank×year fixed effects nor
borrower fixed effects as there would not be enough variation of specialization and
defaults within those groups.66 Instead, we include additive time and bank fixed
effects, and we saturate the regressions with several bank time-varying controls, such
as logged bank assets, the ratio of deposits over total assets, bank book capitalization,
the share of non-performing assets over total assets, and the amount of loan loss
allowances scaled by total assets. We also keep credit rating fixed effects and loan
type fixed effects.
The coefficient of interest is ρ, which measures the differential effect on loan
contract terms of a specialized banks in response to one more default with respect
to a non specialized bank. In particular, given a loan agreement between a bank b
and a firm f that starts at time t, we are going to consider two different types of
Defaults variable: Defaults (same), which denotes only the defaults that have occurred
in the same industry as f , and Defaults (other), which considers the total number of
defaults occurred in all other industries. Crucially, we expect a positive and significant
effect only for the interaction term of the specialization variable and Defaults (same),
66For example, the total number of bank-year groups in the sample is 476. Out of these, we
observe variation in both specialization and defaults only in 28 groups. If we consider bank fixed
effects, out of the 60 present in the sample, we find variation of both specialization and default in 31
groups. Considering borrower fixed effects, out of the 2, 836 firms, we have within-firm variation in
both specialization and default only in 75 cases.
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but not for the interaction term with Defaults (other). This amount to saying the
following: a bank that is specialized in lending towards industry i, when lending to
a borrower in industry i, is going to be more responsive – relative to a bank that is
lending to the same industry – only when it experiences borrower defaults in industry
i, and not when the defaults occur in any other industry.
Table 2.9 shows the results of regressions as in (2.6), and the evidence is consistent
with our hypotheses. The top panel in particular displays regressions in which the
variable Defaults is computed by counting defaults in lender portfolios that occurred
over a period of 90 days prior to the start date of a loan, whereas in the bottom panel
the variable Defaults is computed by looking at a period of 360 days prior to the start
date of a loan. As in previous tables, columns 1 to 3 focus on contract strictness and
columns 4 to 6 on all-in-drawn spread.
From this table two patterns emerge. Specialized banks do not write stricter
contracts nor charge higher spreads with respect to non specialized bank when the
defaults occur in industries out of their area of specialization, and when dealing with
borrowers in these other industries. However, banks specialized in lending to one
industry charge higher spreads, relative to non specialized banks, when lending to
their industry of specialization and after experiencing defaults in that industry.
The estimate on the interaction term between the specialization variable and
Defaults (90d, same) is positive and statistically significant. For each default that
a specialized bank experiences in its area of specialization, it charges borrowers in
that industry an all-in-drawn spread that is 10 basis points higher compared to a
non-specialized bank that lends to the same industry. Specialized banks do not
appear to write proportionally stricter loan contracts. However, this is true only when
considering defaults on lender portfolios that are relatively close in time, that is for
defaults occurring in the 90 days prior the start date of a loan.
If we turn to a larger time-horizon to compute the defaults, namely 360 days, we
find a positive and statistically significant effect of the interaction term between the
specialization variable and Defaults (360d, same) on loan contract strictness. The
effect on the all-in-drawn spread is instead attenuated and not statistically significant.
A potential explanation for these patterns is that at first banks that are specialized in
an industry react more to defaults in their industry of specialization by charging higher
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spreads, and only after a longer period of time, they start updating the perception of
their own screening ability, and write stricter contracts.
Robustness Checks
The results stand to a series of robustness checks. First, omitting or including loan-level
controls leaves the results for the baseline analysis unchanged, and if anything the
results are stronger, as can be seen in Table 2.10. Second, averaging the specialization
dummy defined in (2.4) over different time horizon does not change the main message
of the paper. As can be seen in Table 2.11, the effect of the specialization variable is
attenuated when averaging over 4 or 8 quarters (1 or 2 years), but remain generally
consistent in magnitude. The lower and mostly non-statistically significant estimates
that we obtain when averaging the specialization dummy over a period of 1 an 2 year
actually represent an indirect validation of our proposed mechanism. It takes time
to build expertise that is industry-specific, and therefore estimates are more reliable
and precise once the average of the specialization dummy is taken over longer periods.
Third, considering only the loans with at most 5 or at most 1 lead arranger(s) – the
baseline being all loans with at most 10 lead arrangers – actually makes the results
stronger, as can be seen in Table 2.12. Fourth and last, changing some of the firm-level
controls in the regressions, for example including book leverage and logged firm assets
in lieu of debt to tangible net worth and tangible net worth over total assets, yields
very similar estimates across most specifications, as can be seen in Table 2.13.
2.4 Conclusion
In this paper we provide evidence that banks specialize in lending toward specific
industries even in a credit market for large borrowers, such as the US syndicated
loan market. We show that loan contracts between borrowers in an industry and
banks specialized in lending towards that industry display a less restrictive covenant
structure and no higher spreads. This, comparing two loans made by the same bank
in the same year, one towards the industry of specialization and one to any other
industry. We show that this result cannot be fully explained by borrower risk, or
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other phenomena such as relationship lending, the ability of lenders to internalize the
spillovers effects of their credit decision within an industry, or geographical proximity.
Interpreting the restrictiveness of the covenant structure as the degree of infor-
mation asymmetry between a borrower and a lender, we conclude that a potential
source of the lending advantage associated with specialization is represented by an
information advantage. This carries implications for the understanding of competition
and monopoly power in credit markets, and thus for the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy and potential heterogeneous effects of regulation. These are all
potential avenues for future research.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
Matched Sample Strictness Sample
Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
Loan variables
Contract Strictness 36.57 41.29 11,223 36.57 41.29 11,223
Number of Covenants 1.38 1.49 25,912 2.52 1.15 11,223
All-In Drawn Spread 188.18 133.11 22,379 188.00 124.35 10,777
All-In Undrawn Spread 24.85 19.51 16,523 26.18 18.37 9,257
Loan Amount ($ M) 627.48 1483.63 25,911 519.60 1085.89 11,223
Maturity (Months) 47.00 26.29 24,364 45.07 20.75 11,136
Syndicate Size 7.75 8.74 25,912 9.10 9.77 11,223
Relationship Length 1.83 3.18 25,912 1.76 3.00 11,223
Performance Pricing 0.40 0.48 25,912 0.68 0.45 11,223
mean sd Obs mean sd Obs
Firm variables
Log(Assets) 7.09 1.95 22,958 6.70 1.84 10,662
Rated 0.52 0.50 23,138 0.48 0.50 10,721
Rating 10.28 3.46 11,931 10.80 3.08 5,126
Book Leverage 30.63 22.61 22,138 30.82 22.18 10,338
Debt/Tangible Net Worth 0.98 80.81 14,214 0.34 20.25 6,445
Tangible Net Worth/Assets 0.19 0.50 14,640 0.20 0.31 6,611
Risky Borrower 0.53 0.50 20,228 0.53 0.50 9,512
Current Ratio 1.98 3.14 22,099 1.92 1.64 10,352
Profitability 0.03 0.05 21,620 0.03 0.04 10,020
N. Loans 10.05 8.23 23,138 9.27 7.15 10,721
N. Credit Relationships 3.79 2.86 23,138 3.48 2.46 10,721
mean sd Obs mean sd Obs
Bank variables
Log(Assets) 12.29 1.64 2,053 12.12 1.61 1,487
Deposits/Assets 61.82 13.17 2,043 61.76 12.86 1,480
Book Equity 7.27 2.69 2,010 7.41 2.56 1,467
Market Equity 12.42 5.82 514 12.38 6.22 366
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 9.68 2.26 1,889 9.26 2.11 1,407
Non-Performing Assets 0.68 0.62 1,714 0.64 0.55 1,302
Loan Losses Allowance 0.96 0.48 1,959 1.00 0.47 1,439
N. Loans Arranged 567.44 1073.41 3,151 695.01 1202.93 2,155
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the merged Dealscan - Compustat sample. The first panel reports
information on loan characteristics; the second on firm characteristics; the third on bank characteristics.
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Table 2.2: Univariate evidence on specialization and selection
Spec. Non Spec. Diff. t-Stat N (Spec.) N (Non Spec.)
Loan variables
Contract Strictness 36.26 35.46 0.80 0.48 648 9864
Number of Covenants 1.37 1.33 0.04 1.12 1588 23295
All-In Drawn Spread 224.12 184.77 39.34 10.14 1268 19970
All-In Undrawn Spread 25.85 24.63 1.22 1.72 816 14901
Loan Amount ($ M) 518.67 680.40 -161.73 -4.04 1588 23294
Maturity (Months) 45.87 48.16 -2.29 -3.13 1492 21979
Syndicate Size 6.05 8.06 -2.01 -8.95 1588 23295
Relationship Length 1.95 1.84 0.12 1.43 1588 23295
Performance Pricing 0.30 0.40 -0.10 -8.32 1588 23295
Spec. Non Spec. Diff. t-test N (Spec.) N (Spec.)
Firm variables
Log(Assets) 6.61 7.35 -0.74 -14.63 1569 23101
Rated 0.45 0.56 -0.11 -8.58 1588 23295
Rating 10.87 10.23 0.64 4.85 713 13033
Book Leverage 30.66 31.62 -0.96 -1.60 1491 22341
Debt/Tangible Net Worth 0.82 3.77 -2.95 -0.48 839 14785
Tangible Net Worth/Assets 0.17 0.18 -0.01 -0.60 868 15175
Risky Borrower 0.54 0.54 -0.01 -0.66 1390 20371
Current Ratio 2.49 1.90 0.58 5.80 1511 22241
Profitability 0.02 0.03 -0.01 -11.21 1441 21834
Banks variables
Log(Assets) 11.4 13.3 -1.85 -2.67 1184 19129
Deposits/Assets 66.8 54.9 11.9 2.57 1180 19097
Book Equity 8.15 7.65 0.50 0.84 1168 18962
Market Equity 11.8 9.85 1.96 2.17 238 8038
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 10.1 9.26 0.87 1.00 1131 18755
Non-Performing Assets 0.63 0.61 0.016 0.19 1056 17823
Loan Losses Allowance 1.10 0.99 0.11 1.21 1139 18736
This table reports the results of a battery of univariate t-test, meant to document systematic differences in loan,
firm and bank-level observables between loans made by a specialized bank within its sector of specialization and out
of its sector of specialization. For each observable X listed in the table, H0 is that E[X(Specialized)−X(Non−
Specialized)] = 0.
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Table 2.3: The effect on loan contract terms
Contract Strictness All-In Drawn Spread All-In Undrawn Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Specialization -7.477∗∗ -8.319∗∗ -8.34∗∗ -18.66∗∗ -1.144 -5.319 2.022 3.944 3.652
(-2.08) (-2.17) (-2.16) (-2.10) (-0.10) (-0.52) (0.69) (1.19) (1.12)
Borrower Z-Score -4.492∗∗∗ -3.234∗∗∗ -3.221∗∗∗ -15.91∗∗∗ -8.898∗∗∗ -8.775∗∗∗ -2.213∗∗∗ -1.146∗∗∗ -1.123∗∗∗
(-12.72) (-5.00) (-5.02) (-8.95) (-5.37) (-5.36) (-7.40) (-3.43) (-3.41)
Debt/Tang. Net Worth -.0192 -.0161 -.0154 -.0613∗ -.0183 -.0244 -.0133 -.0288∗∗∗ -.0272∗∗∗
(-0.93) (-0.40) (-0.39) (-2.01) (-0.51) (-0.85) (-1.48) (-3.84) (-3.45)
Tang. Net Worth/Assets -5.069∗ -10.2 -10.35 -48.7∗∗∗ -31.76∗∗∗ -29.29∗∗∗ 6.55∗∗∗ 5.488∗∗ 5.591∗∗
(-1.76) (-1.58) (-1.59) (-4.33) (-3.08) (-2.75) (3.95) (2.47) (2.50)
Current Ratio -.224 -2.372∗ -2.357∗ 9.582∗∗∗ -.7693 -1.644 1.128∗ -1.677 -1.651
(-0.38) (-1.77) (-1.79) (3.65) (-0.49) (-0.93) (1.73) (-1.07) (-1.06)
Bank-Year FE X X X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X
Rating FE X X X X X X
Loan Type FE X X X
Adj. R2 .18 .526 .527 .41 .662 .683 .262 .558 .57
N. Banks 36 35 35 35 34 34 35 33 33
Observations 5484 4740 4740 5283 4549 4549 4526 3810 3810
This table reports the estimates of the coefficients from the following regression over our baseline sample, which includes only loans for which the contract
strictness measure is available:
Loan Contract Termf,b,t = α+ θb,t + Fixed Effects + β · Specializationf,b,t−1 + βF · Firm Controlsf,t + βL · Loan Controlsf,b,t + εf,b,t
in which Loan Contract Termf,b,t is either contract strictness (columns 1 to 3), all-in drawn spread (columns 4 to 6), and all-in undrawn spread
(columns 7 to 9) for a loan originated in time t by bank b to firm f . α is the common intercept, θb,t represents bank×time fixed effects, and Fixed Effects
include, depending on the specification, firm fixed effects, rating (time-varying) fixed effects and/or loan type fixed effects . Specialization is a lagged 3-year
rolling average of the specialization dummy for bank b in the sector of firm f . Firm controls include the z-score, current ratio, the ratio of tangible net worth
over total assets, and the ratio of debt over tangible net worth. Loan controls include logarithms of maturity, number of participants and of the deal amount,
and they are included in the specification for each column. In parentheses, t statistics obtained from clustering at the bank level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 2.4: The effect on loan pricing, full sample
All-In Drawn Spread All-In Undrawn Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specialization -20.04∗ -21.78∗∗ -15.72 .6438 1.695 1.46
(-1.81) (-2.15) (-1.61) (0.29) (0.79) (0.69)
Borrower Z-Score -12.41∗∗∗ -5.895∗∗∗ -5.644∗∗∗ -1.914∗∗∗ -.7445∗∗∗ -.7592∗∗∗
(-10.46) (-6.93) (-7.74) (-8.55) (-3.25) (-3.61)
Debt/Tang. Net Worth .0141∗∗∗ .0159∗∗∗ .0149∗∗∗ -.0048 -.0143∗ -.0139
(7.47) (12.29) (14.21) (-0.72) (-1.70) (-1.59)
Tang. Net Worth/Assets -60.99∗∗∗ -49.16∗∗∗ -47.45∗∗∗ 5.319∗∗∗ .8307 1.029
(-10.96) (-4.39) (-4.79) (3.98) (0.49) (0.71)
Current Ratio 9.186∗∗∗ 3.43∗∗ 2.696 1.031∗∗∗ -.2677 -.2255
(5.41) (2.22) (1.65) (3.25) (-0.54) (-0.46)
Bank-Year FE X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Rating FE X X X X
Loan Type FE X X
Adj. R2 .374 .608 .638 .229 .541 .553
N. Banks 44 42 42 41 38 38
Observations 11362 10541 10541 8374 7554 7554
This table reports the estimates of the coefficients from the following regression over our baseline sample, which includes
only loans for which the contract strictness measure is available:
Loan Spreadf,b,t = α+θb,t+Fixed Effects+β ·Specializationf,b,t−1+βF ·Firm Controlsf,t+βL ·Loan Controlsf,b,t+εf,b,t
in which Loan Spreadf,b,t is either all-in drawn spread (columns 1 to 3), and all-in undrawn spread (columns
4 to 6) for a loan originated in time t by bank b to firm f . α is the common intercept, θb,t represents bank×time
fixed effects, and Fixed Effects include, depending on the specification, firm fixed effects, rating (time-varying) fixed
effects and/or loan type fixed effects . Specialization is a lagged 3-year rolling average of the specialization dummy
for bank b in the sector of firm f . Firm controls include the z-score, current ratio, the ratio of tangible net worth
over total assets, and the ratio of debt over tangible net worth. Loan controls include logarithms of maturity, number
of participants and of the deal amount, and they are included in the specification for each column. In parentheses, t
statistics obtained from clustering at the bank level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively.
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Table 2.5: The effect of on loan contract terms, controlling for relationship
Contract Strictness All-In Drawn Spread All-In Undrawn Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Specialization -7.147∗ -8.321∗∗ -8.347∗∗ -16.74∗ -.8305 -5.197 1.996 3.986 3.7
(-1.96) (-2.15) (-2.15) (-1.82) (-0.07) (-0.50) (0.67) (1.19) (1.12)
Rel. Intensity .821 .8266 .8867 .5224 -6.173 -5.679 1.725∗∗∗ -.0103 -.011
(0.79) (0.69) (0.75) (0.11) (-1.58) (-1.40) (3.43) (-0.01) (-0.01)
Rel. Length -.4438∗∗∗ -.166 -.1593 -2.091∗∗∗ .2887 .6085 -.1155 -.1162 -.1428∗∗
(-3.78) (-1.52) (-1.38) (-5.00) (0.58) (1.03) (-1.65) (-1.63) (-2.21)
Bank-Year FE X X X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X
Rating FE X X X X X X
Loan Type FE X X X
Adj. R2 .181 .526 .527 .412 .662 .683 .263 .558 .57
N. Banks 36 35 35 35 34 34 35 33 33
Observations 5484 4740 4740 5283 4549 4549 4526 3810 3810
This table reports the estimates of the coefficients from the following regression over our baseline sample, which includes only loans for
which the contract strictness measure is available:
Loan Contract Termf,b,t = α+ θb,t + Fixed Effects + β · Specializationf,b,t−1 + β1 · Rel. Lengthf,b,t−1 + β2 · Rel. Intensityf,b,t−1
+ βF · Firm Controlsf,t + βL · Loan Controlsf,b,t + εf,b,t
in which Loan Contract Termf,b,t is either contract strictness (columns 1 to 3), all-in drawn spread (columns 4 to 6), and all-in
undrawn spread (columns 7 to 9) for a loan originated in time t by bank b to firm f . α is the common intercept, θb,t represents
bank×time fixed effects, and Fixed Effects include, depending on the specification, firm fixed effects, rating (time-varying) fixed effects
and/or loan type fixed effects . Specialization is a lagged 3-year rolling average of the specialization dummy for bank b in the sector
of firm f . Rel. Length is the time elapsed between firm f first interaction with the lead arranger b in the DealScan database and the
current loan – originated at time t. Rel. Intensity is the ratio between the total amount of credit firm f received from bank b over the
past 5 years, and the total amount of credit received by firm f over the same period, excluding the current loan. Firm controls include
the z-score, current ratio, the ratio of tangible net worth over total assets, and the ratio of debt over tangible net worth. Loan controls
include logarithms of maturity, number of participants and of the deal amount, and they are included in the specification for each column.
In parentheses, t statistics obtained from clustering at the bank level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively.
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Table 2.6: The effect of on loan contract terms, controlling for bank market share
Contract Strictness All-In Drawn Spread All-In Undrawn Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Specialization -9.273∗∗ -9.872∗∗ -9.905∗∗ -20.56∗∗ -.956 -5.718 1.285 3.3 3.076
(-2.69) (-2.51) (-2.51) (-2.44) (-0.09) (-0.58) (0.43) (1.01) (0.95)
Market Power 15.51∗∗∗ 11.71∗∗∗ 11.77∗∗∗ 16.74 -1.522 3.212 7.051∗∗ 6.244∗∗∗ 5.633∗∗
(4.10) (3.97) (4.15) (0.95) (-0.06) (0.12) (2.52) (3.34) (2.49)
Bank-Year FE X X X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X
Rating FE X X X X X X
Loan Type FE X X X
Adj. R2 .181 .527 .528 .411 .662 .683 .263 .558 .57
N. Banks 36 35 35 35 34 34 35 33 33
Observations 5484 4740 4740 5283 4549 4549 4526 3810 3810
This table reports the estimates of the coefficients from the following regression over our baseline sample, which includes only loans for
which the contract strictness measure is available:
Loan Contract Termf,b,t = α+ θb,t + Fixed Effects + β · Specializationf,b,t−1 + βM ·Market Sharef,b,t−1
+ βF · Firm Controlsf,t + βL · Loan Controlsf,b,t + εf,b,t
in which Loan Contract Termf,b,t is either contract strictness (columns 1 to 3), all-in drawn spread (columns 4 to 6), and
all-in undrawn spread (columns 7 to 9) for a loan originated in time t by bank b to firm f . α is the common intercept, θb,t represents
bank×time fixed effects, and Fixed Effects include, depending on the specification, firm fixed effects, rating (time-varying) fixed effects
and/or loan type fixed effects . Specialization is a lagged 3-year rolling average of the specialization dummy for bank b in the sector
of firm f . Market Share is the ratio between the credit provided by bank b to the industry firm f belongs to and the total amount of
credit received by all firms operating in the same industry as firm f , at time t− 1 . Firm controls include the z-score, current ratio, the
ratio of tangible net worth over total assets, and the ratio of debt over tangible net worth. Loan controls include logarithms of maturity,
number of participants and of the deal amount, and they are included in the specification for each column. In parentheses, t statistics
obtained from clustering at the bank level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 2.7: The effect of on loan contract terms, controlling for proximity
Contract Strictness All-In Drawn Spread All-In Undrawn Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Specialization -7.467∗∗ -8.283∗∗ -8.3∗∗ -18.12∗ -1.115 -5.276 2.178 3.944 3.652
(-2.06) (-2.12) (-2.11) (-2.03) (-0.10) (-0.51) (0.75) (1.19) (1.12)
Same State -.1656 -4.743 -4.749 -8.69 -10.3∗ -10.9∗ -1.598 -.8309 -.648
(-0.08) (-1.61) (-1.61) (-1.38) (-1.79) (-1.77) (-1.50) (-0.77) (-0.55)
Bank-Year FE X X X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X
Rating FE X X X X X X
Loan Type FE X X X
Adj. R2 .18 .527 .527 .411 .662 .683 .263 .558 .569
N. Banks 36 35 35 35 34 34 35 33 33
Observations 5484 4740 4740 5283 4549 4549 4526 3810 3810
This table reports the estimates of the coefficients from the following regression over our baseline sample, which includes only loans
for which the contract strictness measure is available:
Loan Contract Termf,b,t = α+ θb,t + Fixed Effects + β · Specializationf,b,t−1 + βS · Same Statef,b,t−1
+ βF · Firm Controlsf,t + βL · Loan Controlsf,b,t + εf,b,t
in which Loan Contract Termf,b,t is either contract strictness (columns 1 to 3), all-in drawn spread (columns 4 to 6), and
all-in undrawn spread (columns 7 to 9) for a loan originated in time t by bank b to firm f . α is the common intercept, θb,t
represents bank×time fixed effects, and Fixed Effects include, depending on the specification, firm fixed effects, rating (time-varying)
fixed effects and/or loan type fixed effects . Specialization is a lagged 3-year rolling average of the specialization dummy for bank b
in the sector of firm f . Same State is a dummy that takes value 1 if bank b and firm f are headquartered in the same state, and
0 otherwise. Firm controls include the z-score, current ratio, the ratio of tangible net worth over total assets, and the ratio of debt
over tangible net worth. Loan controls include logarithms of maturity, number of participants and of the deal amount, and they are
included in the specification for each column. In parentheses, t statistics obtained from clustering at the bank level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 2.8: The effect on loan contract terms, all controls
Contract Strictness All-In Drawn Spread All-In Undrawn Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Specialization -8.96∗∗ -9.822∗∗ -9.855∗∗ -17.93∗ -17.31∗ -13.15 -.2309 1.021 .9059
(-2.55) (-2.43) (-2.43) (-1.69) (-1.70) (-1.31) (-0.10) (0.48) (0.42)
Rel. Intensity .635 .7013 .7633 -10.55∗∗ -16.3∗∗∗ -12.29∗∗∗ .5623 -.012 -.097
(0.61) (0.59) (0.65) (-2.42) (-4.33) (-3.44) (0.78) (-0.02) (-0.14)
Rel. Length -.4538∗∗∗ -.1549 -.1473 -3.019∗∗∗ -1.458∗∗∗ -.7716∗∗∗ -.0886 .045 .0344
(-3.90) (-1.44) (-1.30) (-8.63) (-4.64) (-3.07) (-0.57) (0.63) (0.45)
Market Power 15.93∗∗∗ 11.63∗∗∗ 11.66∗∗∗ 25.09∗ .5519 .9313 7.7∗∗∗ 5.455∗∗∗ 4.657∗∗∗
(4.05) (3.97) (4.15) (1.81) (0.04) (0.07) (4.56) (5.35) (4.29)
Same State -.0342 -4.71 -4.725 -11.18∗∗ -3.752 -6.185 -.4033 .4631 .364
(-0.02) (-1.61) (-1.60) (-2.17) (-0.68) (-1.20) (-0.34) (0.37) (0.28)
Bank-Year FE X X X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X
Rating FE X X X X X X
Loan Type FE X X X
Adj. R2 .182 .527 .528 .382 .611 .64 .23 .541 .553
N. Banks 36 35 35 44 42 42 41 38 38
Observations 5484 4740 4740 11362 10541 10541 8374 7554 7554
This table reports the estimates of the coefficients from the following regression over our baseline sample, which includes only loans for which the contract
strictness measure is available:
Loan Contract Termf,b,t = α+ θb,t + Fixed Effects + β · Specializationf,b,t−1 + β1 · Rel. Lengthf,b,t−1 + β2 · Rel. Intensityf,b,t−1
+ βM ·Market Sharef,b,t−1 + βS · Same Statef,b,t−1 + βF · Firm Controlsf,t + βL · Loan Controlsf,b,t + εf,b,t
in which Loan Contract Termf,b,t is either contract strictness (columns 1 to 3), all-in drawn spread (columns 4 to 6), and all-in undrawn spread
(columns 7 to 9) for a loan originated in time t by bank b to firm f . α is the common intercept, θb,t represents bank×time fixed effects, and Fixed Effects
include, depending on the specification, firm fixed effects, rating (time-varying) fixed effects and/or loan type fixed effects . Specialization is a lagged
3-year rolling average of the specialization dummy for bank b in the sector of firm f . Rel. Length is the time elapsed between firm f first interaction with
the lead arranger b in the DealScan database and the current loan – originated at time t. Rel. Intensity is the ratio between the total amount of credit
firm f received from bank b over the past 5 years, and the total amount of credit received by firm f over the same period, excluding the current loan.
Market Share is the ratio between the credit provided by bank b to the industry firm f belongs to and the total amount of credit received by all firms
operating in the same industry as firm f , at time t − 1 . Same State is a dummy that takes value 1 if bank b and firm f are headquartered in the same
state, and 0 otherwise. Firm controls include the z-score, current ratio, the ratio of tangible net worth over total assets, and the ratio of debt over tangible
net worth. Loan controls include logarithms of maturity, number of participants and of the deal amount, and they are included in the specification for
each column. In parentheses, t statistics obtained from clustering at the bank level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively.
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Table 2.9: Evidence from defaults on lender portfolios
Contract Strictness All-In Drawn Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Defaults on Lender Portfolios (90 days)
.037 .0266 -.3951 -.4065
(0.19) (0.14) (-0.73) (-0.73)
.7138 .7643 4.777 4.667
(0.29) (0.31) (0.75) (0.74)
1.151∗ 1.145∗ 1.665 1.858
(1.76) (1.85) (0.89) (0.93)
-.6677 -.7034 10.78∗∗∗ 9.627∗∗
(-0.53) (-0.56) (2.93) (2.40)
-4.944 -4.606 -4.971 -17.88 -16.29 -18.44
(-0.96) (-0.87) (-0.95) (-1.18) (-1.15) (-1.21)
.238 .238 .238 .474 .474 .474
29 29 29 31 31 31
Defaults (90d, other)
Specialization × Defaults (90d, other)
Defaults (90d, same)





4472 4472 4472 8933 8933 8933
Defaults on Lender Portfolios (360 days)
Defaults (360d, other) -.102∗ -.0985∗ -.0493 -.0528
(-2.04) (-1.95) (-0.19) (-0.21)
-.6811 1.052 .7838Specialization × Defaults (360d, other) -.2738 
(-0.17) (-0.44) (0.38) (0.28)
.0028 .0379 .6019 .6311
(0.01) (0.17) (1.48) (1.59)
4.245∗∗∗ 4.631∗∗ 5.445 4.48
(4.23) (2.73) (1.32) (1.02)
-4.101 -5.828 -4.582 -17.78 -16.6 -18.04
(-0.78) (-1.15) (-0.86) (-1.07) (-1.13) (-1.08)
.238 .238 .238 .474 .474 .474
29 29 29 31 31 31
Defaults (360d, same)





4472 4472 4472 8933 8933 8933
X X X X X X
X X X X X X
X X X X X X
Bank FE Year 
FE Rating FE 
Loan Type FE
X X X X X X
This table reports the estimates of the coefficients on the Specialization variable from the following regression over three different 
samples, one that includes all loans with at most 10 lead arrangers – as identified by our procedure – one that includes all loans with 
at most 5 lead arrangers, and one that includes only loans with 1 lead arranges:
Loan Contract Termf,b,t = α + θb + θt + Fixed Effects + β · Specializationf,b,t−1
+ γD · Defaultsb,t−1 + ρ · Specializationf,b,t−1 × Defaultsb,t−1
+ γB · Bank Controlsb,t + γF · Firm Controlsf,t + γL · Loan Controlsf,b,t + εf,b,t
in which Loan Contract Termf,b,t is either contract strictness (columns 1 to 3), all-in drawn spread (columns
4 to 6), and all-in undrawn spread (columns 7 to 9) for a loan originated in time t by bank b to firm f . α is the
common intercept, θb represents bank fixed effects, while θt the year fixed effects. Specialization is a lagged 3-year rolling quarterly 
average of specialization dummy for bank b in the sector of firm f . Defaultsb,t−1 stands for either Defaults
(same) (columns 2,3, 5,6), which denotes only the defaults that have occurred in the same industry as f , or for Defaults
(other) (columns 1,3,4,6), which considers the total number of defaults occurred in all other industries. In the first panel, we 
record only defaults in the 90 days before the underwriting of the loan, while in the second panel we extend the horizon to the 
last 360 days. Firm controls include the z-score, current ratio, the ratio of tangible net worth over total assets, and the 
ratio of debt over tangible net worth. Loan controls include logarithms of maturity, number of participants and of the deal 
amount, and they are included in the specification for each column. In parentheses, t statistics obtained from
clustering at the bank level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 2.10: Robustness: Dropping loan-level controls
Contract Strictness All-In Drawn Spread All-In Undrawn Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Specialization -9.424∗∗ -8.164∗∗ -8.446∗∗ -19.98∗∗ 4.058 -1.069 .59 3.768 3.647
(-2.35) (-2.19) (-2.24) (-2.04) (0.37) (-0.11) (0.21) (1.13) (1.13)
Borrower Z-Score -4.625∗∗∗ -3.24∗∗∗ -3.238∗∗∗ -16.37∗∗∗ -8.617∗∗∗ -8.681∗∗∗ -2.216∗∗∗ -1.201∗∗∗ -1.199∗∗∗
(-13.89) (-5.05) (-5.06) (-9.31) (-5.43) (-5.45) (-8.64) (-3.49) (-3.42)
Debt/Tang. Net Worth -.0258 -.0188 -.0167 -.0894∗∗ -.0294 -.0312 -.0144 -.0286∗∗∗ -.0264∗∗∗
(-1.26) (-0.48) (-0.43) (-2.15) (-0.80) (-1.10) (-1.52) (-4.15) (-3.71)
Tang. Net Worth/Assets -2.247 -9.696 -9.857 -39.02∗∗∗ -34.69∗∗∗ -31.38∗∗∗ 8.353∗∗∗ 6.113∗∗ 5.79∗∗
(-0.65) (-1.50) (-1.51) (-4.27) (-3.44) (-2.92) (5.71) (2.55) (2.50)
Current Ratio 1.097∗ -2.298∗ -2.315∗ 14.59∗∗∗ -.9662 -1.838 1.553∗∗ -1.683 -1.628
(1.70) (-1.69) (-1.72) (5.12) (-0.57) (-0.97) (2.49) (-1.10) (-1.09)
Bank-Year FE X X X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X
Rating FE X X X X X X
Loan Type FE X X X
Adj. R2 .133 .526 .527 .346 .658 .68 .222 .547 .558
N. Banks 36 35 35 35 34 34 35 33 33
Observations 5500 4756 4756 5291 4558 4558 4529 3815 3815
This table reports the estimates of the coefficients from the following regression over our baseline sample, which includes only loans for which the contract
strictness measure is available:
Loan Contract Termf,b,t = α+ θb,t + Fixed Effects + β · Specializationf,b,t−1 + βF · Firm Controlsf,t + εf,b,t
in which Loan Contract Termf,b,t is either contract strictness (columns 1 to 3), all-in drawn spread (columns 4 to 6), and all-in undrawn spread
(columns 7 to 9) for a loan originated in time t by bank b to firm f . α is the common intercept, θb,t represents bank×time fixed effects, and Fixed Effects
include, depending on the specification, firm fixed effects, rating (time-varying) fixed effects and/or loan type fixed effects . Specialization is a lagged 3-year
rolling average of specialization dummy for bank b in the sector of firm f . Firm controls include the z-score, current ratio, the ratio of tangible net worth over
total assets, and the ratio of debt over tangible net worth. In parentheses, t statistics obtained from clustering at the bank level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 2.11: Robustness: Different averages of the specialization dummy
Contract Strictness All-In Drawn Spread All-In Undrawn Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Specialization (1Y) -5.78∗ -2.271 -2.244 -11.99 12.39 9.623 2.127 4.249∗ 4.148
(-1.75) (-0.53) (-0.52) (-1.32) (1.06) (0.93) (1.02) (1.70) (1.67)
Specialization (2Y) -6.248∗ -4.356 -4.333 -15.44 -2.725 -6.019 2.091 2.266 2.03
(-1.78) (-0.92) (-0.91) (-1.55) (-0.24) (-0.61) (0.83) (0.74) (0.67)
Specialization -7.477∗∗ -8.319∗∗ -8.34∗∗ -18.66∗∗ -1.144 -5.319 2.022 3.944 3.652
(-2.08) (-2.17) (-2.16) (-2.10) (-0.10) (-0.52) (0.69) (1.19) (1.12)
Specialization (4Y) -7.168 -10.95∗∗∗ -10.94∗∗∗ -19.19∗ -5.536 -8.339 1.434 3.746 3.393
(-1.66) (-2.87) (-2.82) (-1.99) (-0.47) (-0.77) (0.41) (0.99) (0.91)
Specialization (5Y) -9.592∗ -9.823∗ -10.13∗ -14.38 2.178 -.2374 1.338 3.381 2.651
(-1.97) (-1.90) (-1.97) (-1.07) (0.16) (-0.02) (0.37) (0.86) (0.69)
Bank-Year FE X X X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X
Rating FE X X X X X X
Loan Type FE X X X
This table reports the estimates of the coefficients on the Specialization variable – averaged over different time horizons – from the following
regression over our baseline sample, which includes only loans for which the contract strictness measure is available:
Loan Contract Termf,b,t = α+ θb,t + Fixed Effects + β · Specialization (nY)f,b,t−1 + βF · Firm Controlsf,t + βL · Loan Controlsf,b,t + εf,b,t
in which Loan Contract Termf,b,t is either contract strictness (columns 1 to 3), all-in drawn spread (columns 4 to 6), and all-in
undrawn spread (columns 7 to 9) for a loan originated in time t by bank b to firm f . α is the common intercept, θb,t represents bank×time
fixed effects, and Fixed Effects include, depending on the specification, firm fixed effects, rating (time-varying) fixed effects and/or loan type
fixed effects . Specialization(nY) is a lagged n-year rolling quarterly average of the specialization dummy for bank b in the sector of firm f .
In our baseline analysis, Specialization is averaged over 3 years, and is the one without parentheses in this table (third row). Firm controls
include the z-score, current ratio, the ratio of tangible net worth over total assets, and the ratio of debt over tangible net worth. Loan controls
include logarithms of maturity, number of participants and of the deal amount, and they are included in the specification for each column. In
parentheses, t statistics obtained from clustering at the bank level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 2.12: Robustness: Changing number of lead arrangers cutoff
Contract Strictness All-In Drawn Spread All-In Undrawn Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Loans with ≤ 10 Lead Arrangers (Baseline)
Specialization -7.477∗∗ -8.319∗∗ -8.34∗∗ -18.66∗∗ -1.144 -5.319 2.022 3.944 3.652
(-2.08) (-2.17) (-2.16) (-2.10) (-0.10) (-0.52) (0.69) (1.19) (1.12)
Observations 5484 4740 4740 5283 4549 4549 4526 3810 3810
Loans with ≤ 5 Lead Arrangers
Specialization -10.16∗∗ -9.843∗ -9.949∗∗ -24.16∗∗∗ -5.969 -10.3 1.505 3.673 3.447
(-2.51) (-2.01) (-2.05) (-2.90) (-0.47) (-0.88) (0.50) (1.06) (1.00)
Observations 5449 4709 4709 5254 4522 4522 4502 3785 3785
Loans with 1 Lead Arranger
Specialization -13.35∗∗ -13.62∗∗ -13.93∗∗ -25.05∗ -.3457 -6.529 -1.582 -4.584 -4.799
(-2.65) (-2.07) (-2.16) (-1.94) (-0.02) (-0.39) (-0.70) (-1.15) (-1.23)
Observations 4949 4204 4204 4792 4053 4053 4109 3393 3393
Bank-Year FE X X X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X
Rating FE X X X X X X
Loan Type FE X X X
This table reports the estimates of the coefficients on the Specialization variable from the following regression over three different samples, one that
includes all loans with at most 10 lead arrangers – as identified by our procedure – one that includes all loans with at most 5 lead arrangers, and
one that includes only loans with 1 lead arranges:
Loan Contract Termf,b,t = α+ θb,t + Fixed Effects + β · Specializationf,b,t−1 + βF · Firm Controlsf,t + βL · Loan Controlsf,b,t + εf,b,t
in which Loan Contract Termf,b,t is either contract strictness (columns 1 to 3), all-in drawn spread (columns 4 to 6), and all-in undrawn
spread (columns 7 to 9) for a loan originated in time t by bank b to firm f . α is the common intercept, θb,t represents bank×time fixed effects,
and Fixed Effects include, depending on the specification, firm fixed effects, rating (time-varying) fixed effects and/or loan type fixed effects .
Specialization is a lagged 3-year rolling quarterly average of specialization dummy for bank b in the sector of firm f . Firm controls include the
z-score, current ratio, the ratio of tangible net worth over total assets, and the ratio of debt over tangible net worth. Loan controls include logarithms
of maturity, number of participants and of the deal amount, and they are included in the specification for each column. In parentheses, t statistics
obtained from clustering at the bank level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 2.13: Robustness: Alternative sets of controls
Contract Strictness All-In Drawn Spread All-In Undrawn Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Specialization -5.729 -8.332∗∗ -8.291∗∗ -10.7 -2.045 -6.388 1.806 3.781 3.493
(-1.44) (-2.32) (-2.29) (-1.31) (-0.18) (-0.62) (0.61) (1.14) (1.06)
Borrower Z-Score -3.654∗∗∗ -2.483∗∗∗ -2.46∗∗∗ -15.35∗∗∗ -8.494∗∗∗ -8.414∗∗∗ -2.01∗∗∗ -1.009∗∗ -.9739∗∗
(-11.24) (-4.31) (-4.30) (-7.30) (-4.83) (-4.99) (-5.36) (-2.42) (-2.40)
Borrower Leverage .2877∗∗∗ .294∗∗∗ .2983∗∗∗ .8644∗∗∗ .7037∗∗∗ .6581∗∗∗ -.02 -.046 -.0437
(6.98) (5.97) (5.92) (4.82) (3.29) (3.14) (-0.60) (-0.76) (-0.75)
Log(Borrower Assets) -5.353∗∗∗ 3.861 4.031 -26.18∗∗∗ -18.87∗∗∗ -19.01∗∗∗ -.5294 .6701 .6554
(-6.20) (1.42) (1.42) (-10.11) (-3.67) (-4.06) (-1.52) (0.75) (0.65)
Current Ratio -.8615 -2.853∗∗ -2.843∗∗ 5.955∗∗ -1.758 -2.539 1.352∗∗ -1.501 -1.471
(-1.53) (-2.49) (-2.54) (2.24) (-0.91) (-1.14) (2.23) (-0.96) (-0.95)
Bank-Year FE X X X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X X X
Rating FE X X X X X X
Loan Type FE X X X
Adj. R2 .212 .531 .532 .452 .666 .686 .256 .556 .568
N. Banks 36 35 35 35 34 34 35 33 33
Observations 5484 4740 4740 5283 4549 4549 4526 3810 3810
This table reports the estimates of the coefficients from the following regression over our baseline sample, which includes only loans for which the contract
strictness measure is available, using an alternative set of firm-level controls:
Loan Contract Termf,b,t = α+ θb,t + Fixed Effects + β · Specializationf,b,t−1 + βF · Firm Controlsf,t + βL · Loan Controlsf,b,tεf,b,t
in which Loan Contract Termf,b,t is either contract strictness (columns 1 to 3), all-in drawn spread (columns 4 to 6), and all-in undrawn
spread (columns 7 to 9) for a loan originated in time t by bank b to firm f . α is the common intercept, θb,t represents bank×time fixed effects, and
Fixed Effects include, depending on the specification, firm fixed effects, rating (time-varying) fixed effects and/or loan type fixed effects . Specialization
is a lagged 3-year rolling average of specialization dummy for bank b in the sector of firm f . Firm controls include the z-score, current ratio, log of firm
total assets, and firm leverage, measured as the ratio of total debt over total assets. Loan controls include logarithms of maturity, number of participants
and of the deal amount, and they are included in the specification for each column. In parentheses, t statistics obtained from clustering at the bank
level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Figures
Figure 2.1: Specialization examples
No Specialization Specialization
No Specialization Specialization (Bank 2)
Note: This figure reports simplified examples from a two banks, two sectors lending market. These
examples are overall meant to stress how an “outlierness” definition of lending specialization avoids
confounding specialization with the shear size of the supply of credit to an industrial sector. From the top
left, we can see an obvious example of lack of specialization; an obvious example of specialization (bank 1 is
mostly lending to sector A, bank 2 to sector B); a case in which both banks are lending mostly to one sector
– this is not classified as specialization in the outlier sense, as each bank balance sheet is representative of
the average balance sheet of the banks’ population; finally, a case in which the bank that lends less to a
sector (bank 2, only lending to B) is the only one recorded as specialized – indeed, its small lending supply
to sector B is the 100 percent of the lending from bank 2, while the larger supply by bank 1 is only the 10
percent of bank 1’s lending.
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Figure 2.2: The average bank is less diversified than the market
Note: This figure plots on the y-axis the entropy measure of loan portfolio concentration, and on the
x-axis the year at which it is recorded. Entropy is computed for the Market (blue) and Average Bank
(red) portfolios per each year. Entropy of the market portfolio is defined as EMt = −
∑I
i=1 Lit log (Lit),
where Lit is total outstanding syndicated loan in Dealscan to industry i in year t; Entropy of the average













. A higher value of the entropy measure implies that lending to sectors is
more dispersed in the market/average bank’s portfolio. The fact that the average bank is systematically less
entropic than the market shows graphically how the average syndicate loan leader remained overall more
concentrated than the whole syndicated market over the last 20 years.
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Figure 2.3: Specialization is common across industries and time
2000 2005
2010 2015
Note: This figure shows on the x-axis TNIC sectors, and on the y-axis centered portfolio shares, Lbit − L̄it.
Lbit is the portfolio share of loans to sector i at year t for bank b, while L̄it is the average of the same
measure across all banks lending to industry i at time t. Data are represented through box-and-whiskers
plots of centered shares per each sector. When a blue dot is shown, Lbit − L̄it for bank b is a positive outlier
with respect to the distribution of Lβ 6=bit − L̄it in sector i at year t. As outlier banks are common across
all sectors and at all years (years reported on top of each figure), we can conclude that “outlierness” is a
common feature of the syndicated loan market.
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Firms’ management and the quality of contract enforcement are two important factors
that help explain disparities in growth, innovation, and productivity. Two literatures
have studied the economic effects of management (see Bloom and Van Reenen (2010)
review) and institutions (see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005), Moser (2013)
reviews) in a mostly separate fashion. In this paper, I work on linking these two strands.
I contribute in two ways. First, using publicly available firm-level data, I bring novel
empirical evidence of a link between managerial selection and contract enforcement
through the access to credit; second I use a simple static general equilibrium model of
firm allocation to study the mechanics of this potential link, and when its presence
can justify policy interventions.
I document the possibility of a link between defective contract enforcement and
managerial selection. Using the World Bank “Doing Business” survey, and Eurostat
labor data, I highlight the case of Italy, where two anomalies - long expected time to
enforce a contract, and a higher presence of old managers - can be observed jointly.
First, it takes double the amount of time to solve a commercial dispute in Italy than
in any other major European country. Second, Italian firms have approximately 2.3
times more over-60 year old CEOs than the firms of other comparable European
‡University of Pennsylvania.
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countries, and such difference cannot be rationalized by differences in the age profile
of the population, labor force, or by systematic differences in the entry or exit rates of
firms across such countries.
Using Bruegel’s firm level survey data (EFIGE survey, Altomonte and Aquilante
(2012)), I confirm that the age anomaly is robust to controlling for different firm and
regional level characteristics. At present, I lack data allowing me to directly investigate
the relationship between the quality of contract enforcement and managerial selection.
I do, instead, have information about firms’ access to credit, which is strongly affected
by a weak enforcement environment (see Jappelli, Pagano, and Bianco (2005) and
Schiantarelli, Stacchini, and Strahan (2020)). I thus document a series of robust
correlations, which are both economically and statistically significant, and suggestive
of a trade-off between management quality and the access to financing when quality
of enforcement is bad.
First, it is the case that across all major European countries, old CEOs come with
older credit relationships, but more so in Italy; furthermore, only in Italy it is the case
that old CEOs come with a higher probability of being granted a loan application. For
a subsample of the dataset for which information on the use of external financing is
available, I show that there is no evidence that old Italian CEOs invest systematically
in less risky projects, implying that the difference in the likelihood of being granted
credit appears to be linked directly to CEO’s characteristics, and not to firm’s or
projects’ characteristics. On the other hand, I do also find evidence that such old
CEOs come at cost, as firms’ with old CEOs tend to list “lack of managerial resources”
as a constraint to their growth.
I then present a theoretical investigation of the trade-off highlighted by the de-
scriptive evidence, i.e. the one between adopting a new vintage of human capital,67
and facing financing and contracting frictions which destroy value. Such trade-off can
be summarized in a simple model of a market for the management rights on firms, in
67Clearly, we must believe that the new vintage is better for this to be a proper trade-off. As I
want to study, in general, when a policy of subsidy can make sense, I will start from the assumption
that the new vintage is better. On the matter there is relatively little empirical evidence. For a
few examples, Daveri and Maliranta (2007) and Daveri and Parisi (2015), using Finnish and Italian
data respectively, find that old managers can arm firm performance in innovative industries, and
Kodama and Li (2018) estimate on Japanese data a managerial performance curve, and find it peaks
at around 55 years of age.
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the style of Caselli and Gennaioli (2005), building on Lucas Jr (1978)’s framework.68
In such model, firms are a production technology that employs human capital
and labor to produce the final consumption good. Managers provide the human
capital of the firms, while workers provide labor. To manage the firm, a person must
own a “license” to operate the technology, and pay the wage of her workers before
production is realized. Such working capital constraint forces the managers to borrow
funds from a bank, which can be thought of as a foreign, deep-pocketed investor. I
consider a case with no uncertainty of any kind, and no default. There are two types of
risk-neutral agents in the economy. “Old” people, who originally own licenses, have a
lower endowment of human capital, and exogenously borrow at a risk-free rate; “young”
people, who can buy licenses, have a higher endowment of human capital, but must
borrow at an exogenously higher rate. Such add-on to the price of labor is a shorthand
to represent the cost of setting up credit relationships, or more in general a reputation
for respecting contracts, in an environment where public contract enforcement is weak.
Firm allocation will thus depend on whether the gap in the quality of human capital
vintages is high enough to compensate the higher cost of borrowing. A sufficiently
higher human capital is such that the young can grant a payment to the old which
is large enough to make the old happy to relinquish control and just supply labor in
equilibrium. In particular, I show that if the financing friction is the only friction
in the economy, the allocation of firms to the young or the old is based on a cutoff
rule in the size of the friction vis-a-vis the gap in human capital vintages, and the
equilibrium is unique.
I then study the equilibrium efficiency properties, establishing three results. First,
the equilibrium of the market for control may be wasteful. Which is, it may not
coincide with the unconstrained optimum. Old agents do not internalize the general
equilibrium effect of not relinquishing the firm on wages, thus making the equilibrium
with allocation of the firm to the young unfeasible even in cases where aggregate
consumption implied by such allocation would be higher. Second, this does not
grant per se an argument for interventions that a naive reading of the first result
would suggest, e.g. subsidies to young entrepreneurs. No tax/subsidy levied in
equilibrium can improve on it, as long as the planner must respect the same resource
68I stress differences and comment similarities with Caselli and Gennaioli (2005) at the end of this
Introduction.
117
and participation constraints as the players in the economy. Third, a simple extension
of the model can, instead, grant a range of interventions. If we assume that also the
market for control is frictional, in particular that a fraction of the price of the license
is lost in the passage from old to young, multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria arise. The
economy can be stuck in the equilibrium with lower consumption, while both the
low and high consumption equilibria are feasible.69 Tax/subsidies can be used by a
benevolent planner to select the best among feasible equilibria.
The result can be explained following the logic of Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986).
The reason for the waste in the equilibrium with only the financing friction is the
complementarity in the “relinquishing” action of the old, which causes a large shift in
the price of labor (and firms). At the same time, as long as the market for control is
frictionless, gain and losses due to the pecuniary externality net out, and this is why
the equilibrium cannot be improved upon within the constraints of the economy. The
inefficiency in the extended model is, instead, due to the interaction of the two frictions.
Again, control allocation affect wages and, through wages, it exerts an indirect effect
on the value of the firm. Though, this now affects differentially old and young agents,
because of the friction in the market for control. The pecuniary externality does
not net out, but nobody can individually act on wages to take this asymmetry into
account. This justifies how the economy can get stuck in the equilibrium in which the
allocation of firms implies the highest waste.
The mechanism I stress in this paper relates to the theoretical grounds of policies
subsidizing new entrepreneurs.70 I highlight how believing that the potential new
entrants’ “quality” (the human capital endowment in the model) is higher and that
they face financing frictions does not per se grant an economic argument for a policy
of subsidies. I show that in order to sustain a policy of subsidies we must believe that
the market for control is frictional in itself.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents aggregate and
firm level motivating my interest in the topic and some of the assumption of the
modeling framework; Section 3.3 presents the theoretical framework and the policy
69Note, the inefficient equilibrium may involve either the young or the old as managers. It depends
on the relative size of the frictions, and the gap in ability between young and old.
70Such policies are common both in the developing and developed world, while their effectiveness
is debated (see Acs et al. (2016), Åstebro (2017), Fotopoulos and Storey (2019)).
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implications I derive from it; Section 3.4 concludes.
Related literature. The works closest to mine are the theoretical papers by Burkart,
Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003), Caselli and Gennaioli (2005), the quantitative papers
by Caselli and Gennaioli (2013) and Lippi and Schivardi (2014), and the empirical
literature spurred by works such as La Porta, Silanes, and andrei (1999), La Porta et al.
(2000). I distinguish myself from the first set of works, which focus on family firms,
tackling incumbent advantages in general and shifting my focus on optimal policy. In
particular, Caselli and Gennaioli (2005) studies a setting where firm misallocation is
caused by an agency problem in the credit market, giving rise to multiple equilibria
through the general equilibrium effects on wages too. In my case, the mechanism
giving rise to the multiplicity is simpler and exogenous, it is grounded on the add-on
to factor prices that only young agents must pay. This is a coarser choice, but gives
rise to a simple environment in which there is a potentially efficient justification
for allocating the firm to the “less capable” agents, i.e. saving on a friction in the
capital market. My contribution is a study of the efficiency properties of the model,
discussing policy implications from the perspective of a planner that must respect the
same constraints as the agents in the economy. I contribute to the second strand of
literature bringing further empirical evidence on the matter, including in our analysis
data about small manufacturer, and highlighting the role of access to credit in driving
the selection into firms leaderships.
Furthermore, I contribute to the debate about the problem of the Italian economy,
and how business leadership contributes to them (Bandiera et al. (2008), Daveri and
Parisi (2015), Pellegrino and Zingales (2017), Schivardi and Schmitz (2018)). In
particular, and complementary to Pellegrino and Zingales (2017), I point out that
even if we do not believe that the prevalence of old managers in Italy is directly linked
to lower productivity at the firm level, it can be a relevant indicator of the importance




Among the major European economies (France, Germany, Italy, and Spain) the
country with the worst enforcement of contracts, Italy, is also an outlier in terms of
the share of managers that are over-60 years old. I document this regularity employing
two main sources. First, I use Eurostat data for aggregate business and population
demographics. Second, to track the quality of enforcement, I use the Doing Business
survey by the World Bank. Both sources are publicly available, and data free to
download on their websites.
I start from the age distribution of managers across countries. My data source,
Eurostat, is the European Union’s Directorate General responsible for collecting data
and analysis to inform the European institutions. Among other information, it collects
firms’, workers’ and population’s demographics, and makes them available by country,
age group, profession, role in the firm.
In Figure 3.1 we can see that, in the second quarter of 2017,71 Italy had about 2.3
times more over-60 years old managers than the Euro area average.72 The relative
prevalence of old managers in Italy has been documented in Bandiera et al. (2008)
and Boeri, Merlo, and Prat (2010). Though, these works tend to stress dispersion
in the distribution, whose average is overall similar to the one of other countries. I
instead focus specifically on the fat right tail of the age distribution, and I show that
it is a persistent regularity across multiple datasets, which cannot be explained by
underlaying cross-country demographic differences. First, as shown in Figure 3.2, such
wide discrepancy is not matched by a comparably high discrepancy in the age profile
of the entire population. Moreover, it is also not matched by a similar cross-country
difference in the share of old workers. Aiyar and Ebeke (2017) show (see Figure 1,
p.4 in Aiyar and Ebeke (2017)) that even though the share of old (55-65 years old)
workers in Italy at 2016 is around 15 percent, it is below the German figure, and in
line with the Euro area average. Finally, also firm demographics appears not to be
71This is the last date for which Eurostat shows reliable data on number of managers by age class
for all the major European economies, and the Euro area average.
72Eurostat defines managers as employees that fall within the International Labour Office Major
Group 1 definition, i.e. employees who “plan, direct, coordinate and evaluate the overall activities of
enterprises, governments and other organizations, or other organizational units within them, and
formulate and review their policies, laws, rules and regulations” (ILO (2012), Vol. I, p.87).
120
enough to explain all of the large difference. In Figure 3.3 and 3.4 we can see that,
even though it is true that in Italy the firm entry and exit rates are among the lowest,
the differences with Spain, France and Germany are relatively small, with Germany
and France recording respectively the smallest entry rate from 2014 onward, and the
smallest exit rate from 2011 onward.
An aspect under which the Italian economy differs as starkly as in the prevalence
of old managers, is the time it takes to enforce a contract. This can be observed
employing the Doing Business survey by the World Bank. The Doing Business survey
is recorded since 2003 by the World Bank; it measures the ease of doing business
across different countries (see Besley (2015)). Among other data, the survey collects
information on expected time to solve court cases, and the costs involved in using the
enforcement services provided by a country’s legal system.
In Figure 3.5 I plot the expected time to conclude a commercial dispute in a
major city in each country, as of the opinions of a World Bank selected sample of
legal experts and judges.73 Doing this, I can see that the expected time to solve a
dispute is about double the European expected time. Such evidence is confirmed in the
literature employing different measures of court efficiency. See, for example, Djankov
et al. (2003), Giacomelli and Menon (2016), and Drozd and Serrano-Padial (2018).
This is relevant for my study, as such low quality enforcement may highly increase
the value of connections and soft enforcements through relationship capital.74 The
importance of soft enforcement and the high cost of commercial litigation could then
justify an incumbent advantage, and contribute to explain the age profile discrepancy.
Clearly, as the unit of observation is at the country level, recording the coexistence
of old managers prevalence, and of very slow contract enforcement is not enough to
73A commercial dispute is defined by the World Bank as a procedure in which firm A necessitates
of a legal enforcement procedure to obtained a payment to which firm B was bound by a contract.
Cities involved in the surveys are capital cities, in the case of France, Germany and Spain, and an
average of major municipalities for the case of Italy. Survey methodology details can be consulted at
https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/methodology/enforcing-contracts.
74Lippi and Schivardi (2014) present a similar argument in the motivation of their quantitative
framework. For a review on the substitutability between formal and informal enforcement, see
MacLeod (2007), and for a recent example of a study of how reputation constrains markets when
enforcement is lacking see Macchiavello and Morjaria (2015). In a fully dynamic environment, this
reasoning is valid under the assumption that the cost of screening new relationships in a weak
enforcement setting is higher than the one implied by the higher attractiveness of default for an old
agent.
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postulate the above channel. Unfortunately, I lack the data to directly argue a causal
chain starting from the quality of enforcement and ending with effects on the allocation
of management positions. At the same time though, less direct ways to document
correlations supportive of my reasoning can be pursued. Weak enforcement is a general
feature of an economy, with many implications. One is, though, particularly salient.
It is well documented that, in such economies, granting loans is riskier.
For example, Jappelli, Pagano, and Bianco (2005) shows that, within Italy and
controlling for geographic heterogeneity, worse judicial efficiency correlates with lower
credit supply and higher measures of credit constraints for businesses; more recently
Schiantarelli, Stacchini, and Strahan (2020) shows evidence that Italian the same firm
is more likely to default on a bank that is located where legal enforcement is slower,
and that credit losses during financial crisis are worsened by this behavior. This is
confirmed for the Italian case by the Doing Business survey. Indeed, even though
the expected time to resolve an insolvency is in line with the rest of its European
peers, Italian insolvency procedures are extremely wasteful (22 percent of the assets
involved75 gets lost in 2017, double the Spanish figure), and the recovery rate on the
Euro is 63 percent, 15 percent lower than the second worst performer among the five
major countries, France.
If the channel I postulate - weak enforcement is substituted with soft enforcement
and reputation built through time is particularly valuable - is indeed at play, we
should expect to observe it at play in the access to credit of firms. Which is, we
should observe for Italian firms, and only for them, ease in credit conditions coming
with older management. To do this, I use a publicly available survey of European
manufacturers collected by Bruegel, in its expanded version including balance sheet
information. Through this I do show that the expected correlation is present, and
that, more in general, a trade-off between firm-growth and access to financial resources
appears at play only in the Italian case. This is clearly a second best with respect of
showing empirically that weak enforcement actually causes these regularities I observe,
a task which I leave to further work.
75The World Bank defines the assets involved as the debtor’s estate, which encompasses the
debtor’s assets that are garnishable.
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Firm level evidence from EFIGE
The EFIGE (European Firms in a Global Economy) dataset is a detailed survey of
14,759 manufacturers from Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, and the
United Kingdom (Altomonte and Aquilante (2012), which also includes extensive
description). Data refer to the year 2007, and include information of firms’ employment,
operation, ownership structure, management structure, credit access and use of external
resources. The survey is anonymized and includes sampling weights to be representative
of the underlying national population of firms.76 I employ the version of the dataset
augmented with information from Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus, a balance sheets
database covering European firms.77
Following Piguillem and Rubini (2019) and Steinberg (2019), I drop observations
for Austria and Hungary, which have worst data coverage, and I focus on a resulting
sample of 13,771 observations. The dataset restricts information on the management
to each firm’s CEO, which often coincides with the business owner for smaller firms.
The sample characteristics are described in Table 3.1; I have information regarding
CEO age bracket (10 years brackets), her relationships to the owners, whether the
firm is owned by foreigners, whether it is active abroad, and whether the firm was
born before 1976 (Old Firm dummy); for about 12,000 observations, I can observe
firms’ total assets, liquidity ratio, and the answer to a questionnaire asking to the
respondent within the firm whether they perceive that management or accessing to
finance pose a constraint to growth;78 for about 10,000 observations, I can observe
number of employees, and EBITDA; for a more restricted subset of the dataset, I can
finally observe the age of the relationship with the main bank (6,000 observations),
whether the firm was denied a credit application, and how it used external funding79
(2,500 observations).
First of all I set to verify whether the regularities observed in the aggregate data
76In all the regressions result reported, I do employ the sampling weights provided.
77The dataset has been employed, among others, by Pellegrino and Zingales (2017) to investigate
the reasons for the Italian economic stagnation, by Steinberg (2019) to track the effects of Brexit, and
by Piguillem and Rubini (2019) to track the interaction between barriers to firm growth and export.
78Other possibilities are listed, as bureaucracy, but fall beside the scope of this paper. As the
survey is anonymous, I cannot access to the role of the respondent within the firm, nor to any
summary statistic or break-down regarding it.
79External funding uses recorded include 1) the increase of the scale of production, 2) in or 3) out
of sector acquisitions, 4) funding working capital, 5) optimizing the funding mix.
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for managers in general do hold also in the firm level data for CEOs. In Figure 3.6
I observe that the fatter right tail of the age distribution is common between the
two data sources. To verify that firm heterogeneity cannot explain away the large
numbers of old CEOs in Italy, as a next step I explore differences in the relationship
between the old age of CEOs and the five country dummies, as I progressively saturate
a regression with controls.
The relationship I estimate takes the form
CEO Older than 65fc = α +
∑
c
βcCountry Dummiesfc + ΓXfc + εfc (3.1)
where CEO Older than 65fc is a dummy taking value 1 if firm f , located in country
c, is led by an over-65 CEO; α is a common intercept, coinciding with the excluded
country dummy, Germany; Country Dummiesfc, dummies equal 1 if firm f is located
in country c 6= Germany. Xfc is a matrix of covariates. It includes, at its largest, a
dummy equal to 1 if the firm birth is before 1976; a dummy equal to 1 if the CEO is
related to the owners; a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is an active exporter; a dummy
equal to 1 if the firm is owned by foreigners; the number of firm employees; total
assets in millions of Euro; EBITDA; liquidity, calculated as fixed assets minus stocks,
divided by current liabilities; region, industry, employee size-class fixed effects (FEs);
εfc is the heteroscedasticity robust standard error.
In Table 3.2 I present the findings. In the first column, I observe that the fraction of
over-65 CEOs is about 9 percent in Germany, with Spain and France showing younger
CEOs on average, the United Kingdom slightly older CEOs, and Italy a striking 21
percent of over-65 CEOs.80 As sequential robustness test, I start adding (column 2)
the region, industry, and size class FEs; then the firm level dummies tracking firm’s
foreign operation, ownership structure, and age; then the balance sheets controls
(column 3). We can see that, upon the addition of the balance sheet controls (column
4), only the Italian dummy’s coefficient stays large and significant. This implies that
for the firm for which we have balance sheet information, firm characteristics explain
80Though, it must be noticed that also the standard deviation is double in the Italian case, which
reconciles my stylized fact with the finding that the average Italian CEO age is not extremely different
from her European peers (Bandiera et al. (2008))
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to a large extent the correlation between CEO’s old age in all countries except for
Italy, substantiating the robustness of the previous stylized fact.
Second, I show that there is evidence to believe that only in Italy there is an
old-CEO – access-to-financial-resources trade-off. The first piece of evidence I present
comes from estimating the following linear regression for all countries but Italy, and,
separately, for Italy.
CEO Older than 65fc = α + βManagerial Constraintfc
+ ωFinancial Constraintfc + ΓXfc + εfc
(3.2)
where α is a common intercept; Managerial Constraintfc is a dummy equal to one
if, in the answer to the survey, firm’s f respondent claimed that lacking managerial
resources constrain the growth of the firm; Financial Constraintfc is an equivalent
dummy, if financial resources are mentioned as a constraint growth; Xfc; the Xfc
matrix includes the same variables as in Equation 3.1, plus, whenever the specification
is estimated on all countries but Italy, a Country * Industry FE.
Table 3.3 shows that, 1) consistently across finer and finer specifications, Italian
firms led by an over-65 CEOs are 4 percent less likely to mention access to finance
as a constraint to firm growth, while for all other countries this figure is stable at
around 1.5 percent. 2) At the same time, Italian firms led by an over-65 CEOs are
4 percent more likely to claim that lacking management is a constraint to growth,
with this figure always significant at least at the 10 percent, and with significance
increasing with finer specification; for all other countries this figure is stable at around
1.5 percent, and insignificant but for one specification (column 3). This suggest that,
in the Italian case, some of the old-CEOs may be in place at cost, a cost that is
justified by better access to funding for the firm they lead. Clearly, this is a qualitative
answer, and the degree of detail is scarce. I thus work to find out whether the access
to finance, and particularly to credit, peculiarity in Italy stands to finer test.
For a subset of the EFIGE dataset, Bruegel provides information on the age of
the relationship between each firm f and its main bank, and on whether the firm was
recently denied a credit application. I use this information to present the second piece
of evidence, estimating
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Yfc = α + β CEO Older than 65fc + ΓXfc + εfc (3.3)
where Yfc will be first a the age of the main credit relationship of firm f in years;
then a dummy equal to 1 if firm f sees a credit application denied; while the other
variables have been described before.
First, in Table 3.4 we can see that there is an overall strong and positive relationship
between the old age of the CEO and the age of her firm’s main credit relationship.
As expected, though, upon the inclusion of controls for firm heterogeneity we can
see that in Italy such effect is larger. In particular, it is about 25 percent larger (2.4
years more for over-65 CEOs against 3 years more for over-65 CEOs) if controlling for
ownership structure, firm export activity and firm age, and about 60 percent larger
(1.7 against 2.7) upon controlling (and restricting the estimation) for firms’ balance
sheet characteristics.
Second, in Table 3.5 we can see that only in Italy we can observe a negative
relationship between the presence of an old CEO and the likelihood of the denial of a
credit application. Even if the sample in this case is fairly small (700 observations for
Italy, and 1,800 for the other countries), such correlation’s significance increases with
finer specifications, economic significance is strong (between 7 and 10 percent less
likely to record an application denial). At the same time, the sign of the correlation
for the other countries is reversed, settling on a noisy 5 percent greater likelihood
of application denial for older CEOs’ firms. To ensure that such observation is not
explained by starkly different patterns in the use of funds, I use the same specification
as in Equation 3.3 to show (Table 3.6) that there is no significant correlation between
having an over-65 CEO and the likelihood of using external resources for specific
projects.81
3.3 Theory
In Section 3.2 I show that older managers in Italy have easier access to credit even
after controlling for firm type and performance. It is thus reasonable to ask under
81I only use three of the five resource use dummies provided. I focus on dummies recording
resource use to a) increase scale of production, b) fund working capital, c) optimize the financing mix.
I do so as almost no firm in the dataset answers that it used external finances to fund acquisitions.
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which conditions this may imply a waste. Also, if a waste is implied, is there any
space for policy intervention (i.e., can we talk of inefficiency in a meaningful way?),
for example in the form of a subsidy to the new entrepreneurs/managers? In order to
answer this question, I present a simple, static general equilibrium model, in which
some agents face a higher cost for accessing funding. In this setting, I stack the cards
in favor of the “intervention” scenario, and I show that, even if we assume that young
people are all endowed with better human capital than old people, a case for subsidies
requires further frictions to be added.
Environment
Consider a static economy where two mass-one continuums of agents - young and old,
but these are just labels in my setting - coexist. All of them are risk neutral. In this
economy, firms operate a technology that has decreasing returns in labor, and constant
returns in managerial quality. Each firm is going to produce output y in quantity:
y = hMnα (3.4)
where n is labor, hM is managerial quality - with superscript M ∈ {O, Y } tracking
whether firm’s manager is old or young -, and α is the span of control parameter,
assumed to be smaller or equal than 0.5.82
Output is produced at the end of the single period, but wages must be payed at
the beginning of the period. The agents have no individual wealth before production
is realized, and there is a risk neutral, deep pocketed investor, with an outside option
paying 1 $ for each $ dollar invested. The economy is non-stochastic, and there is no
way to default on the borrowing; though, the marginal cost of lending to old people is
0,83 while the marginal cost of lending to the young people is γ. This is a reduced
form shortcut to represent the relatively smaller cost of dealing with well-known
counterparts, and matches the evidence I provided.84 I will focus on the case in which
82This assumption is necessary in such setting to have people willingly pursuing a manager career
in equilibrium.
83On top and above the 1 $ opportunity cost.
84For more empirical evidence of how old owners and managers come with established relationships,
which grant considerable advantages in accessing credit, I refer to Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons
(2012), Haselmann, Schoenherr, and Vig (2018), Karolyi (2018).
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the young agents are more skilled than the old agents, as it is the one relevant to think
of a potential intervention.85 Which is, I will assume that the young generation’s
ability is higher than old generation’s ability: hO = 1, hY = x, s.t. x > 1.
There are thus two market clearing conditions for this economy, one for the good,
and one for the labor market. Expressing all quantities in per manager terms, we
have:
cM +RMncW = (n)α hM
n = 1
(3.5)
where the W apex indicates the worker, and R is the gross interest rate required by
the bank to pay the stipends in advance, which will equal 1 if M = O, and 1 + γ if
M = Y .
Manager problem
Then, each manager must solve the following constrained maximization:
Max
n







where n is the amount of workers per manager the firm employs, and w is the
equilibrium wage. The solution of the manager’s problem allows us to write the profit












As, for simplicity, I assumed that all young have the same quality x > 1, while
the old have the same quality 1, only two possible firms’ allocations can emerge in
equilibrium. In one case, the young agents get to lead the firms, the firms will have to
pay the relationships setup costs with the bank and RM = 1 + γ. In this case, the
wages and profits implied by the market clearing conditions in 3.5, and the first order
condition in 3.6, are
85Moreover, Daveri and Maliranta (2007) and Daveri and Parisi (2015) bring evidence that old





, π (x, 1 + γ, w) = (1− α)x (3.8)
while, in the other case, RM = 1, wages and profits are
w = α, π (1, w) = (1− α) (3.9)
In order to understand which of these two outcomes are going to emerge in a
decentralized equilibrium, I’m going to assume the existence of a market for control,
which I analyze in the next subsections.
Equilibrium in the market for control
Similarly to Caselli and Gennaioli (2005), I am going to assume that firms are associated
to licenses. I assume such licenses are initially with the old agents, and can be bought
for a price q. To begin with, I will also assume that the higher cost of dealing with
the external investor for the young is the only friction. The contracts between old
owner-managers and young aspiring owner-managers allow to transfer wealth between
the two with no waste. In such a context, the value function of a young agent buying
the firm from an old agent, and the one of an old agent selling, are







VOld (Selling) = w + q
(3.10)








VYoung (Not Buying) = w
(3.11)
it follows that (details and algebra are shown in the Appendix).
Proposition 1 There exists a unique competitive equilibrium which involves firms
being managed by young agents if x ≥ (1 + γ)α, and by old agents if x < (1 + γ)α.
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In order to find the allocation of control rights over firms implied by the equilibrium
of this market, it is not necessary to know the exact price of the firms in equilibrium,
only the willingness (or not) of the old agents to sell the licenses. This willingness is
going to be pinned down by the value functions of old and young in the equilibrium
with trade and the equilibrium without trade of licenses, and the deviation available
to each young and old in each equilibrium.
Consider the equilibrium without trade, whose wage and profits are given in 3.9,
and the deviations thereof.86 The payoffs of such deviations can be easily obtained by
inputing equilibrium wages in 3.7







VOld (Deviation | No-Trade) = α + q
(3.12)
from these, I can derive an upper bound for the price of the firm under no trade, −q -
the most the young would pay for the firm in the no-trade equilibrium - and a lower
bound q
−
- the least the old would accept in the no-trade equilibrium.
−









= πOld (Keeping| No-Trade)− w = (1− α)− α
(3.13)
and the equilibrium without trade will exist as long as −q < q
−
, i.e.
x < (1 + γ)α (3.14)
Conversely, starting from the standpoint of an equilibrium with trade, we have
that the wage and profits are given in 3.8. Deviation in such case would involve an
old agent who is not willing to sell the firm, and a young agent not willing to buy.
The payoffs of such deviations are
86Deviations involve old agents still willing to sell the firm, and young agents still willing to buy.
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VYoung (Deviation | Trade) =
αx
1 + γ








in this case, existence requires a non-empty range of prices between the most the
young would pay under the trade equilibrium, −q, and the least the old would accept
in the trade equilibrium, q
−
, such that the firm can actually be traded on path. As
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non-emptiness of the price range, i.e −q ≥ q
−
is equivalent to the complement of 3.14
x ≥ (1 + γ)α (3.17)
which proves that a unique threshold determines the unique equilibrium in the control
market. In allocating control, young and old agents in this economy will trade-off the
higher “quality” of the young, unconnected agents against the cost of setting up their
relationships with the investor.
Efficiency of the allocation in the market for control
This framework presents complementarities in the action of trading the firm. If the
equilibrium entails trade, trade increases the wages, and makes old agents more willing
to sell the firm. I will show that there is a region in the parameter space in which
promotion would increase the overall economy resources, but the increase in wage
upon trade is not enough to make each single old agent willing to trade the firm. In
these situations, I will speak about waste. Though, such waste does not imply an
inefficiency, since, as long as the market for control is perfect, a planner could not do
better while respecting the same constraints as the agents.
In the following, I will first show the formal result, and I will further comment on
the economics of it before presenting the planner problem.
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Proposition 2 There exist x̄: for all x ∈ [x̄, (1 + γ)α] the allocation of control rights
over firms to the young entails a higher total welfare than the equilibrium allocation
without trade.
Consider the resource constraints under the two different equilibria
(Resource Constraint, RO) cY + cO = 1 if M = O
(Resource Constraint, RY ) cY + cO = x− γ αx
1 + γ
if M = Y
(3.18)
If the old are in control, managers’ quality is lower (hO = 1), but there is no
transaction cost to access resources necessary to pay wages; if the young are in control,
managers’ quality is higher (hY = x), but the credit friction bites (and I evaluate it at
the equilibrium wage: γ αx
1+γ
).
By comparing the total resources in RO and RY , it is easy to see that the condition
under which total resources are higher under RY is different from x ≥ (1 + γ)α.
x
1 + γ(1− α)
1 + γ
≥ 1 ⇔ x ≥ 1 + γ
1 + γ(1− α) (3.19)
in the following, I will refer to this threshold as the no-waste threshold.
As α ≤ 0.5 by assumption, the no-waste threshold is always below the (1 + γ)α
threshold determining the existence of the equilibrium with trade.87 This implies
that, for some x differences in the managerial ability of old and young, allocating
control to the young would increase available resources, but cannot be supported by
free exchange.
Even though this shows that the economy can be far from the unconstrained
optimum, it does not per se imply that there is meaningful space for policy. The waste
stems from the fact that the equilibrium wage in the labor market depends on the
allocation of control rights. If γ is small enough/x big enough to make the equilibrium
wage with promotion higher than the equilibrium wage without promotion, higher
wages implied by the equilibrium with promotion make this same equilibrium easier to
sustain. Indeed, higher wages both decrease profits, and increase the opportunity cost
of managing the firm. In this way, my model captures the idea that quicker growth,
pushed also by quicker adoption of new skill/practices/technology, implies that there
87The same statement is true as long as α ≤ 1. Detailed proof in the Appendix.
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are more “good jobs” than the very top jobs. This makes the leadership turnaround,
necessary to adopt the new skills, easier. As this acts through equilibrium prices, no
single agent internalizes it in a competitive market for control, so we may have no
promotion, even though promotion would actually increase the resources available to
the economy.
On the other hand, as the market for control is without friction, agents pursue
all the trades that are mutually gainful with respect to their available alternatives.
The waste cannot be undone with ex-post efficient taxes and transfers, but only with
ex-ante redistribution of the property rights.88
To see this formally, I state and prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium implied by the market for control is constrained
efficient: A planner who cannot undo 1) the resource constraints of the economy, 2)
the higher cost at which young owner-managers borrow for paying wages, and 3) the
participation constraints of the agents, cannot propose a better allocation to these
agents.
In order to prove this, I envision a utilitarian planner89 facing the following
constraints
88A government which could instead commit to tax and throw away resources if the inferior
equilibrium emerges could improve the situation. Though, such a government would need to commit
to a threat that would not be credible as long as it cares about people welfare both before and after
the equilibrium is realized.
89A planner who applies equal Pareto weights to the young and the old cohort.
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max
cY , cO, M∈{Y,O}
cY + cO
(Labor Resource Constraint) n = 1
(Resource Constraint) cY + cO = nα if M = O
(Resource Constraint) cY + cO = nαx− γ αx
1 + γ
nα−1n if M = Y
(Participation Constraint Y ) cY ≥ VY (Buying| M = O) = α
(Participation Constraint O) cO ≥ VO(Selling| M = O) = xnαdev(O)(1− α)




(Participation Constraint O) cO ≥ VO(Keeping| M = Y ) = nαdev(Y )(1− α)
(3.20)
in the following, I will refer to each constraint by the initial letterS, plus the letter
labeling whether the control is allocated to old or young agents. Hence, the resource
constraint if the old manage the firms will be RO, the participation constraint of the
young if the old lead the firm will be POY , and so on and so forth.
Here the first two constraints exactly mirror the ones faced by the market economy.
The labor and production markets must be cleared. In the third constraint, instead,
the planner faces a γ αx
1+γ
nα−1 loss per each agent allocated to firms managed by young
managers. I.e. a fraction of the marginal productivity of the workers is lost to the
financial friction. This mirrors the loss of the economy when the young agents must
interact with the bank. Finally, the fourth and fifth constraints imply that even though
the planner can redistribute consumption and property rights, it cannot propose a
plan entailing less consumption to each agent than they would achieve independently,
given their original property rights. This, assuming that they would otherwise hire





1−α for the deviation from the young






Consider an allocation giving to both young and old the bare minimum so that


















(1− α) ≤ x(1− α)⇔ x ≥ (1 + γ)α
(3.21)
as this condition is coincident with the equilibrium existence one in 3.17, the above
shows there is no way to improve on the market allocation respecting the partici-
pation constraints. I present graphical illustration of attainable and unattainable
unconstrained optimum through Pareto-frontier plot in Figure 3.7 and 3.8.
The enforcement friction in the market for control
I will then consider the case in which also the exchange of control rights between old
and young agents is frictional. In this case, the friction in the market, affecting wages,
creates a discrepancy in how the young and the old value the effect of one more dollar
of wages when trading the firm, and opens the door to inefficiency and intervention.
I will assume that the transaction between young and old agents involves an
iceberg cost φ ∈ [0, 1], such that, if the young pays the price q, the old will only receive
q(1− φ).90 The value function of a young agent buying the firm from an old agent,
and the one of an old agent selling will be modified as follows







VOld (Selling) = w + q(1− φ)
(3.22)
while, if the young does not buy and the old does not sell, individual value functions
are the same as in 3.11. In this case, the iceberg cost creates the possibility of multiple
equilibria.
Proposition 4 Equilibrium existence depends on the relative magnitudes of γ, φ, α
and x, through the thresholds
90 There are multiple ways to justify this φ term. From steep notary fees in case an actual
transaction is involved, to the risk of not being conferred the agreed upon stream of utility if we
would interpret this transaction as the promotion of a young manager, conditional on the old manager
serving on the firm board/being compensated with some perks for stepping down.
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(A) x ≥ (1 + γ)α
[
(1− α)
(1− α)(1− φ) + φα
1+γ
]1−α
(B) x < (1 + γ)α
[
1− α(1 + φ)
(1− α)(1− φ)
]1−α (3.23)
Whenever both (A) and (B) are violated, there exists no equilibrium in pure
strategies; when (A) is verified, but (B) is not, then there exists a unique equilibrium
in pure strategies, with young agents managing the firms; when (A) is not verified,
but (B) is, then there exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, with old agents
managing the firms; finally, if both (A) and (B) are verified, multiple equilibria in
pure strategies exist.
Again, to pin down the equilibrium allocation of control rights, we need to determine
the upper and lower bound for the price at which control of the firm is traded, q.
Consider the equilibrium without trade; in such equilibrium the wage and profits
are given in 3.9. Each agent is also allowed to deviate. For example, an old agent
may still be willing to sell the firm, and a young agent to buy. The payoffs of such
deviations are







VOld (Deviation | No-Trade) = α + q(1− φ)
(3.24)
from these I can derive an upper bound for the q price of deviation, −q, the most the
young would pay for the firm, and a lower bound q
−
, the least the old would accept.
−

















and the equilibrium without trade will exist as long as −q < q
−
, which yields condition
(B).
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Conversely, starting from the standpoint of an equilibrium with trade, we have
that the wage and profits are given in 3.8. Deviation in such case would involve an
old agent who is not willing to sell the firm, and a young agent not willing to buy.
The payoffs of such deviations are
VYoung (Deviation | Trade) =
αx
1 + γ








in this case, existence requires a non-empty range of prices between the most the
young would pay, −q, and the least the old would accept, q
−
, such that the firm can
actually be traded on path. As
−



















non-emptiness of the price range, i.e. −q ≥ q
−
will now yield condition (A). As it is
possible (see Figure 3.9) that both (A) and (B) hold at the same time, we can see
that allowing for the friction to affect also the control market, we open the door to a
multiplicity of equilibria.
Efficiency and the friction in the market for control
As previously mentioned, an increase in wage entails two effects both for the old and
for the young: decreases firm value, and rises the opportunity cost of managing the
firm. Though, for the old agent, and only for her, there is a third effect now. All else
equal, a higher wage implies that a smaller portion of her total income is subject to
the transaction cost. Hence, a rise in wages decreases the value of retaining the firm
for the old agent more than it decreases the value of acquiring it for the young one.
The result of this mismatch is that now multiple allocations in the market for
control can be consistent with the participation constraints of the agents. This implies
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that welfare improving policies are possible even if the planner must respect such
constraints, as she can play a role ruling out the Pareto-inferior equilibrium with a
proper taxes and transfer scheme.
The first pre-requisite for this to be possible is that the no-waste threshold does
not coincide with either (A) or (B), and that it can be located in the space between
(A) and (B) when both (A) and (B) are respected. In this case there will be two
equilibria, both possible, one superior and one inferior in terms of total resources and
welfare.
Proposition 5 The no-waste threshold does not coincide with (A) and (B), and can
be included within (A) and (B).
Consider the resource constraints under the two different equilibria. Now there is
an additional loss component, the φ friction. This loss is the larger, the higher the
price at which a firm trades; in order to prove my result for all the possible prices, it
is then enough to consider the case of the higher possible q in the equilibrium with
trade, i.e. q̄ = (1− α)x+ αx
1+γ
in condition 3.27.
(Resource Constraint, RO) cY + cO = 1 if M = O
(Resource Constraint, RY ′) cY + cO = x− γ αx
1 + γ
− φq̄ if M = Y
(3.28)
The no-waste threshold, resulting from the comparison of the unchanged RO with
the modified RY ′, is thus changed
(C) x ≥ 1 + γ
(1− φ)(1− α)(1 + γ) + α(1 + φ) (3.29)
and it is again possible to prove that, for α < 0.5, x can respect both (A) and (C). If
it is also true that (B) is respected, then the possibility of an inefficient equilibrium
without promotion is verified. I verify the possibility of this case within the model
graphically, and display it in Figure 3.10.
In this case, it is then possible for the planner to improve on the market allocation.
Proposition 6 The equilibrium implied by the frictional market for control can be
inefficient: A planner who cannot undo 1) the resource constraints of the economy, 2)
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the higher cost at which young owner-managers borrow for paying wages, and 3) the
participation constraints of the agents, can improve on the market allocation.
max
cY , cO, M∈{Y,O}
cY + cO
(LRC) n = 1
(RO) cY + cO = nα if M = O
(RY ) cY + cO = nαx− (γ−φ) αx
1 + γ
nα−1n− φxnα(1− α) if M = Y




(PCOY ) cO ≥ VO(Keeping| M = Y ) = nαdev(Y )(1− α)
(PCY O) cY ≥ VY (Buying| M = O) = α
(PCOO) cO ≥ VO(Selling| M = O) = αφnα−1 + (1− φ)xnαdev(O)(1− α)
(3.30)
where I use the same labelling for the constraints as in 3.20.
With respect to the planner problem in 3.20, the most important difference
regards the RY constraint. There, I add the loss component due to trading the firm
(φxnα(1−α)). This new loss term interacts with the wage, as captured by the (γ − φ)
term multiplying the loss due to interacting with the bank. In this setting, increasing
the wage decreases the value of the firm, and thus the φ loss.91 As this interaction
happens through the price of labor, the planner can internalize it, and can propose a
better allocation to an economy stuck in an inferior equilibrium. An example of this
can be visualized in Figure 3.11, where both the equilibria with trade and no trade
are possible, and the planner can pick the superior one.
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper I analyze aggregate and firm level data on the major European economies,
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. I show two stylized fact
91The shift in the participation constraint of the old under M = O is not particularly relevant for
my results.
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from Eurostat and World Bank’s aggregate data. First, the age distribution of Italian
managers has a fatter right tail than the one of its peers; such discrepancy is not
matched by comparable discrepancy in the age profile of the population, in the entry
and exit rate of firms, and in the age profile of the working population. Second, Italy
is by far the worst performing country in terms of quality of enforcement; this both
under the perspective of the expected time to solve a commercial dispute, and the cost
of insolvency in terms of destroyed estate value. I cannot directly show that the second
fact cause the first. Building on previous literature showing that weak enforcement
makes credit more difficult to obtain, I use Bruegel’s EFIGE manufacturer dataset to
show that only in Italy a trade-off between the age of CEOs and access to financial
resource appears to be at play, as we would expect if the weak enforcement caused
an increase in the value of connections and reputation built over time. Motivated by
this evidence, I analyze such trade-off through a static general equilibrium model of a
market for the control of firms. I use the model to derive policy conclusions. I show
that the difficulty to access financing is not enough to justify subsidies to new-comers
even if we assume that they are endowed with better human capital. What is necessary
to argue for such policy, is the assumption that the contracting friction directly affects
the market for control.
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3.A Appendix
Further proofs and algebra
1. −q (No-Trade) < q
−
(No-Trade) implies x < (1 + γ)α

















x < (1 + γ)α
(3.31)
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2. −q (Trade) ≥ q
−
(Trade) implies x > (1 + γ)α




















x ≥ (1 + γ)α
(3.32)
3. The no-waste threshold (inequality (3.19)) is weakly below the thresh-
old for the equilibrium allocation of firms to the young (inequality (3.17))
for all (weakly) decreasing return to scale technologies
First, we can see that both thresholds are increasing in γ. Second, we can notice
that both thresholds are also increasing in α. Third, we can easily check that the
thresholds coincide for α = 0 and α = 1
(1 + γ)α = 1 =
1 + γ
1 + γ(1− α)
for α = 0
(1 + γ)α = 1 + γ =
1 + γ
1 + γ(1− α)
for α = 1
(3.33)
then, by monotonicity, if we prove that for a certain α threshold (3.19) is below
threshold (3.17), we know that the same statement holds true for all γ and for all
α ∈ (0, 1). Indeed, pick α = 0.5, we can see that
(1 + γ)0.5 > 0.5 ∀ γ > 0 (3.34)
which concludes the argument.
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4. −q (No-Trade) < q
−

































≥ 1− α(1 + φ)
(1− α)(1− φ)
x ≥ (1 + γ)α
[




5. −q (Trade) ≥ q
−






By plugging expressions in 3.27, I obtain:
x




























≥ (1 + γ)(1− α)
(1− α)(1 + γ)(1− φ) + αφ
x > (1 + γ)α
[
(1− α)






Table 3.1: Descriptives: EFIGE dataset
Mean S.D. p10 p50 p90 N
CEO Older than 65 0.123 0.328 0 0 1 13,771
Italy 0.307 0.461 0 0 1 13,771
France 0.143 0.350 0 0 1 13,771
United Kingdom 0.120 0.325 0 0 1 13,771
Spain 0.157 0.364 0 0 1 13,771
Old Firm 0.357 0.479 0 0 1 13,771
CEO related to Owners 0.668 0.471 0 1 1 13,771
Active Abroad 0.739 0.439 0 1 1 13,771
Owned by Foreigners 0.062 0.241 0 0 0 13,771
Employees 50.495 87.332 12 24 103 8,762
Total Assets 10.845 120.984 0.557 2.418 13.400 12,554
EBITDA 1.444 17.594 0.030 0.281 1.873 9,846
Liquidity 1.544 3.059 0.470 0.990 2.580 11,699
Age Main Bank Rel. 16.739 14.286 4 13 32 6,343
Denied Credit 0.228 0.420 0 0 1 2,585
Increase Scale 0.242 0.428 0 0 1 2,663
Out-Sector Participation 0.013 0.114 0 0 0 2,663
In-Sector Participation 0.006 0.074 0 0 0 2,663
Working Capital 0.535 0.499 0 1 1 2,663
Financing Mix 0.070 0.254 0 0 0 2,663
Managerial Constraint 0.116 0.320 0 0 1 11,456
Financial Constraint 0.325 0.468 0 0 1 11,456
This Table presents descriptive statistics for the EFIGE sample, with assets and EBITDA measured in
millions of Euro.
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Table 3.2: Correlation between CEO’s old age and Italy
Dependent variable:
CEO Older than 65
Italy 0.126∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(13.21) (12.45) (13.00) (7.98)
France -0.047∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.016
(-6.75) (-6.27) (-3.73) (-1.03)
United Kingdom 0.031∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.038∗
(3.32) (2.57) (4.59) (1.95)
Spain -0.023∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.007
(-3.05) (-3.15) (-0.84) (-0.45)
Old Firm 0.061∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(8.47) (6.95)
CEO related to Owners 0.041∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(6.30) (4.22)
Active Abroad 0.023∗∗∗ 0.007
(3.19) (0.58)










Germany (constant) 0.0910∗∗∗ 0.0909∗∗∗ 0.0183∗∗∗ 0.00970
(16.20) (15.22) (2.01) (0.51)
Industry FE X X X
Region FE X X X
Size Class FE X X X
R2 0.040 0.044 0.059 0.072
Observations 13,771 13,771 13,771 7,996
This Table presents the results of the estimation of the following regression: CEO Older than 65fc = α +
βCountry Dummiesc + ΓXfc + εfc, where CEO Older than 65fc is a dummy taking value 1 if firm f , located
in country c, is led by an over-65 CEO; α is a common intercept, coinciding with the excluded country dummy,
Germany; Country Dummiesfc, dummies equal 1 if firm f is located in country c 6= Germany. Xfc is a matrix of
covariates. It includes, at its largest, a dummy equal to 1 if the firm birth is before 1976; a dummy equal to 1 if
the CEO is related to the owners; a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is an active exporter; a dummy equal to 1 if the
firm is owned by foreigners; the number of firm employees; total assets in millions of Euro; EBITDA; liquidity,
calculated as fixed assets minus stocks, divided by current liabilities; region, industry, employee size-class fixed
effects; εfc is the heteroscedasticity robust standard error.
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Table 3.3: Correlation between CEO’s old age and constraints to firm growth
Dependent variable:
CEO Older than 65 Else
Italy Else Italy Else Italy Else Italy
Managerial Constraint 0.041∗ 0.019∗ 0.044∗ 0.015 0.046∗∗ 0.010 0.048∗∗-0.002 
(-0.17) (1.78) (1.73) (1.89) (1.40) (2.01) (0.74) (1.98)
Financial Constraint -0.044∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.041∗∗ -0.017∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗-0.022∗∗∗ 
(-3.26) (-2.69) (-2.20) (-2.50) (-2.43) (-2.71)
-0.016 
(-1.56)






CEO related to Owners 0.051∗∗∗ 0.027 0.077∗∗∗ 0.016
(7.47) (1.58) (6.87) (0.89)
Active Abroad 0.029∗∗∗ 0.017 0.003 0.007
(3.66) (0.90) (0.22) (0.34)
Owned by Foreigners -0.040∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.233∗∗∗
(-4.12) (-9.86) (-3.68) (-9.35)
Employees 0.00003 0.0003
(0.50) (1.46)









X X X X X X
X X X X X X
0.001 0.003 0.016 0.018 0.031 0.044 0.054 0.055
State-Sector FE 
Industry FE Region 
FE Size Class FE R2 
Observations
8,436 3,020 8,435 3,020 8,435 3,020 3,223 2,685
This Table presents the results of the estimation of the following regression: CEO Older than 65fc = α + βManagerial Constraintfc +
ωFinancial Constraintfc + ΓXfc + εfc, where CEO Older than 65fc is a dummy taking value 1 if firm f , located in country c, is led by an over-65 CEO; α is a common intercept, coinciding 
with the excluded country dummy, Germany; Managerial Constraintfc is a dummy equal to one if, in the answer to the survey, firm’s f respondent claimed that lacking managerial resources 
constrain the growth of the firm; Financial Constraintfc is an equivalent dummy, if financial resources are mentioned as a constraint growth. Xfc is a matrix of covariates. It includes, at its 
largest, a dummy equal to 1 if the firm birth is before 1976; a dummy equal to 1 if the CEO is related to the owners; a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is an active exporter; a dummy equal to 1 if the 
firm is owned by foreigners; the number of firm employees; total assets in millions of Euro; EBITDA; liquidity, calculated as fixed assets minus stocks, divided by current liabilities; region, 
industry, employee size-class, and country*industry fixed effects; εfc is the heteroscedasticity robust standard error.
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Table 3.4: Correlation between CEO’s age of main banking relationship
Age Main Bank Rel.
Else Italy Else Italy Else Italy Else Italy
CEO Older than 65 4.541∗∗∗ 4.487∗∗∗ 4.406∗∗∗ 4.311∗∗∗ 2.441∗∗ 2.989∗∗∗ 1.754∗ 2.683∗∗∗
(3.54) (5.49) (3.77) (5.32) (2.27) (3.78) (1.67) (3.19)
Old Firm 12.043∗∗∗ 8.117∗∗∗ 8.839∗∗∗ 8.620∗∗∗
(19.72) (11.12) (13.05) (11.18)
CEO related to Owners 2.373∗∗∗ 1.652∗∗∗ 1.718∗∗∗ 1.629∗∗∗
(4.76) (2.90) (3.18) (2.65)
Active Abroad -0.689 0.951 -0.997∗ 1.196∗
(-1.17) (1.48) (-1.70) (1.69)
Owned by Foreigners -4.015∗∗∗ -1.705 -3.823∗∗∗ -2.327
(-3.98) (-0.79) (-3.02) (-0.99)
Employees -0.001 -0.013∗
(-0.17) (-1.68)






State-Sector FE X X X
Industry FE X X X
Region FE X X X X X X
Size Class FE X X X X X X
R2 0.006 0.021 0.101 0.045 0.235 0.141 0.175 0.154
Observations 4,483 1,860 4,482 1,860 4,482 1,860 2,680 1,657
This Table presents the results of the estimation of the following regression: Age Main Bank Rel.fc = α+ βCEO Older than 65fc + ΓXfc + εfc, where
Age Main Bank Rel.fc is the age in year of the main credit relationship of firm f located in country c, CEO Older than 65fc is a dummy taking value
1 if the firm is led by an over-65 CEO; α is a common intercept, coinciding with the excluded country dummy, Germany; Managerial Constraintfc is
a dummy equal to one if, in the answer to the survey, firm’s f respondent claimed that lacking managerial resources constrain the growth of the firm;
Financial Constraintfc is an equivalent dummy, if financial resources are mentioned as a constraint growth. Xfc is a matrix of covariates. It includes, at
its largest, a dummy equal to 1 if the firm birth is before 1976; a dummy equal to 1 if the CEO is related to the owners; a dummy equal to 1 if the firm
is an active exporter; a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is owned by foreigners; the number of firm employees; total assets in millions of Euro; EBITDA;
liquidity, calculated as fixed assets minus stocks, divided by current liabilities; region, industry, employee size-class, and country*industry fixed effects;
εfc is the heteroscedasticity robust standard error.
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Table 3.5: Correlation between CEO’s and being denied a loan application
Denied Credit
Else Italy Else Italy Else Italy Else Italy
CEO Older than 65 0.006 -0.070∗ 0.058 -0.079∗ 0.056 -0.073∗ 0.053 -0.100∗∗
(0.16) (-1.65) (1.63) (-1.84) (1.53) (-1.70) (0.93) (-2.24)
Old Firm 0.004 -0.015 0.022 -0.007
(0.21) (-0.37) (0.72) (-0.17)
CEO related to Owners 0.007 -0.079∗∗ -0.009 -0.082∗
(0.31) (-1.97) (-0.30) (-1.95)
Active Abroad 0.028 -0.023 0.035 -0.041
(1.18) (-0.52) (0.87) (-0.86)
Owned by Foreigners 0.035 0.097 0.034 0.037
(0.82) (0.63) (0.70) (0.23)
Employees 0.000 0.000
(1.04) (0.72)






State-Sector FE X X X
Industry FE X X X
Region FE X X X X X X
Size Class FE X X X X X X
R2 ∼0.000 0.003 0.115 0.032 0.117 0.040 0.121 0.060
Observations 1,842 743 1,841 742 1,841 742 1,060 650
This Table presents the results of the estimation of the following regression: Denied Creditfc = α+βCEO Older than 65fc+ΓXfc+εfc, where Deniedfc
is a dummy equal to 1 if firm f located in country c has been recently denied a credit application; CEO Older than 65fc is a dummy taking value 1
if the firm is led by an over-65 CEO; α is a common intercept, coinciding with the excluded country dummy, Germany; Managerial Constraintfc is a
dummy equal to one if, in the answer to the survey, firm’s f respondent claimed that lacking managerial resources constrain the growth of the firm;
Financial Constraintfc is an equivalent dummy, if financial resources are mentioned as a constraint growth. Xfc is a matrix of covariates. It includes, at
its largest, a dummy equal to 1 if the firm birth is before 1976; a dummy equal to 1 if the CEO is related to the owners; a dummy equal to 1 if the firm
is an active exporter; a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is owned by foreigners; the number of firm employees; total assets in millions of Euro; EBITDA;
liquidity, calculated as fixed assets minus stocks, divided by current liabilities; region, industry, employee size-class, and country*industry fixed effects;
εfc is the heteroscedasticity robust standard error.
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Table 3.6: Correlation between CEO’s and use of external financing
Increase Scale
Else Italy Else Italy Else Italy Else Italy
CEO Older than 65 -0.072∗ -0.011 -0.047 -0.024 -0.049 -0.029 -0.029 -0.031
(-1.90) (-0.30) (-1.28) (-0.62) (-1.32) (-0.73) (-0.53) (-0.74)
R2 0.002 ∼0.000 0.093 0.032 0.096 0.034 0.137 0.051
Observations 1,912 751 1,911 750 1,911 750 1,192 671
Working Capital
CEO Older than 65 0.063 0.026 0.105∗∗ 0.029 0.112∗∗ 0.036 0.100∗ 0.041
(1.26) (0.58) (2.12) (0.63) (2.26) (0.76) (1.69) (0.83)
R2 0.001 ∼ 0.000 0.147 0.046 0.155 0.050 0.171 0.074
Observations 1,912 751 1,911 750 1,911 750 1,192 671
Financing Mix
CEO Older than 65 -0.021 -0.004 -0.027 0.000 -0.029∗ 0.001 -0.019 0.010
(-1.36) (-0.15) (-1.60) (0.00) (-1.68) (0.05) (-1.61) (0.32)
R2 0.001 ∼ 0.000 0.031 0.035 0.034 0.037 0.040 0.048
Observations 1,912 751 1,911 750 1,911 750 1,192 671
State-Sector FE X X X
Industry FE X X X
Region FE X X X X X X
Size Class FE X X X X X X
Survey Controls X X X X
Balance Sheet Controls X X X X
This Table presents the results of the estimation of the following regressions: Funding Usefc = α + βCEO Older than 65fc + ΓXfc + εfc, where
Funding Usefc is a dummy equal to 1 if firm f located in country c used external resources for specific purposes; these purposes can be increasing the
scale of the business, financing working capital, or optimizing the funding mix; CEO Older than 65fc is a dummy taking value 1 if the firm is led by an
over-65 CEO; α is a common intercept, coinciding with the excluded country dummy, Germany; Managerial Constraintfc is a dummy equal to one if, in
the answer to the survey, firm’s f respondent claimed that lacking managerial resources constrain the growth of the firm; Financial Constraintfc is an
equivalent dummy, if financial resources are mentioned as a constraint growth. Xfc is a matrix of covariates. It includes, at its largest, a dummy equal to
1 if the firm birth is before 1976; a dummy equal to 1 if the CEO is related to the owners; a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is an active exporter; a dummy
equal to 1 if the firm is owned by foreigners; the number of firm employees; total assets in millions of Euro; EBITDA; liquidity, calculated as fixed assets




Figure 3.1: Managers age distribution, Eurostat
Note: The figure plots the age distribution of managers from the second quarter of 2017, using
Eurostat country level data and European Union aggregate data. Figures report fraction of total
managers population. Employees are classified as “managers” coherently with the International
Standard Classification of Occupations from the International Labour Office.
152
Figure 3.2: Population age distribution
Note: The figure plots the age distribution of managers for the 2017, using Eurostat country level
data. Figures report fraction of total population above 25 years old. The population is defined as all
the people who reside legally in the country of interest.
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Figure 3.3: Firm entry, Eurostat
Note: The figure compares firm entry rate over time across major European countries. The rate is
defined as number of firm births within the year over total firms at the beginning of the year.
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Figure 3.4: Firm deaths, Eurostat
Note: The figure compares firm exit rate over time across major European countries. The rate is
defined as number of firm deaths within the year over total firms at the beginning of the year.
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Figure 3.5: Expected time to enforce contract
Note: The figure plots the expected time to enforce a contract in a court, comparing countries and the
European Union average. Data are from the World Bank Doing Business Survey. Quoting the World
Bank online description, the measure of the expected time is the “number of calendar days from the
filing of the lawsuit in court until the final determination and, in appropriate cases, payment".
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Figure 3.6: Managers age distribution, EFIGE
Note: The figure plots the age distribution of CEOs (including entrepreneurs) from EFIGE dataset.
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Figure 3.7: Attainable first best
Note: The figure shows an example in which the first best is attainable to both the planner and
the market in the case with only the financing friction. The red line plots the Pareto frontier if
control rights are allocated to the young agents; the blue line plots the Pareto frontier if control rights
are allocated to the old agents; the shaded red area represents the allocations that are compatible
with the agents’ participation constraints if control rights are allocated to young agents; the shaded
blue area represents the allocations that are compatible with the agents’ participation constraints if
control rights are allocated to old agents.
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Figure 3.8: Unattainable first best
Note: The figure shows an example in which the first best is not attainable to both the planner
and the market in the case with only the financing friction. The red line plots the Pareto frontier if
control rights are allocated to the young agents; the blue line plots the Pareto frontier if control rights
are allocated to the old agents; the shaded red area represents the allocations that are compatible
with the agents’ participation constraints if control rights are allocated to young agents; the shaded
blue area represents the allocations that are compatible with the agents’ participation constraints if
control rights are allocated to old agents.
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Figure 3.9: Possibility of multiple equilibria
Note: The figure shows how, under some parametrization of the model, the market for control can
allow for multiple equilibria. All combinations of the x and γ parameter above the pink line are such
that the equilibrium with trade of the firm exists; all combinations of the x and γ parameter below
the red line are such that the equilibrium without trade of the firm exists.
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Figure 3.10: Multiple equilibria, example where trade is Pareto-dominant
Note: The figure shows an instance of how the existence of multiple equilibria implies Pareto-
superiority of the equilibrium with trade. All combinations of the x and γ parameter above the
pink line are such that the equilibrium with trade of the firm exists; all combinations of the x and
γ parameter below the red line are such that the equilibrium without trade of the firm exists; all
combinations of the x and γ parameter above the blue line are such that the equilibrium with trade
of the firm is superior in terms of resources available than the equilibrium without trade of the firm.
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Figure 3.11: Multiplicity and space for policy
Note: The figure shows an example in which the first best is attainable, may not be picked by
the market, but can be achieved by the planner within the constraints of the economy. The red
line plots the Pareto frontier if control rights are allocated to the young agents; the blue line plots
the Pareto frontier if control rights are allocated to the old agents; the shaded red area represents
the allocations that are compatible with the agents’ participation constraints if control rights are
allocated to young agents; the shaded blue area represents the allocations that are compatible with
the agents’ participation constraints if control rights are allocated to old agents.
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